Captivity: The Extreme Circumstance

NAVEDTRA 14316

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PREFACE

About this course:

This is a self-study course. By studying this course, you can improve your professional/military knowledge. Remember, however, this self-study course is only one part of the total Navy training program. Practical experience, schools, selected reading, and your desire to succeed are also necessary to successfully round out a fully meaningful training program.

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CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

Wars have been fought for many reasons ranging from religious, territorial, and economic reasons, to colonial expansion and sometime even ideologies. In ancient times prisoners were seldom taken and victory often meant that the victor would totally destroy or enslave the defeated party. One historian refers to prisoners, hostages, and captives during this time as merely a “footnote” to the military experience.

As long as nations engage in wars, or think they can promote their cause through terrorists’ activities, the taking of military prisoners or civilian hostages’ remains a fact of international political life. Despite efforts to codify and “humanize” prisoner of war/hostage conditions, the cultural unknowns of an imprisoning power cannot be estimated or predetermined. It is difficult to predict the humanitarian instincts of one’s captors. As a result, the ability of prisoners/hostages to survive is always questionable.

Military members, from the beginning of their enlistment, receive a clear message; knowledge is the key to success in the command environment. The implied message is that if you work hard, take advantage of every opportunity to advance in rate/rank, and follow the chain of command, the institution will reward you. Military people live in and by a very structured protocol of behavior. Regulations and instructions guide tasks to completion.

Uniform insignia indicate job description, status, and level of experience. But what happens when the trappings of this sub-culture are removed? Specifically, what happens to people who have relied heavily on their military or civilian status for self-validation and sense of self worth? When all these external trappings are stripped away, prisoners have only their personal values to hold on to as they face captivity. How they adhere to the Code of Conduct, their faith, and their value system depends on their personal integrity, strength of character, and belief in themselves and their country.

A lesson learned following the Korean conflict is that a person can be prepared through rigorous training to acquire “survival skills” that empower them to face captivity (or the possibility of captivity) more effectively. This nonresident training course highlights the nature of personal care under extreme circumstances. The overall objectives of this course are

- to help you gain knowledge of the history and policy pertaining to prisoners of war,
- to enable you to reflect upon how these lessons learned can help you, and
- to suggest avenues of support for POW/MIA’s and their families.

To assist you in meeting these objectives, discussion questions are included in each chapter. These questions are intended to direct your thinking to the primary teaching points and to act as initiators for a more in-depth discussion of the subject matter.

Since ancient times, wars and their consequences have been preserved in historical record. One of these consequences, readily available for review alongside causes, strategic planning, types of weapons, and lessons learned, is the taking of enemy prisoners. War, when viewed from the perspective of how human beings treat their enemy captives, takes on a profound dimension that increases in importance as fighting is prolonged. It may be argued that the considerable maintenance costs associated with providing enemy prisoners food, clothing, medical care, and shelter have often placed the imprisoning power, over a period of time, in the position of choosing between pursuit of its military objectives and ensuring the humane treatment of enemy prisoners. How nations have developed in theory, and observed in practice, restraints that apply to the conduct of war and the capture and treatment of prisoners, is the subject of “the law of war.”

THE BEGINNINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE

Learning Objective: Recognize the historical factors and circumstances contributing to the need for an international code concerning the taking of, concern for, and care of prisoners of war.

The ancient world exercised little restraint in its conduct of war, reserving what few mitigating features it recognized for wars between like peoples and civilizations. Conquered powers underwent torture, slavery, death, and confiscation of property. Little distinction was made between combatants and non-combatants. During the Middle Ages, barbarism, brutality, and mass killings continued to typify wars. This was true even of those wars, which were often religious in origin and nature. In the early Middle Ages, because few moral or legal inhibitions restricted fighting powers, total defeat meant total destruction.

Prompted, however, by religious ideals, ideas of chivalry, and the emerging rationalist and humanist sentiments of the Renaissance, nations began for the first time in the later Middle Ages to codify the conduct of hostilities. One early law, for example, specified that Christians taken prisoner by other Christians could no longer be enslaved. In 1550, Francisco de Vitoria, a Dominican priest and professor at the University of Salamanca, wrote that he considered it illegal to do more harm in war than was warranted by the objective. The procedure to follow in the treatment of prisoners, he maintained, should be to hold them for ransom, vice brutalizing them, or killing them, en masse. By 1625, with the publication of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, on the Law of War and Peace, a comprehensive international formulation of conduct between warring nations had appeared. The author, Hugo Grotius, espoused the ideal that wars should be fought for a just cause. In this, he foreshadowed the terms that marked the conclusion of the Thirty Years’ War. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) specified that prisoners would be released without ransom. Exchange and parole had become the new rule.

Between the years 1581 and 1864, at least 291 international agreements were concluded with the intent of providing maximum protection for human life during a state of war. By the eighteenth century, humane treatment of prisoners of war was an established ideal. Montesquieu, for example, held that prisoners should only be prevented from further active fighting. Rousseau reasoned that because war involved relations between states, the only individuals who were enemies were soldiers, not unarmed men (prisoners). In agreement with this view was de Vattel, who defined “Belligerents” as those who were able to fight for the aims of war. Prisoners, because they were unable to fight, were not included in this category, and therefore should neither be considered nor be treated as belligerents.

According to de Vattel prisoners could be confined but were not to be treated harshly unless guilty of some crime. It is interesting to note that clergy and men of letters were given special status provided they did not bear arms on the field of battle. If they did, then they were subject to same treatment as regular combatants.

Ideals, of course, contrasted markedly with actual practice. During the American Revolution, the colonies made an effort to apply the concepts expressed by the eighteenth century humanists to their treatment of enemy prisoners. In reality, treatment depended on the attitude toward the specific enemy group involved. For example, British prisoners were treated fairly well, according to the principles of humane treatment expressed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Hessian mercenaries, however, were normally held as indentured servants. Loyalists received the harshest treatment of all: most were convicted of treason and were condemned to death. American prisoners captured by the British were maintained in wretched living quarters; but then, so were most British soldiers and sailors captured by the Colonists.

Read, “Don’t Worry, Be Still: The Virtue of Nonchalance,” by John Garvey in Appendix I of this manual. The author looks at emotions and raises questions as to their role in stressful situations that test our ethical judgment.

As has been the case throughout history, the conditions of imprisonment during the American Revolution were dictated by the prevailing customs and culture of the imprisoning power, as well as by the captor’s hatred of the enemy — an emotion which frequently negated the capacity of the captor to apply Rousseau’s principle of distinction between soldier and prisoner.
In the early nineteenth century, during the years immediately following the Revolution, Daniel Webster echoed the humanitarian ideals expressed in an earlier age, when he declared that prisoners of war were to be considered unfortunate, not criminal. Nevertheless, prisoners taken during the Mexican War received harsh treatment.

During the Civil War, treatment varied widely, from grossly inhumane to compassionate, on either side of the conflict. In an effort to achieve uniform treatment of prisoners, President Lincoln tasked Professor Francis Lieber to prepare a set of rules that both sides could follow. On 24 April 1863, President Lincoln published as General Order 100, Professor Lieber’s “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” Following is a summary of selected articles:

**Article 49.** A prisoner of war is defined as a “public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active aid” who has been captured.

**Article 52.** Belligerents may not make the determination on their own to view prisoners of war as brigands or bandits vice professional military forces.

**Article 53.** Chaplains, medical staff officers, apothecaries, hospital nurses, and servants, are not prisoners of war, unless the commander has reasons to detain them. They are to be treated as prisoners of war only if they choose to remain with their captured companions and may be exchanged if commander sees fit.

**Article 56.** Prisoners of war are not subject to punishment for being a public enemy, nor may they be subjected to any excessively severe treatment.

**Article 74.** Prisoners of war are prisoners of the government, not of the captor.

**Article 75.** Prisoners of war are subject to confinement and imprisonment, but not to intentional suffering.

**Article 76.** Prisoners of war are to be well fed, treated with humanity, and may be required to work for the captor’s government.

**Article 78.** Prisoners of war who escape and are recaptured shall not be punished for escaping.

**Article 79.** Prisoners of war who are wounded shall receive medical treatment.

Despite what became known as the “Lieber Code,” the treatment of prisoners on both sides was anything but uniform. In general, treatment was better at the start of the war than in the middle and latter years. Neither the North nor the South was equipped to maintain prisoners. Accommodations, food, and clothing were all in inadequate supply, particularly in the South. Properly trained guards were also in short supply, which meant that abuse and excessively harsh treatment occurred in individual cases. The reality of prisoners was an unanticipated consequence of the war. Neither side wanted to appear inhumane, yet neither side was prepared to sacrifice its military objectives to ensure the appropriate care of prisoners.

In the same year as the publication of the Lieber Code, further efforts took place on an international scale to bring about a uniform code of prisoner treatment. These efforts culminated in the establishment of the International Red Cross. At the urging of Henri Dunant of Geneva, Switzerland, the first of the Geneva Conventions was held in 1864 for the purpose of determining projections for the wounded in war. In 1874 an international conference known as “The Project for an International Convention on the Laws and Customs of War” was held in Brussels.

The results of this conference, though not ratified with the force of law, were nevertheless published in the form of a manual in 1880, and contributed part of the foundation for subsequent international conferences on the law of war. Skeptical of its ideals, German Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, the great strategist who molded the Prussian army into a formidable war machine, expressed doubt that the code would yield real results. In a memorable reply to von Moltke, Professor Jean Gaspard Bluntschli wrote, “Every state, even the most powerful, will gain considerably in honor before God and before men if it is found to be faithful and sincere in respect to and observation of the law of nations.” Bluntschli’s appeal to moral sensibilities and conscience reflects a timeless standard, not only for a nation’s honorable and humane treatment of enemy prisoners, but also for prisoners’ cultivation of an attitude that values resistance with honor. Nevertheless, even under the “best” of circumstances, that some tension will arise between the humane nation and the resistant prisoner is inevitable: the essential and radical conflict implicit in war involves the deep-seated, foundational values of nations opposed to one another. Regardless of how “honorable” each side seeks to be, they are still at war.
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN WORLD WARS I AND II

Learning Objective: Recognize the evolving concern for the status of prisoners of war, the information a prisoner was required to give to the captor, the requirements for humane care of prisoners, and the strengths and weaknesses of the Geneva Conventions during World Wars I and II.

It was the Hague Conventions of 1864 and 1899 that, along with the Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929, and 1949, codified most of what still exists today as the definitive law of war. As nations moved into the twentieth century, efforts to commit one another to specific restrictions and observances of war became more concerted. As the practice of war became increasingly “total,” i.e., involved greater numbers and populations of people at greater cost for longer periods of time, its consequences became more destructive and widespread.

In the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907, it was stipulated that armed forces of belligerent parties could consist of combatant and non-combatants. If captured both had the right to be treated as POW’s. They must be humanely treated and their personal belongings remain their property. Chapter II of the Annex detailed specific conditions for their treatment.

Article 4. POW’s were prisoners of the Government and not the captors.

Article 6. POW’s could be used as laborers according to rank and aptitude.

Article 7. The capturing Government was responsible for their welfare.

Article 8. POW’s were responsible to the laws of the capturing Government.

Article 9. POW’s were required to give their name and rank.

Article 18. Granted POW’s the liberty to exercise their religion.

Unfortunately, because the Hague Conventions stipulated that signing be unanimous in order for the terms of the conventions to apply, the code was not binding in World War I. The Geneva Convention of 1929 corrected this deficiency by requiring all governments that signed to be held to its provisions. The Convention of 1929 was signed by 33 nations, including the United States.

During World War I, which marked the beginning of American involvement in global conflicts, the United States sought to ensure the humane treatment of Americans imprisoned overseas, by transporting enemy prisoners to this country, and providing them good treatment. While enemy prisoners were interrogated for intelligence purposes, this was considered appropriate as long as force was not used. This national strategy of modeling reasonable treatment of prisoners was, apparently, effective. The Germans soon found it more expedient to treat Americans well. Statistics show that only 147 (3.5%) of the 4,120 American prisoners taken captive in World War I died during imprisonment, all causes of death considered.

World War II occasioned the first real test of a legally binding convention that all signatories were committed to observe. This time, the problem that arose involved the non-signatories, Russia and Japan. These nations did not observe the terms of the convention in their treatment of enemy prisoners. Consequently, when captured, Russian and Japanese troops received harsh treatment from some of their captors. The Germans, for example, insisted that because Russia was a non-signatory, humane treatment did not apply to Russian prisoners. As a result, of five million Russians taken captive, only one million survived.

American treatment of enemy prisoners, as in World War I, followed specific treatment standards established by the United States government with regard to food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and pay. Additionally, enemy prisoners were entitled to religious services in their native language, conducted by American military chaplains and civilian clergy conversant in those languages. While attention to standards of treatment was motivated to some degree by humanitarian concern, ensuring humane treatment for American prisoners was high on the agenda. Captivity for Americans held by the Germans was arduous, but they did not receive political indoctrination, nor were they denied the opportunity for religious expression. Despite humane treatment of Japanese prisoners by United States forces, Americans imprisoned by the Japanese did not fare as well. Treatment varied somewhat, depending upon the interests or personality of the camp commander. On the whole, life in the prison camps was deplorable. The Bataan Death March is but one example of the fate of many prisoners. Similar conditions and treatment existed at Cabanatuan, Old Bilibid Prison Camp, Palawan Barracks, and Davao Penal Colony.
Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 depict allied prisoners who liberated and who could testify to the truth of this fact.

**THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AFTER WORLD WAR II**

Learning Objective: Recognize the revisions to the Geneva Conventions after World War II, and the impact of these changes on the treatment of prisoners of war during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.

There have been three Geneva Conventions (1906, 1929, 1949). The last in 1949 was designed to correct deficiencies that arose in World War II. Specifically that issue was Article 2 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The 12 August 1949 revision specified that the conventions would apply to all signatories and non-signatories “if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof,” a move directed at Germany’s refusal during the war to treat Russian prisoners humanely.

A further provision in this convention stated that the conventions “apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” This was the provision that afforded the United States tremendous leverage in securing changes in treatment for, and eventually the release of, American prisoners during the Vietnam War. Although accounts of American prisoners’ captivity in Vietnam abound with incidents of torture and deprivation, in violation of the
Geneva Convention, the United States was not completely powerless in efforts to change these abuses. Because South Vietnam was a signatory to the Geneva Convention, American prisoners could be transferred to South Vietnam for release. Further, because North Vietnam was also a signatory, the pressure brought to bear on them by the international community to comply with the standards of the Geneva Convention contributed significantly to American prisoners receiving improved treatment toward the close of the war. During the Korean War, by way of contrast, neither the Republic of Korea, nor North Korea, nor the Chinese Communists were signatories to the Geneva Convention. As a result, the United States had very
little leverage in effecting the release of American prisoners of war.

It is important to remember that Communist Block countries took exception to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 that offers protection to POW’s legally convicted of a crime before capture. As a result communist captors often used their reservation to this article as the basis to charge all opposing armed forces members as “war criminals.” Thus, POW’s were often charged as “war criminals” simply because they waged war against their communist captors.

The Korean War presented a variety of unique problems for the United States in its management of enemy prisoners. Western food aggravated already existing medical and nutritional problems plaguing the Korean prisoners. Additionally, American soldiers guarding the captives often used more force than was necessary, because of their negative attitude toward and fear of the Koreans. A third consideration had to do with the fact that the United States’ view of enemy prisoners as non-combatants (vice active enemy agents) underestimated the pervasive, subtle power of the communist system. Captain Kim Sun Ho of the Republic of Korea, a war crimes investigator at the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps in Korea, considered it noteworthy that communist prisoners were treated no differently from anticommunist prisoners. South Korean civilians in the area, he said, could not understand this, because in their eyes, fair treatment of communist prisoners was too fair. They were aghast at the costs expended by the United States for the care and maintenance of enemy prisoners. Statistics do, in fact, bear out the startling difference between the way American prisoners were treated, and the way North Korean prisoners were treated. Of the 173,219 North Koreans taken prisoner by the United States, 3,432 (2%) died. Of the 7,190 Americans taken prisoner by North Korea, 2,730 (38%) died.

It was the experience of the Korean War that acquainted the United States for the first time with the power of indoctrination and propaganda. While the Japanese had used these tools to a limited degree in
World War II, they did not use them to the extent that
the Communists did in Korea. The Japanese had been
harsh, and this prompted commanders to limit the
amount of mission-related information provided to
aircrews going into combat, but the Japanese never
developed an intentional program of indoctrination.
The Germans, on the other hand, were skillful
practitioners of stagecraft, misleading geniality, glib
questions, and kindness. They would typically stage a
mock interrogation of an air crewman they had
captured, in which they went through the motions of
attempting to elicit information from him. After the
interrogation session, the prisoner was invited out for a
beer. Over a period of time, crucial information,
gathered piece-meal in convivial social settings from a
variety of prisoners, resulted in increased casualties
and thwarted air raids on the part of Allied forces.
Viewed against the backdrop of these previous
experiences, communist indoctrination was confusing
and unpredictable. Compulsory, systematic, and very
well organized, the tenets of communism comprised
the baseline of prison camp life. A battery of camp and
company newspapers, published by the prisoners, but
managed by the North Koreans, provided a steady diet
of propaganda and slanted news reporting on the war.
Prisoners were categorized and separated from one
another at the outset. Widespread use of
self-incriminating and self-critical statements made by
prisoners were combined with propaganda, and
exploited for use in indoctrination lectures. Numbers
of prisoners succumbed to what was widely branded
after the war as “brainwashing.” On the whole,
American forces were not prepared to practice escape,
evasion, and resistance, nor had they received
consistent training regarding what information could
be revealed, and what could not be revealed.

POST-KOREA: THE CODE OF
CONDUCT

Learning Objective: Recognize the lessons
learned from the Korean War, the reasons for the
establishment of the Code of Conduct, and the lessons
learned from the Vietnam War.

At President Eisenhower’s insistence, the Defense
Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War was
convened on 17 May 1955 to review the Korean
experience, and provide specific guidance to address
the identified problems. The Committee’s
recommendations included the following:

- Establish a Code of Conduct.
- Institute a training program.
- Develop security regulations.
- Develop an escape and evasion strategy for
  American forces, for the purpose of infiltrating
  enemy areas and assisting American prisoners.

The first of these recommendations, the
establishment of a Code of Conduct, was enacted as
Executive Order 10631 on 17 August 1955. By all
accounts from Americans held prisoner in North
Vietnam from 1964 to 1973, it was the Code of
Conduct that inspired and provided the framework for
resistance and survival. The Code, combined with
good training, enabled our people to detach themselves
from and maintain a perspective on the methods being
used to exploit them for political ends.

Unfortunately, there were some important lessons
to be learned from the POW accounts after WW II;
however, no organized effort was instituted to
formulate a specific code or training program. For
purposes of learning the lessons of captivity, the
Vietnam experience forms our most recent precedent,
and the only test, thus far, of the effectiveness of the
Code of Conduct and the training ordered by President
Eisenhower’s Executive Order 10631. The subsequent
chapters of this course will explore some of the specific
lessons of Vietnam regarding prisoners, those missing
in action, their families, and some of the chaplains who
ministered to them.

Like Korea, Vietnam confronted the United States
with unique dilemmas regarding the treatment of
enemy prisoners. Unlike Korea, enemy prisoners were
not under the direct management of the United States.
Upon capture, the Vietcong were generally transferred
to the South Vietnamese. Despite the fact that South
Vietnam was a signatory to the Geneva Convention,
there was a deeply ingrained philosophy on the part of
the government against full compliance. The
predicament of the United States was that Article 2
held the capturing power responsible for the treatment
of enemy prisoners if the detaining power did not
comply with the Geneva Convention. Thus, the
difficulty of ensuring compliance, coupled with
concern over world opinion in the light of problems
associated with the treatment of American prisoners,
thrust the United States into a tremendous struggle to
achieve humane treatment for the Vietcong.

Beginning in 1973, nearly 600 American prisoners
of war returned from Vietnam. While there had been
suspicions, and some confirmed reports, of torture,
extreme deprivation, and inhumane treatment, the full
story of cruelty and heroism emerged for the first time as formal debriefings were conducted in the months following repatriation. Prisoners described the various methods of interrogation, including rope torture, which characterized prison life at the “Hanoi Hilton” (Hoa Lo Prison), particularly prior to 1970. They also described their dogged and determined dedication to uphold the Code of Conduct, to support their fellow prisoners, and to remain faithful to their country. Most remarkable of all, while they experienced a variety of residual medical problems, and evidenced some difficulty in transitioning to a culturally changed United States, they maintained their sense of honor, and exhibited a heightened awareness of the meaning of life.

Today, 27 years following repatriation (in year 2000), the vast majority of American prisoners of war are psychologically and spiritually sound. The contrast with the way in which American prisoners in Korea fared is noticeable, but the reasons why are not mysterious. The advantage of those imprisoned in Vietnam may be attributed to their higher overall educational level, their better advance training in survival and resistance, and the Code of Conduct. The Code, in fact, forms the spiritual core of SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) School, the Navy’s program to acquaint Navy and Marine air crew and intelligence personnel with the survival skills, evasion techniques, enemy interrogation tactics, and the resistance posture necessary to endure captivity with honor. Students also realize and confront their physical, spiritual, emotional, and psychological limitations. The lessons are arduous, but indelibly impressed. American Naval personnel imprisoned in Vietnam testify to the fact that they did not have to start at “ground zero” in actual captivity, because they had already built, through SERE training, a known set of resources. The Air Force requires similar training for its aircrews.

REPATRIATION AFTER KOREA & VIETNAM

Learning Objective: To develop an awareness of the sensitivity of the political needs of our country of developing diplomatic relations with Vietnam and yet continue in the pursuit of information about POW’s and MIA’s.

A sobering consequence of the Vietnam War that remains unresolved is the number of American military members and civilians unaccounted for in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos). Since 1982, through increased intelligence efforts, a significant body of information has been gathered from refugees and other sources. According to the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, the data provide credible evidence that the remains of over 400 American servicemen were recovered and withheld by the Vietnamese. This number has decreased as negotiations between the two governments have been more successful, and as some remains have been returned. Efforts are underway to achieve a full accounting of the missing, and to have the remains of those who died returned to their nation and families. The United States has had to persevere, and has occasionally been frustrated in its efforts to meet these objectives. Nevertheless, over time, the issue in Southeast Asia is being resolved.

Over the years, as the uncertainty and pain of waiting are prolonged for the families of those missing in action, the likelihood of resolution may appear less promising. U.S. policy has intentionally sought to keep separate the humanitarian issues associated with the repatriation of persons from the political and strategic aspects of the normalization of relations between nations. The reason for this intent is to avoid the development of a conflict between these two areas, a conflict in which the humanitarian issues would inevitably lose. Since 1981, government resources have been applied in countless numbers to the resolution of prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) matters, especially to the issue of MIA repatriations.

At the end of the war, there were 2,583 unaccounted for American prisoners, missing in action or killed but not recovered. As of June 28, 2000, 2,014 Americans are still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War, though 468 were at sea or over water. Joint missions are still underway in an effort to achieve the fullest possible accounting of personnel still listed as missing. Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, underlined this commitment in these words, “We’re committed to all our warriors, past and present, we’re committed to their families, whose pain has endured for decades. America’s fallen heroes did not face the horror of battle for us to turn away from their sacrifice. They didn’t fight for us to forget.”
Learning Objective: Recognize the definition of terrorism and the nature of the continuing threat of terrorism and hostage taking.

Although a much larger dimension in its scope, hostage taking still entails all the psychological traumas of prisoners of war. The intensity of the various hostage experiences plus the factor that non-military personnel can be involved seem to limit the effectiveness of strictly military training to forestall the threatened results. The need for Chaplain Corps personnel to be trained in successful counseling techniques in dealing with the released hostages becomes imperative.

While hostage taking is not a recent phenomenon in world affairs, and while it often accompanies nonpolitical violent crime, the terrorist acts of the previous decade have been particularly frightening in their intensity, and have received worldwide news and instant coverage by the media.

Terrorism is defined as the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. In such a circumstance, the hostage becomes a political pawn, and their status is more akin to that of a prisoner vice a hostage victim.

Just as American prisoners of war in Korea and Vietnam were exploited for political and ideological ends, hostages in Iran and Lebanon have been used to manipulate the U.S. government into a position of unwitting negotiation. Innocent bystanders who suddenly find themselves “imprisoned” in a fast-food restaurant while their “captor” negotiates personal demands with the police outside, may be held hostage for a period of hours, or possibly days. Such circumstances present traumatic after-effects for the victim, but the victim’s whereabouts are no secret. There is also the guarantee that, eventually, the hostage taker will be either caught or killed.

In contrast, political hostages in a foreign country have been held for years, while the terrorist group responsible for their capture pursues accomplishment of its own ideological and political ends. The political hostage’s whereabouts are almost always secret, especially if that individual has been kidnapped. Aside from an occasional photograph or videotaped message, the outside world has no information about the hostage’s health or well-being, and may not even know whether the individual is still alive.

Because the leverage afforded the hostage’s home country by the Geneva Convention cannot be exercised in this situation, such rights as sending and receiving mail, available on a limited censured basis even to the POWs in Vietnam, are non-existent for the political hostage. Unless the nations whose citizens have been captured decide to negotiate directly with the terrorists, the only option for solving this crisis is quiet diplomacy, and the hope that, somehow, external influences or events will intervene. In the meantime, the political hostage is imprisoned, and viewed by the captive power as representative of the opposed political ends of his or her country.

Since 1982, some 100 foreign nationals have been taken hostage by a variety of ideologically and politically committed terrorist groups. Prior to 1982, 80 percent of terrorist attacks were against property, and only 20 percent were against people. During the 1980’s, despite a slight decline in the total number of worldwide terrorist incidents, the percentage of attacks against people increased to 50 percent; the rate of death increased 13 percent. Deaths of hostages, and death threats against them (which may or may not be acted upon), have typically taken place in response to world events. The volatile and constantly changing face of political life in the Middle East has served to confuse and entangle even further the unfolding crisis of the hostages.

As long as nations continue to engage in wars, or find that they can work with some great degree of effectiveness through terrorist groups, the taking of prisoners/hostages will remain a fact of international political life. Despite centuries of effort to codify and “humanize” prisoner of war conditions, the cultural unknowns of the imprisoning power are formidable, the humanitarian instincts of one’s captors quixotic, and the survivability of the prisoner mostly untested. Training to survive captivity has been developed out of the hard lessons, both the successes and the failures, of past scenarios.

The next chapter provides examples of some of the lessons learned by prisoners of war.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. How would you react were you called into a brig to provide care for a distraught prisoner, and, as
you step close to hear the prisoner’s voice, he spits in your face?

2. Suppose you were placed in charge of 10 prisoners who were members of an elite enemy fighting group that had massacred 50 people in a small village. In addition, they had killed six of your shipmates while attempting to flee aboard a small gunboat, how would you be impacted in your treatment of these prisoners?

3. Why do you think it is necessary to have “laws of war?”
PRISONERS IN PROFILE

Learning Objective: To develop an awareness of the commonalities of spiritual development of those in confinement and their capabilities to use this development to survive.

The captivity experiences of Americans in Vietnam constitute the closest available model from which events and lessons of wartime imprisonment may be drawn. If all 651 accounts of captivity could be told one after the other, 651 distinct and highly personal stories of survival would emerge. Some of these stories have been published in written form, while others have been related to dozens of fascinated audiences. Regardless of the form, each prisoner’s story concludes with a consciously developed, clearly stated “lessons of life.” A small sampling of these stories, with their associated “lessons,” follows.

CDR TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, USN, (RET)

Commander Sullivan was shot down over North Vietnam in 1968 while a LTJG serving as a Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) in a fighter squadron. He was imprisoned for five and a half years, during which time he was moved from prison to prison. He was 24 years old at the time of capture, and 29 years old at the time of his release in 1973.

Upon capture, and in the weeks immediately following, Commander Sullivan felt, primarily, disgust and hatred for his captors. Initially, at least, these strong feelings were enough to keep him going; but eventually, he discovered that hate could not sustain him indefinitely. Over the long haul, he relied upon a combination of factors to help himself survive. While he noticed that one overriding factor, such as religion, or patriotism, or family, carried some of the prisoners through captivity, he found that his own sense of hope alternated among these factors at various times. First, as his feelings of hatred dissipated, his sense of and appreciation for Navy tradition and history increased. He figured that he was not the first American to be captured, and he was probably not going to be the last.

The realization that he was part of a long line of people who had made sacrifices for their country became important to him. Second, he thought a great deal about his parents, and discovered that these thoughts of his family helped sustain him. Third, his religious faith gave him a way of understanding the universe, i.e., why things were the way they were. Because it is one of life’s extreme circumstances, captivity requires some way of making sense of situations that defy reasonable attribution and problem solving.

In Commander Sullivan’s case, his religious faith contributed a whole pantheon of values, which, in turn, determined his responses during the particularly stressful times.

What exactly were these values, and where did they come from? For Commander Sullivan, they were what he describes as “basic family values”: how his family taught him about the world, and the people in it. This basic sense of security helped him deal with the greatest fear he experienced as a POW, the fear of the unknown. The scariest aspect of captivity for him was when his captors changed the “game plan,” after he had arrived at some knowledge of his limitations, and how far they could push him.

Immediately after he was shot down, he was placed in the same cell with an Air Force Colonel who was in very bad shape, both physically and mentally. Determined to resist his captors at any cost, this man was in almost a full body cast, which went from one shoulder, around his ribs, and down one leg. Understanding the “game plan” meant realizing that if the captors wanted information badly enough, they would, eventually, be able to obtain it. Resisting at all cost was, for the vast majority of the prisoners, not an option. The ability to face the realistic limitations of resistance, and to experience forgiveness from one’s fellow prisoners when one’s limits were exceeded, had to draw heavily from an essential and deeply rooted sense of self-esteem and personal worth.

Over time, Commander Sullivan has found that he intellectualizes his captivity experience more, and that he has become more detached from it emotionally. The inevitable distance which time has placed between him
and that period of his life has, however, contributed the insight he needs in order to direct one of the Navy’s sites for SERE training. As he observes class after class of students experience the hard lessons of evasion, capture, and interrogation, he has come to a significant conclusion: what individuals need in order to cope with such a situation, they have acquired long before they join the Navy. Those who have never reflected on their life and their values prior to SERE School will discover the need for that reflection very quickly. Commander Sullivan knows this well. He was there for five and a half years.

CAPT JAMES A. MULLIGAN, USN (RET.)

Captain Mulligan had served in the Navy for 24 years when he was shot down over North Vietnam on 20 March 1966. Stationed aboard the USS ENTERPRISE as Executive Officer of VA-36, he was flying his A-4 Skyhawk just south of Vinh, when he was struck by a Surface to Air Missile (SAM), and was forced to eject. He was immediately captured by North Vietnamese regulars, and then transported to Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi, the infamous Hanoi Hilton. As one of the more senior Navy POWs, he endured torture, abuse, and miserable conditions for nearly seven years, until his release in February 1973.

What prepared him to survive a captivity experience, which included 42 months of solitary confinement? In response to that question, Captain Mulligan cites the process of receiving a liberal education, i.e., undergoing the intellectual preparation necessary to find out who he was. He recalls that the first time he ever heard the Code of Conduct, he thought to himself, “Why do we need this? Why is this necessary? Isn’t this basic to who and what we are? Doesn’t everybody know this?” The answer, as he discovered during his years in the Navy was, no, not everybody does understand what integrity, commitment, and loyalty mean. For Captain Mulligan, imprisonment in North Vietnam was a supreme test of those values embodied in the Code of Conduct, values of right and wrong. Captivity was an experience in which a prisoner had to live off of whatever was in his head. When it was all over, Captain Mulligan was able to recall some of what he felt on the day of release, as described in his book, The Hanoi Commitment:

This was the only good day I would ever have in North Vietnam, and it would only become good when I boarded that plane and flew out of this damn country. I had spent 2522 days here and I hated every damn one of them. They were firmly etched deep in my mind. I couldn’t forget them even if I wanted to. They were as much a part of me as an arm or a leg. In one way I had been a loser for all of those days, yet in another way I had much to be thankful about. For out of the miseries had come strength; out of the suffering, compassion; out of hate, love. If nothing else, I would come home a better man than when I entered there. Life would be more meaningful in every aspect from now on. Freedom, integrity, moral character had new and stronger meanings for me. I knew that I could face the future with faith and hope. I had learned firsthand that in life’s darkest hours in Hanoi, God’s grace had shone down upon me. In my heart I knew that during my captivity I had lost all the battles, but had won the war because I had done my best. I had paid the price. I had day by day put myself on the line for what I believed in. Alone and in solitary, when no one knew and no one cared, I and the others had fought the good fight. If nothing else, I cared, and they cared. There was no easy way. When the chips were down we did what we had to and we paid the price with physical and mental pain. Now that it was over, we could go home with heads held high. We would walk erect as free men taking our rightful place in a free world. The man who appreciates freedom the most is the free man who has become a slave. We were leaving Hanoi, slaves no more.

Captain Mulligan recalls that the greatest challenge he faced during his imprisonment was the process of living out his convictions and beliefs about who he was in the face of the loss of self-respect. Prior to captivity, he had experienced and understood divine forgiveness; he also knew of human forgiveness; but he did not really know, nor had he fully experienced, personal forgiveness. Survival in the dehumanizing environment of Hoa Lo Prison was critically dependent on his ability to forgive himself, and then come back to fight another day.

Indeed, it was self-forgiveness and inner fortitude that enabled the POWs, as a unit, to win a moral war in 1971, even though victory came at the expense of a hard won battle for group living. Following Christmas of 1970, the North Vietnamese began housing prisoners together in rooms of 45 to 50 each. For many of the prisoners, this move marked the first time they had ever met one another face to face. Nevertheless, they were willing to risk small cells and solitary
confinement once again for the sake of the right to worship. As Captain Mulligan recounts what was later referred to as the “Church Riot,” the Vietnamese “became upset” when each room conducted Sunday worship services. Apparently, group worship posed such a threat, perhaps because of the evident spirit of unity that resulted, that all such services were subsequently forbidden.

As the senior POWs met to discuss what action they should take, most favored the politically “smart” course: not making an issue of the worship services, lest the Vietnamese retaliate by moving everyone back into small or solitary cells. Captain Mulligan took the opposite position, that making a moral stand on the freedom of religion took precedence over political strategy. In the overall assessment of what would be lost and what would be gained, he concluded, “We don’t have a choice.” The agreement of the group was unanimous. Because he and the other prisoners were confronted daily with time slipping away, time which they were missing with their families, especially their children, Captain Mulligan and others developed their own special responses to the question, “If you had just five minutes to spend with your kids, what would you pass on to them?” His answer was:

1. Live a life of order, i.e., as to the priority of things.
2. Live a life of discipline, i.e., absolute self-discipline to do what is right, and not to do what is wrong.
3. Live a life of moderation, i.e., there is plenty to go around — share the wealth!

As for himself, what are the lessons which 42 months in solitary confinement gave him the time to think through and assess?

- With God all things are possible (Matthew 19:20).
- Permissiveness is the corruption of Freedom.
- Anarchy is the corruption of Democracy.
- Immorality is the corruption of Morality.

A free democratic moral society has the right as well as the obligation to resist the incursions of those perversions, which would lead to its destruction. A free society requires order, discipline, and moderation. Thus it follows that rights and freedoms demand corresponding duties and obligations from all citizens.

Man is an imperfect creature living in an imperfect world but he should always strive to be better than he is. In this struggle he should never, never, never, give up!

Jim Mulligan May 1984

CDR GEORGE COKER, USN (RET.)

Commander Coker was stationed aboard the USS CONSTELLATION with VA-65 when he was shot down over North Vietnam on 27 August 1966. As one of the “early shoot downs,” he observed some differences between himself and those prisoners with whom he came into contact after 1970. What did he observe, and what did survival as a prisoner of war constitute for him? Commander Coker recalls that those who functioned best in captivity were strong in three areas of belief: God, country, and family. While the enemy, he found, could repeatedly attack one’s country, and might attempt to manipulate one’s behavior regarding God and family, there was nothing they could do to change one’s faith in these areas, if one truly believed in their efficacy. The enemy had no way of proving or disproving belief.

Consequently, for Commander Coker, it became important to separate what it meant to “do well,” from what it meant to “survive,” as a prisoner. “Doing well” meant doing what was morally correct. The capability to make morally correct decisions derived, for him, from:

- The Code of Conduct, which provided a quick wrap-up, a reminder, of moral values;
- A sense of duty to one’s country;
- His basic upbringing and nurturing set of values;
- One’s training as a military member;
- Remembrance of past ceremonial observances, such as parades and changes of command; and
- The Senior Ranking Officer (SRO) concept, i.e., a respect for rank.

“Surviving,” on the other hand, merely meant physical survival or existence. It was possible to “hang on” physically, without behaving morally, or doing what was morally correct. In order to continue to fight the war in Hanoi, and to win, it was imperative to “do well.”

Commander Coker observed that the “later shootdowns,” those captured after 1970, often reflected a “qualified/modified resistance” posture, a difference in attitude that undoubtedly reflected the
gradual shift in cultural values taking place in this country at the time. For POWs, who were living in conditions where the external trappings of culture had been stripped away, and for whom values and attitudes were all that was left, this was a particularly noticeable and disturbing difference. The “modified” posture maintained that not everything is worth suffering for, if conceding a few principles here and there meant receiving more humane treatment at the hands of one’s captors. Why knowingly subject oneself to abuse in conditions which were already miserable by any standard? The politically smart course was to accommodate to the enemy at certain points in order to ensure that one would, in the end, make it home.

The case for expediency, however, was challenged by those who valued “doing well” over merely “surviving,” a challenge which often stood in direct opposition to one’s basic instincts of fear and self-preservation. As justification for his moral conviction to resist the enemy, Commander Coker raised the question, “Why should I deny what I believe in because I’m afraid? My decision is to be what I am. It’s up to the other person to decide what to do about that.” When measured against a standard of moral character, Commander Coker learned, the case for expediency was found wanting. At least in Hanoi, moral expediency would not have won the war.

CAPT GILES R. NORRINGTON, USN (RET.)

When he was shot down over North Vietnam on the Sunday afternoon of 5 May 1968, Captain Norrington recalls, he could not have foreseen that he would be spending the next four years, ten months, and nine days of his life as a prisoner of war. Even less likely could he have known that, during that period, he would experience not only the toughest of times, but also some good times, when he would grow as a person, and come into touch with himself and his comrades. Upon repatriation in 1973, at which time he was debriefed for 29 and a half hours on his nearly five years as a POW, Captain Norrington found that talking about what happened was an extremely helpful, purging experience. Since that initial debrief, he has continued to refine his perspective on how he and his fellow prisoners coped with seemingly unsurvivable conditions.

The context for captivity, he explains, originates from a series of traumas, beginning with physiological trauma. Most of those shot down arrived at the prison camps wounded, either from injuries incurred as a result of damage done to the airplane, or from injuries sustained during ejection. However, physical wounds were only one part of the picture. One’s entire system experienced an all-encompassing shock from the disorienting effects of shootdown, and the humiliation of capture. Thus, in addition to the physical pain of broken legs, arms, ribs or, as in Captain Norrington’s case, debilitating burns, the dehumanizing effect of being paraded through villages where North Vietnamese were allowed to vent the full extent of their hatred and anger at the prisoner, resulted in tremendous psychological shock. “Males”, observes Captain Norrington, “as conditioned by their families and the demands of society not to fail, and when occasionally they do fail at something, are ill equipped to deal with that failure. Further, although aviators are used to teamwork in flight, squadron or Air Wing operations, they are in large measure, independent creatures ill-prepared for the dependence that POWs learn is the very essence of their emotional survival. Yet, the capacity to acknowledge failure, the faith in oneself to bounce back, and the ability to rely on and support others, were critically important instincts and skills for POWs to develop.”

The result of these personal and interpersonal changes was that, as a group, the prisoners became more than brothers, they became very much like “mothers” to one another. Like a mother, they nurtured each other, both physically, as when a fellow prisoner was in poor health or badly injured; and emotionally, as when a fellow prisoner’s guilt and remorse over his inability to endure torture at all costs required confession and forgiveness. In order to fill, literally, years of space creatively, and as a way of escaping the misery of the present, one simply had to get to know the other person. Communication, in which one was willing to be vulnerable, was essential, not for the sake of exchanging information, but for emotional contact.

As he recounts the lessons learned during those years, Captain Norrington cites a greater appreciation for those around him, and an enhanced awareness that all resources — one’s own, one’s country’s, and one’s comrades’ — belong to God. Through this awareness, he discovered gifts and tools he never knew he had, tools which enabled even the wounds of captivity to heal.

COL JERRY MARVEL, USMC (RET.)
“LAST FLIGHT” 27 MAY 95

Colonel Marvel was stationed with VMAW-533 out of Chu Lai when he was shot down on the night of 24 February 1968. An A-6 pilot with 12 years in the
Marine Corps, he was on his second tour in Vietnam. In the process of ejecting from the airplane, he broke three vertebrae. For the first 18 months of captivity, he was in solitary confinement. The only emotion he seemed able to experience at first was anger, and he spent a great deal of time wondering, “Why me?” One day, he received an answer to his question: he heard the sound of an A-6 being shot down, and he realized that he was alive. Now that the initial shock and anger associated with capture had begun to dissipate, what was going to enable him to survive?

It was a strong sense of pride in himself which became the principal survival factor for Colonel Marvel. As he recalls, he was determined not to do anything to disgrace himself, his family, or the legacy of morality and integrity which he hoped to pass on. However, he knew that he could not have cultivated this sense of pride apart from his relationships with other prisoners. Long lasting and unique in their quality and closeness, these relationships provided him during captivity with the emotional grounding he needed to continue the fight.

One of the greatest challenges he faced was adhering to the Code of Conduct. As a function of his training, he was aware of the kind of treatment he might expect from the enemy, and he was familiar with survival techniques; but he was not particularly conversant with the Code of Conduct. As did the other prisoners, he rapidly discovered that he could not make it on the “Big Four” alone: name, rank, service number, and date of birth. His captors had a way of prolonging torture to the point that the prisoner would almost, but not quite, pass out. They were professional extortionists, and their job was to extract information for intelligence and propaganda purposes, one way or another.

Eventually, Colonel Marvel recalls, most of the prisoners became adept at knowing what kind of lie the enemy was most likely to believe, and at what point during the interrogation session they were most likely to believe it. It was a mistake to give up information too soon, because the enemy was suspicious of an easy mark; but at some point, each one needed to acknowledge that he had reached his limit. This way of manipulating the enemy was about the only recourse available. Nevertheless, Colonel Marvel found it difficult for his sense of pride to concede even the lies, for he still felt as though he had disgraced himself and his country. Being a prisoner of war appeared to constitute the quintessential “no-win” situation.

During his first few months of captivity, the predominant impression he had was, “No one has any idea I’m here,” and this further aggravated his sense of loneliness and defeat. Once he became a part of the communications network, however, he realized how much his mind was capable of exaggerating and distorting reality, and concurrently, how crucial it was for him, especially in solitary confinement, to discipline his mind. As a result, he rigorously scheduled his time in such a way that he devoted one hour each to such functions as, some type of physical exercise, a topic of study, a subject for reflection, or a project for planning. As many of the prisoners who had wives and children back home had to do, Colonel Marvel learned to discipline himself to restrict his thoughts about his family, lest he enter a downward spiral of despair from which there was no way out. Each prisoner was emotionally vulnerable in a different area of life. Whatever area this was — and for most, it was family — it had to be disciplined.

“At the time,” recalls Colonel Marvel, “we thought we were getting passed by, that we were living in a vacuum,” but this was not so: “We gained more from that experience than we could ever know.” What were the lessons that captivity in enemy territory could teach a community of military men? Colonel Marvel answers, “We had to work with each other, we had to get things done, and we had to cooperate.” These, he adds, have been timeless lessons, not by any means restricted to survival under adverse, hostile conditions, but applicable to any job or family situation. Most importantly, they were lessons which relied heavily upon, and reinforced, personal pride and honor.

CAPT KENNETH COSKEY, USN (RET.)

Captain Coskey was Commanding Officer of VA-85, stationed aboard the USS AMERICA, when he was shot down over North Vietnam on 6 September 1968. Looking back at his four and a half years of captivity, he recalls that, at the beginning, time seemed like an eternity. How did he get through this initial period, and what changes in perspective did he experience during the years that followed?

Contributing to his initial shock at the point of capture were three factors: physical pain and deprivation; interrogation; and the fact that three weeks elapsed from the time he was shot down, to his arrival in Hanoi. Probably as a result of this rather lengthy period preceding actual imprisonment, a period which most of the other prisoners endured as well, almost two months went by before Captain
Coskey reached a state of acceptance of his circumstances. He even remembers how reaching that state of acceptance felt, and when it happened. On one particular morning, he woke up, looked outside, and noticed that the sun was shining, and that it was a beautiful day. At that moment, he recalls, “I knew I was going to make this thing.” Communication with other prisoners helped him immeasurably in reaching this point of acceptance. He also found himself turning to prayer as a way of releasing what he could not control, from the most major concern, e.g., the welfare of his family, to the seemingly mundane, e.g., taking care of a cold.

As months turned into years, the hope that “we were going to be out of here in six months” became a significant sustaining factor. During fourteen months of solitary confinement, when, from day to day, the future extent of prolonged isolation was uncertain, Captain Coskey found that his thoughts were preoccupied mostly with family. As a way of disciplining his mind, which, in solitary confinement, became a necessity, he was able to dredge up all the names of his grammar school class, and alphabetize them. Eventually, he was able to recall 50 names from those eight years of his life. These periods of discipline were interspersed, inevitably, with daydreams about escape and freedom.

One period of time during his captivity particularly stands out in Captain Coskey’s memory, not only because he reached a new level of acceptance and understanding of his circumstances after he came through it, but also because he has never fully understood why it happened. For almost three months, he completely withdrew, not to the point that he was suicidal, but that he simply did not want to communicate with anyone. He did nothing to take care of himself, and did not even bathe when given the opportunity. One day, the guard came in to give him a hair cut, and, discovering that Captain Coskey was covered with dirt, gave him some soap, and told him to “go take a bath.” Captain Coskey recalls bathing, and bathing, and bathing, as though trying to cleanse himself of “whatever it was.” On both a physical and a spiritual level, that bath marked the termination of a period of withdrawal, which he never revisited.

Perhaps the most significant lesson, which Captain Coskey derived from his years as a prisoner of war, was the value of communication. On an informal level, communication with other prisoners contributed a perspective to captivity, which ensured both survival and growth. However, communication also served an invaluable function along the formal lines of the chain of command. Juniors’ obedience of seniors, and mutual accountability both up and down the chain of command, enhanced everyone’s ability to keep faith with one another.

When they heard a fellow American reading a propaganda statement on the camp radio, or when they were shown signed statements in which their fellow prisoners acknowledged committing criminal acts against the North Vietnamese, the adage, “Don’t be surprised at what you see and hear,” took on new meaning. Captain Coskey realized that, as individuals, they were not just in personal survival situations: they were together, and they were still in the military. Most important, keeping faith with one’s fellow prisoners ensured camp unity, the one feature of the American way of life, which the North Vietnamese could not destroy.

VADM EDWARD H. MARTIN, USN (RET.)

On 9 July 1967, Admiral Martin was making a run on an ammunition site near Hanoi in his A-4 Skyhawk. The previous day, 8 July, he had successfully bombed the same area, but his squadron, VA-34, of which he was Executive Officer, was directed to go back, “just to make sure.” The day he went back, Sunday, 9 July, was the day he was shot down.

At the start, Admiral Martin experienced much the same shock, which other prisoners experienced, as a result of beatings by both captors and villagers, the “nasty treatment” of initial interrogation, and the physical trauma associated with ejection. He particularly recalls being “dreadfully thirsty.” Upon arrival at Hoa Lo Prison, he endured 30 to 50 days of rope torture, during which his back and both shoulders were broken; leg irons; wrist irons; and boils and mosquitoes. Following this ordeal, he recalls that Major Chuck Tyler, USAF, was “brought in to clean me up.”

Despite the ordeal, however, Admiral Martin was “determined” that he was “going to beat these people.” To do this, he developed a personal code, which consisted of maintaining:

- Absolute trust and faith in God and in His infinite wisdom
- Absolute trust and faith in the President of the United States and all those in power
- Absolute trust and faith in your family at home
• Absolute trust and faith in his fellow prisoners
• Absolute trust and faith in his personal ability to withstand an ordeal and make the best of it

He recalls that each prisoner, in whatever way he could, had to develop some strength, “something to lean against.” For most, including himself, the Code of Conduct was an essential component for developing a strong personal code: without it, it was much too easy to rationalize a weak resistance posture. The Code, in other words, provided a standard by which to develop a response in the face of manipulation by the enemy.

As a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Martin had learned all about humility during his Plebe year, a lesson that helped him understand his captors’ attempts to humiliate him. It was more manipulation, not humiliation, which posed the challenge to resistance. Each prisoner had to learn to “play the game, and walk a tightrope.” Eventually, if the enemy wanted information badly enough, they would find a way for the prisoner to give it, and to give it willingly. Violating the Code, which happened daily, was always done willingly — no one was “brainwashed” — which is what made it so difficult to forgive oneself.

On the other hand, if information was handed over too readily, the enemy would only come back for more. Consequently, there was no way to “win” the propaganda game: the reality of being a prisoner guaranteed a “no win” scenario. One could, however, in countless small ways, outsmart the enemy, especially by knowing how and when to feed them lies; and could emerge with one’s personal code of honor intact. In such a situation, the key to developing a personal code was discipline: moral (personal) discipline, service (Navy, Marine Corps) discipline, and the discipline of foundational (social) values. These disciplines enabled at least one man to survive, grow, and emerge the victor through one of life’s most extreme circumstances.

CAPT GERALD COFFEE, USN (RET.)

One of the first sensations that Captain Coffee recalls experiencing immediately following his shoot down, was the feeling of floating in a sun-drenched ocean, the sounds of a loudspeaker in the distance announcing speedboat rides. For just a few moments, he was back in the San Joaquin Valley, swimming next to his wife, Bea. Suddenly, she dove beneath the surface, and seemed to be pulling him down with her. His attempts to free himself were futile, because, for some reason, his right arm would not move. What kind of fantasy was this? Where was Bea? What had become of the speedboats, and the amusement park, and the rides?

The shock and resulting disorientation associated with shootdown and ejection had temporarily erased the grim reality for then — Lieutenant Jerry Coffee that he was far from the USS KITTY HAWK, far from his RA-5C Vigilante aircraft, and far from all hope of rescue. It was February 1966. It was not Bea with whom he was playing in the waters of California, but the shroud lines from his parachute which threatened to pull him forever into the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. Having just checked aboard the squadron the previous month, he now found himself surrendering to an excited boatload of Vietnamese who, moments before, had nearly killed him by firing a barrage of bullets into the water. Years later, remembering how it felt to be thrust so abruptly into a strange and hostile world, Captain Coffee reflects on “the enemy’s other face”:

The absolute tests are those we face alone, without the support of others who believe as we do. There the beliefs we hold most dear are challenged — some to be strengthened, some to be tempered, others to be abandoned — but all to be examined. From deep within we claim the values that we know to be our own. Those are the ones by which we are willing to live or die.

For the next seven years of captivity in Hanoi, Captain Coffee was to discover what his real values were; how dependent he was on the community of his fellow prisoners for perspective and forgiveness; and the importance of not merely surviving such circumstances, but of emerging through them triumphant.

As every other prisoner of war before him had experienced, the predicament and conditions of captivity were utterly foreign, stifling, and overwhelming. As he realized that he had never in his life felt such physical deprivation — hunger, filth, and pain — he also realized that even his qualifications as a “jet jock” counted for nothing in Hanoi. “Suddenly,” he recalls, “I was quiet: the stripping away of my perceived identity had commenced.” Fortunately, and to Captain Coffee’s credit, what lay beneath the surface features of his “perceived identity” was a will and a determination to continue thinking, dreaming, and behaving as an American, despite attempts to coerce him to the contrary. Several fellow prisoners provided encouragement and inspiration to “hang on,” but Captain Coffee writes with special admiration for the
leadership example set by Colonel Robinson Risner, USAF, senior ranking officer at the Hanoi Hilton. Apparently, the North Vietnamese were positively gleeful when Colonel Risner was shot down, because they had seen his picture on the cover of *Time* magazine, and were well acquainted with his illustrious career as an aviator, both in Korea and in Vietnam. Captain Coffee points out that “Robbie” lost battles, but never lost the war: “They ultimately forced him to write statements and say things he wouldn’t have otherwise, but they never got him in their pocket, never forced him to surrender his will to theirs, to conform — without torture — to their program of extortion and exploitation.”

Through an elaborate communications network, in which prisoners tapped messages in code to one another on the walls (the so-called “tap code”), Captain Coffee began to understand that the Communists were not nearly as interested in gathering intelligence, as they were preoccupied with exploiting prisoners for propaganda purposes. Colonel Risner himself once pointed out with some amazement that their captors seemed oblivious to the “gold mine of military information they are sitting on here,” due, in part, to their lack of technological sophistication; but due, in larger part, to their urgency for control over their own people, and for influence over the nations around them. To broadcast tapes, in which downed American military air crewmen read statements condemning the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, extolling the virtue and tenacity of the Vietnamese people, and acknowledging their own criminal acts of war, was a tremendous victory for the Communist cause. The process — whether the statement was read under duress, for example, or whether the tape itself was the edited product of statements taken out of context was not nearly as important as the end result.

Through persistent communication, prisoners encouraged and supported one another, and realized that taking care of each other was a primary need in captivity. Captain Coffee recalls that some men did withdraw, despite determined efforts by their fellow prisoners to break through the wall of isolation. Eventually, they stopped eating, and “disappeared.” Some, feigning insanity or amnesia in order to avoid exploitation, might be caught in a lie or a discrepancy by the Vietnamese, and would then be punished and beaten into the actual state which they had sought to feign. These tragic cases reinforced the fact that communication was survival, and, beyond survival, growth.

Captain Coffee remembers one day seeing a simple formula scratched into the prison wall: God Strength. Communion with others met one set of needs essential to survival and growth; but in those moments when one was totally and utterly alone, where was strength to be found? Captain Coffee describes in some detail one Christmas which he spent in Hanoi. The guards had made a big show of “the Christmas Room,” where they had set up a Christmas tree, and little baskets of fruit and candy for each prisoner. After he had returned to his cell that evening, he made an origami rosette, a swan, and a star from the foil wrappers left over from the candy. As he watched the little ornaments twinkle softly in that chilly cell, he “was immediately struck by the satisfying simplicity” of his Christmas celebration. His reflection on that Christmas of 1967 follows — a fine Christmas meditation, and an eloquent summary of spiritual strength:

I thought more about the birth of the Christ Child and the simplicity of the Nativity. There was nothing to distract me from the pure awesomeness of the story of Christ’s birth — no materialism, commercialism, no food, presents, or glitz. Just me and that little baby.

Finally I thought intensely of Bea and the children and of their own Christmas Eve activities, close unto themselves certainly, but perhaps now with friends and family celebrating the occasion in all the usual ways. I prayed for them and for their joy and peace and well-being. And I knew there were many prayers and toasts for me. I felt them all.

I was beginning to realize and appreciate my own spirituality because I had been stripped of everything else. Everything by which I had measured my identity was denied: my rank, my title, uniform, clothes, money, car, the trappings of my religion. It was just me left — my flesh, bones, intellect, and soul.

And where was I now finding answers and sustenance? From within. It had been there all the time. And as I had gone deeper within myself and with God, I began to realize and see more clearly all my connections to everyone and everything else. To go within and to know myself was the key to understanding everything outside, my relationship with God, with the man in the next cell, with the geckos on the wall, with my family on the other side of the world, and with all elements of nature.
But for the moment I had God, myself, and my rosette and my swan and my star. I realized that although I was hurting and lonely and scared, this might be the most significant Christmas Eve of my life. The circumstances of this night were helping me to crystallize my understanding of my journey within to find God there, and thereby to see Him everywhere.

CDR EVERETT ALVAREZ, JR., USN (RET.)

CDR Alvarez was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese for eight-and-one-half years, the 2nd longest period of captivity endured by any American in Vietnam. On 5 August 1964, after a successful attack against the naval docks in Hon Gai Harbor, then — LTJG Alvarez’s plane was hit by flak, and he was forced to eject from his A-4 Skyhawk at low altitude. Picked up by local fishermen, Commander Alvarez initially attempted to confuse his captors by speaking Spanish, but a search through his identification papers quickly revealed that he was an American. After some initial interrogation at Hon Gai, he arrived in Hanoi on 11 August, and began his lengthy captivity at Hoa Lo Prison.

At home in California, his wife of seven months, Tangee, his parents, and his sisters, eventually learned that he had been taken prisoner. The story of Commander Alvarez’s captivity is also their story, as not only their grief over his situation, but also their uncertainty and questions about the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, surfaced and grew over time. It was not until he began writing Chained Eagle in 1986 that he and his family really reviewed with one another the full extent of their feelings, doubts, and opinions from those years.

At the very start of his captivity, because he was alone in Hanoi for several months, Commander Alvarez was overwhelmed with the sense that he was “already a corpse in the eyes of the world.” He was convinced that no one knew he was alive, or in prison, and that, therefore, the Vietnamese would never be held accountable for his fate. The huge rats with which he shared living quarters seemed to be the only other occupants, until a year later, when he met a group of Navy and Air Force prisoners.

From that point on, even during the most stressful and painful of times, he and his fellow prisoners developed a solid unity, even a sense of humor. Commander Alvarez, more than anyone else, observed innumerable cases of “new-guy-itis,” the difficult adjustment to prison life which all new prisoners, in one way or another, experienced. Imitating the quirks of their guards and assigning them names, accordingly (Rabbit, Elf, Dum-Dum, etc.); laughing at new guys’ expectations that the Hanoi Hilton had a laundry service, reading the note scratched into the wall of the shower room which said, “Smile! You’re on candid camera!” — all of these incidents worked together to forge a bond of loyalty and forgiveness which sustained them through the changing seasons.

Perhaps most painful of all during the period of captivity itself was the news that Tangee had divorced him and remarried. For years, Commander Alvarez had written her letters, wondering why he never received a reply or any word about her, but assuming that it was simply the Vietnamese’ failure to give him his mail. On Christmas Day, 1971, he learned through a letter from his mother that his wife had “decided not to wait,” and that no one had seen her. About a year later, he learned that she had remarried and was expecting a child. The sudden feeling of desolation from the loss of dreams which he had nurtured for seven-and-a-half years was nearly overwhelming.

Commander Alvarez describes himself at the time as “drifting pathetically,” his “light at the end of the tunnel” gone. Even his closest friends were, initially, unable to help him view this incident as nothing more than a minor setback within the grand scheme of life. Nevertheless, he eventually recovered a tremendous sense of hope, even within that grim prison setting in Hanoi.

I had lost my freedom and now my wife, but my faith in a just and merciful God remained steadfast. While I paced outside I prayed silently, seeking guidance. ‘What shall I do now?’ Prayer and the strong loyalty of my friends pulled me through the grim months of dejection and self-examination. Gradually, the pain eased somewhat and though my whole world had disintegrated, I was beginning to face up to the reality.

Commander Alvarez considered becoming a monk, and began to look forward to the prospect of living in a monastery and writing about his experiences. But it was the arrival of spring which completed his awakening, and which provided him not just with the ability to accept reality, but to fall in love with life again.

When I heard [the] murmuring [of Spring] I seemed to shake off a trance and suddenly became aware of other people. It all happened so quickly that it
felt like I was being carried along on a swift current. I stood revitalized ... I was going to live! My prayers for guidance had been answered because I was now looking forward instead of backward. Maybe I would be a monk and maybe I wouldn’t. It didn’t matter ... I didn’t know what I wanted to do and yet I was going to do everything. There seemed to be neither limits nor boundaries. I might still be in a prisoner of war camp but I was now back up to speed.

His inner transformation from despair to hope is testimony to the power of the spiritual life, despite the physical backdrop and circumstances. As his mother was eventually to write in a letter to him later that spring, “It was good you had a dream to live when you did need one. Your world hasn’t vanished.”

Stamina, endurance, and a persistent belief in his country’s values enabled Commander Alvarez to withstand years of attempts by the Communists to extort and exploit him. In his case, because he had been in captivity the longest, he was particularly vulnerable to promises of early release. Additionally, because up until 1971 he had been so concerned about his wife, Tangee, he was vulnerable to the anticipation of being reunited with her. But over time, he had changed, having developed an inner reserve of strength from which he drew a renewed will for, and a deeper understanding of the meaning of life.

He observes about himself that by the time he had reached his last year of captivity, he had become, after eight years in chains, a more patient person, “so that like many people of the East, I cared little for the movement of the hands on a clock.” Time had become, for him, simply a change of seasons. Had it been necessary, he could have gone through many more years.

Following repatriation, Commander Alvarez remarried, and started a family after a long and arduous, painful and grim, episode in his life. While, happily, his circumstances had improved, the best part was the legacy which he had brought with him from Vietnam. On the day of his wedding, a U.S. flag was flown over the Capitol building in Washington, DC in his honor. At dusk, it was lowered and folded, and sent as a gift to a man who had served his country with honor, dignity, and valor.

CDR PORTER A. HALYBURTON, USN (RET.)

On 17 October 1965, Commander Halyburton became the fortieth American shot down over North Vietnam. Even though he was a Lieutenant junior grade, he had already flown 75 combat missions since reporting from the Training Command. While his treatment at the hands of the Vietnamese varied somewhat from season to season during the seven-and-a-half years of captivity, conditions improved towards the end of 1969. Prior to 1969, the darkest days stressed him and the rest of the small society of prisoners to a point where few of the rest of us have ever been, or probably ever will be. In that environment, characterized by change, fear, and uncertainty, Commander Halyburton emphasizes that what “works” for survival is also what “works” for growth and meaning in all kinds of life situations.

It is very difficult to predict how an individual will respond in the stressful environment of captivity. That response depends on the nature of the captivity, and the nature of the person—and these remain surprises until the existential moment has arrived. In Vietnam, every prisoner, sooner or later, came to a point where he realized that the enemy could make him do something he did not want to do. The pain of this reality stemmed from the realization that living up to the letter of the Code of Conduct was, under brutal and extreme circumstances, not possible for the vast majority of prisoners. That is, most prisoners eventually gave up information beyond name, rank, and serial number.

It was at this point that what Commander Halyburton refers to as, “the second line of defense,” came into play: one resisted to the very best of one’s ability, and then either provided the enemy with a lie, or gave up as useless a piece of information as possible. These concessions were never made without a fight. If the enemy wanted something, he was going to have to work for it. By taking this approach, the prisoner preserved and sharpened two essential ingredients for survival: his wits, and his will to resist. In turn, he built a reserve of strength for coming back to fight the second line of defense another day.

Along with many of his fellow prisoners, Commander Halyburton acknowledges that the role of faith cannot be divorced from survival in a captivity situation. The objects of faith may vary — God, country, family, one’s fellow prisoners, oneself — and may combine differently for different people. Regardless of what “faiths” a prisoner chose to rely on in captivity, his ability to maintain his faith, and to keep adverse circumstances in perspective, depended upon how active he remained physically, mentally, and spiritually. Living these three areas in some kind of balance through force of discipline multiplied and
enhanced the benefits to be derived from “keeping faith.”

In fact, “keeping faith” was often the only constant, through circumstances characterized by horror, fear, and unpredictability. Additionally, the depth of one’s faith was tested as mental and emotional needs changed, over the entire course of captivity, and evolved like the passing seasons. Commander Halyburton recalls three distinct stages of preoccupation in his own life during those years. In the first stage, he spent a great deal of time in retrospection, in which he reviewed, in exhaustive detail, every word he ever spoke, and every deed he ever did, for which he was either proud or remorseful. He filled in the conclusions of unfinished incidents or unresolved relationships, and revised those, which had not ended as he had hoped. After he had thus examined the past, he passed into the “future dreaming” stage, in which he projected and outlined everything he hoped, some day, to study, accomplish, or improve about himself. Daydreaming, he discovered, was a breath of fresh air from the earlier dwelling on the past, but he found that he could not stay there forever, either.

Eventually, he passed into a third stage, in which he learned to find meaning: life in the present. It was at this third and final stage that he finally felt at peace, in much the same way that Victor Frankl wrote about finding peace through being able to choose his own attitude, and transcend the environment of the concentration camp, in his book, *Man’s Search For Meaning*. Commander Halyburton discovered, once he had “gotten over” his need to review the past and project the future, that he had developed profound resources to grow in the present during his years of captivity.

It cannot go without saying that keeping faith and preserving one’s will took place in a community of prisoners, without whose collective internal network and sense of unity, individual resources would most certainly have dried up after a short period of time. The communal aspect of living, whether as prisoners in captivity in North Vietnam, or as families at home, became essential both to survival, and to ongoing mental, physical, and spiritual health. The unity of the prison camp also served to ensure that the good name of the United States would be preserved: because the propaganda war was being fought in Hanoi, the entire group had to follow the orders and judgment of camp leadership in the face of attempts to confuse, intimidate, or manipulate individual prisoners into believing and endorsing Communist propaganda about the United States’ political and military role in Vietnam. “Lone rangers” bent on becoming self-made heroes either died in captivity, or punished the entire group as a result of their independent actions and decisions. On the other hand, lives lived in connection with others were the only ones which survived and flourished, possibly because these were the only truly examined lives.

Commander Halyburton’s own “Life Statement” expresses the lessons learned in captivity about faith, will, and connectedness, thus:

I wish, at the instant of my death, to be able to look back upon a full and fruitful Christian life, lived as an honest man who has constantly striven to improve himself and the world in which he lives, and to die forgiven by God, with a clear conscience, the love and respect of my family and friends, and the peace of the Lord in my soul.

COL FRED V. CHERRY, USAF (RET.)

Colonel Cherry was one of the few black aviators who flew in Vietnam, and the first black to be captured. On 25 October 1965, while flying his fiftieth mission of the war, he led a squadron of F-105s against a series of missile installations in the North. Colonel Cherry recalls seeing rifle fire on the ground when he was about three minutes from the target, but was not particularly concerned until he heard a thump. Thinking that something electrical had probably been hit, he immediately headed towards the target, and released his weapons. Just as he was exiting the area, dense electrical smoke began to fill up the cockpit, and the plane exploded. By this time, the smoke was so dense that he could not see outside, and he had no idea whether he was upright or upside down. He ejected, and prayed, and hit the ground. In the process, he smashed his left shoulder, and broke his left wrist and ankle; and, as happened to many of his fellow prisoners, he landed right into the arms of a dozen militia. There was no opportunity for evasion. After some initial interrogation at Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi, he was transferred in November 1965 to the prison known as The Zoo in southwest Hanoi.

The Zoo is where Colonel Cherry met then — LTJG Porter Halyburton, who would be his cellmate for almost 9 months of captivity. Commander Halyburton would also become his nurse, confidante, and lifelong friend. Colonel Cherry believes that because “Hally,” as he calls him, was a white
southerner, the North Vietnamese intentionally put the two of them together, assuming that a white man and a black man from the American South would have “a long-term game to run.” While they were initially very wary around each other, they quickly developed a mutual trust which Colonel Cherry credits with saving his life. The injuries which he had sustained as a result of high-speed ejection had only partially healed. His wrist and ankle did not require medical attention, but he badly needed an operation on his shoulder. This eventually took place in February 1966, resulting in a torso cast which extended down to his hipline, but which, unfortunately, was not accompanied by penicillin or an equivalent antibiotic. In a month’s time, Colonel Cherry was dying of a massive infection. Feverish and delirious, he even recalls, at one point, leaving his body and going into town. (Years later, when he actually saw Hanoi in daylight, he recognized several streams, bridges, and buildings).

Over the next three months, as Colonel Cherry suffered from sadistic, negative medical treatment (major operations performed without anesthetic, antibiotics withheld, gasoline poured over his wounds), Hally conscientiously washed him and tended him, providing his own food and clothing so that his cellmate could live. The day the guards moved Hally to another cell, Colonel Cherry recalls, “was the most depressing evening of my life. I never hated to lose anybody so much in my entire life. We had become very good friends. He was responsible for my life.”

Colonel Cherry did survive his injuries, and went on to endure months of beatings, torture, and solitary confinement (700 days). Because he was the senior black officer in captivity, the North Vietnamese did everything they could to make him write statements denouncing the “American imperialists,” statements which, in turn, they hoped to pass on to young black GIs. Through all of this, Colonel Cherry was strongly motivated to resist by the thought that he was representing 24 million black Americans. He was determined to do nothing to shame his country or his people.

Raised in Suffolk, Virginia, at a time when segregation was the norm, and inequality between whites and blacks was not questioned, Colonel Cherry credits his parents with building into him toughness, a strong will, and a sense of fairness in doing things for other people. He also credits his sister for believing in him, and pushing him to do well in school. These qualities enabled him to pursue his dream of becoming a fighter pilot, in 1951. A fierce determination not to submit to his captors’ attempts at coercion, and an almost philosophical view of his own longing for freedom, allowed him to forgive the depressions and failures of others, doggedly communicating through the walls with those of his fellow prisoners who had begun to withdraw, until they, too, answered back.

Years after their repatriation, Colonel Cherry and Commander Halyburton continue to keep in touch with one another, and to tell others about “how we looked to each other the first time we met.” They describe the bonds of brotherhood which they forged in that hostile, alien setting in Hanoi, North Vietnam. Colonel Cherry insists,

No matter how rough the tortures were, no matter how sick I became, I never once said to myself, I want to take my own life or quit. I would just pray to the Supreme Being each morning for the best mind to get through the interrogations, and then give thanks each night for makin’ it through the day.

He makes it sound simple, but there was nothing easy about the spirit of survival, which Colonel Cherry evidenced as a prisoner of war. That spirit grew out of his upbringing, his faith in God, and the love of a fellow prisoner who would not let him die.

VADM JAMES B. STOCKDALE, USN (RET.)

As the most senior naval officer imprisoned in North Vietnam, Admiral Stockdale became well known during his years of captivity for extraordinary courage in leadership. Following repatriation, he was awarded the Medal of Honor for offering resistance to the North Vietnamese, on behalf of his fellow prisoners, by “deliberately inflicting a near-mortal wound to his person in order to convince his captors of his willingness to give up his life rather than capitulate.” Admiral Stockdale is also a persuasive and insightful thinker and writer on the lessons of captivity. From the day of his shootdown (9 September 1965) until the day of his release (12 February 1973), he experienced both the pain of externally imposed suffering, and the power of his own inner resistance.

What “secret weapon” became his security during those years? It was “those selected portions of philosophic thought that emphasized human dignity and self-respect,” epitomized and expounded upon in Epictetus’ Enchiridion, which helped him organize and understand an experience as shocking as shootdown and capture by the enemy, and face it
head-on. A few years prior to his capture, Admiral Stockdale had taken the opportunity to study moral philosophy at Stanford University under Professor Philip Rhinelander. It was Professor Rhinelander who not only taught him and tutored him privately, but also gave him, at the end of his course of study, a copy of Epictetus’ *Enchiridion*. A moral guide written by a military man of the ancient world, the *Enchiridion* discussed matters over which the author acknowledged that he had no control — a seemingly odd choice of a parting gift for a naval aviator in a technological age. Nevertheless, while he recognized little in Epictetus that applied to him in 1963, here is how Admiral Stockdale, in a 1974 letter to Professor Joseph Brennan of the Naval War College, described what went through his mind on 9 September 1965:

As I sped over the treetops it became immediately apparent that I had lost my flight controls—by reflex action I pulled the curtain and ejected—and was almost immediately suspended in air 200 feet above a village street, in total silence except for rifle shots and the whir of bullets past my ear. So help me in those fleeting seconds before I landed among the waiting crowd I had two vivid thoughts. (1) Five years to wait (I had studied enough modem Far East history and talked to enough Forward Air Controllers in the South to fully appreciate the dilemma of Vietnam — I turned out to be an optimist by 2 1/2 years). (2) I am leaving that technological world and entering the world of Epictetus.

Just as Epictetus had observed in his world centuries before, Admiral Stockdale soon discovered that in an environment that can best be described as a “buzz saw,” human will was the only salvation.

Human will, of course, was the primary target of the North Vietnamese. If they could succeed in weakening the resolve of men who were accustomed to making their own decisions, by removing not only their independence, but also their sense of hope, they would have caused them to become self-defeating. Admiral Stockdale, in the book he later co-wrote with his wife, Sybil, summarized his state of mind during the winter of 1966 as preoccupied with one central fear: that he was doomed to a “life of continuous shame without friends or self-respect.” After six months of captivity, he had all but locked himself in to futility and failure: “When I took stock of the power the Vietnamese had over me, my weakness and crippledness, my sinking mental state, it seemed clear that they had me on a downhill run that would force me to the bottom.”

Nevertheless, in testimony to his ability to be truthful with himself, and to live with himself, Admiral Stockdale survived by thinking, imagining, dreaming, and, in general, by learning to make sense of loneliness. In a tone reminiscent of Epictetus and the Stoic philosophy which contributed so prominently to the formation of his own world view, Admiral Stockdale summarizes the perspective which helped him understand the confusing, ever-changing events of captivity: “In such circumstances, when one has no voice in what happens to him and randomness and chanciness determine his fate, one lives in a worse hell than if continually pestered by a mean but predictable antagonist. Chance and continual uncertainty are the ultimate destabilizers.” Simply knowing that he was experiencing what others who had gone before him — even as far back as ancient times — had come to know as the evil depths of human behavior, helped him remain connected with himself and his fellow prisoners; and gave him the resolve to fight hard for his own, his family’s, and his country’s honor.

How does one acquire that perspective and resolve? As did many other prisoners of war, Admiral Stockdale drew liberally from the lessons in life learned early in childhood; from his higher education and training; and from a persistent desire to make the best of a terrible situation. With these assets he maintained his wits, and his knowledge of himself and his captors. When he finally came home, he had the assurance that he had lived through seven-and-a-half years of extreme moral stress without ever having made a compromise to conscience.

**CHAPLAINS AS RETAINED PERSONNEL**

Learning Objective: Recognize the selfless response of chaplains in captivity during WW II and recall one contemporary chaplain’s suggestions after going through survival training.

**CHAPLAINS CAPTURED IN THE PHILIPPINES**

War came to the Philippines on the morning of 8 December 1941. A strong force of enemy planes hit Army airfields in the vicinity of Manila shortly before noon, knocking out of action one-half of the Army bombers and two-thirds of the fighter planes. On 10 December, the Japanese, with complete air superiority,
struck at Cavite. The bombs from 50 enemy planes left the Navy yard a mass of flames. About 200,000 tons of American shipping were in the harbor at the time, including the submarine tenders *Holland* and *Canopus*. Most of the American ships managed to escape.

Four Navy chaplains were taken prisoners by the Japanese in the 5 months campaign waged to conquer the Philippine Islands. They were Earl Brewster of the *Holland*, D. L. Quinn of the Sixteenth Naval District, F. J. McManus of the *Canopus*, and H. R. Trump of the Fourth Marine Regiment. Brewster and Quinn were taken when Manila fell, in the closing days of 1941 and opening days of 1942. McManus and Trump were on Corregidor during the last bitter days of its defense and were made prisoners when it surrendered on 6 May 1942.

Chaplain Earl Brewster of the *Holland* was recovering from an operation performed in the Canacao Naval Hospital, Cavite, when his ship left the Manila Bay area. He reported for duty on 15 December and was ordered by the Staff of Commander Submarines to a unit assembling at the Philippine Girls College at Caloocan that consisted largely of medical personnel and former patients of the hospital. He reported there on the 20th. The victorious Japanese forces, sweeping through the city of Manila during the closing days of December, took Brewster prisoner and confined him with others at Santa Scholastica’s College, Manila, on 2 January 1942.

Chaplain D. L. Quinn was also interned at Santa Scholastica’s College, (see fig 2-1). A diary kept by R. W. Kentner, pharmacist mate first-class during the whole of his captivity, records the fact that Chaplains Brewster and Quinn were among those transferred to the Elementary School at Pasay, Rizal, on 9 May 1942, and that the two were sent to Bilibid Prison on 28 May. On 2 June, the two chaplains were sent to Cabanatuan. Regarding his experiences as a prisoner of the Japanese, Brewster has written:

The transporting of prisoners between Manila and Cabanatuan was effected by means of half sized metal boxcars, which had to hold from 80 to 100 men, together with their gear. The 6- to 8-hour trip was not exactly a luxury ride in that heat. Of course, a hike was required on each end of these trips, and they were never under ideal conditions, to put it mildly. We usually found far from ideal conditions when we arrived at our destination.

Arriving at Cabanatuan on 1 June 1942, we started on our rice diet, which was really quite an experience. Lack of water, sanitation, medical supplies and equipment, a combination of malaria, dysentery, beri-beri, and diphtheria, were responsible for the loss of 2,000 out of 8,000 men in 4 months, nine-tenths of whom could have been saved with decent food.

We buried (after the Japs agreed to permit chaplains to officiate) from 10 to 40 a day during this period. The experience of seeing Zero Ward, where men wallowed and died in their own filth, to be moved to another barracks labeled the “morgue,” where I have seen 40 naked skeletons on the bare deck, to be carried out to the so-called cemetery by fellow prisoners, some of whom would themselves be carried out soon, to be thrown into watery common graves to be visited by roaming wild dogs, is a sight some of us will not soon forget. And may God help us if we fail to keep faith with those who can no longer enjoy the life they have helped to make possible for us.

Partly because there was no other place, and partly because the Japs banned religious services for a while at Cabanatuan, I held services in my own barracks (at the request of fellow naval officers) during most of the time that I was there. In spite of the fact that some of these services had to be held in secret, and in spite of a lack of facilities (I did have my New Testament) we had some rich experiences, and I personally enjoyed a relationship with my shipmates that I could never expect to have duplicated. I was also privileged to hold services for enlisted men in their barracks.

A few days after their arrival at Cabanatuan, Chaplain Quinn was transferred to camp No. 3, where he remained until that camp was closed on 28 October 1942, when he was returned to camp No. 1. In the meantime, Brewster had been sent with other prisoners to Mindanao, and the two chaplains did not meet again until October 1944. Of his trip to and experiences in Mindanao, Brewster testified:

In October of 1942 I was selected to be one of 1,000 officers and men to go to a camp in Mindanao, to which place we were sent via Manila in our boxcars, and then to Davao by ship. This was a rugged experience, taking a dozen days for a trip which could have been made in two. Many of us were not in good shape by then. I myself was in such bad shape from beri-beri that I was forced to turn in to

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**2-14**
our so-called hospital soon after arriving there. This was an experience, the like of which I would not wish for my worst enemy. Suffice it to say, that I suffered the tortures of the damned, and my weight went to 120 pounds from a normal 200. But, by the grace of God, it was my good fortune to gradually recover to the extent that since I have been privileged to return home to normal living, I seem to be fully restored to my former good health.

Over the period of 20 months we remained here at this former penal colony, things did not turn out as well as we had hoped. Perhaps a very successful escape by 10 Americans was partly responsible for this. Food rations were always inadequate, even when the things we needed were available. Services were banned part of the time, but we managed to hold them most of the time (the hard way) and had some rich experiences. We found there were some things they couldn’t take from us—although we had practically none of the things we were used to.

On 4 April 1943, Major Jack Hawkins, USMC, escaped from Mindanao, and, on 7 February 1944, wrote about the heroic services rendered by Chaplain Brewster while in prison. Hawkins stated:
After the final surrender of the Philippines, I was interned at prison camp number 1 at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, P. I. I met Chaplain Brewster for the first time in this camp and was immediately struck by his splendid example of courage and fortitude under the stress of the terrible circumstances in which we found ourselves. In this camp all Naval and Marine Corps personnel, seeking to keep together as much as possible, had managed to be quartered in the same portion of the camp. It was difficult to maintain faith and hope in these horrible circumstances, but it was made easier for all of us by the moral and spiritual leadership of Chaplain Brewster, (see fig 2-2). He was our friend and counselor and a constant source of good cheer and hope. He ministered to the sick, organized a daily Bible class for us which benefited all of us greatly, and every Sunday he delivered a sermon to us which was absolutely inspiring. His efforts were endless even though his physical strength ebbed constantly as a result of the starvation we were enduring.

Figure 2-2.—Chaplain Earl Ray Brewster.
Finally, a group of prisoners numbering 1,000 were sent to camp number 2 at the former Davao Penal Colony in Mindanao. Chaplain Brewster and I were in this group. We all suffered terribly from exposure and the unbelievably crowded and filthy conditions on the Japanese ship during the 11-day trip to Davao. Upon our arrival there, we were forced to march about 20 miles, which, in our weakened condition, was almost beyond the limits of our endurance. It was not long after our arrival in this new camp that Chaplain Brewster developed beri-beri, the disease which caused untold suffering among the prisoners. The chaplain’s condition was very serious. He suffered endless, stabbing pain in his feet and legs and he was not able to get up from his bed in our crude hospital. He was very thin. Sleep for him was almost impossible since there were no sedatives and the pain never stopped, not even for a minute. He once told me “Jack, I never knew such suffering was possible on this earth. But I will never give up.”

Major Hawkins and others managed to smuggle fruit past the guards which they brought to the suffering chaplain. It was good medicine. Brewster began to rally. “We marveled,” wrote Hawkins “when we found him on his feet, even though it caused him torturing pain, holding religious services for the other suffering patients in the hospital.” And, Hawkins added: “When I escaped with the other members of our party of 10, we left Chaplain Brewster still improving, still walking, still defying pain, still bringing hope and courage to the hearts of men.”

Of his religious activities Brewster wrote:

The response to religious activities was good, everything considered. I was even requested by a group of fellow bed patients, while I was not able to walk, to preach to them from my bed, which I did (sitting on my cot) for several Sundays. As I mentioned above, some services had to be held secretly, although they let us arrange for some special services at Christmas and Easter. Mother’s Day services were as well attended, as were the services on Easter. There was considerable interest in Communion Services. I had no elements or equipment. The men were asked to bring their canteen cups, and I poured the wine, which was melted grape jelly from my Red Cross box. The bread was made from rice flour. We really had some good times together and I have not enjoyed preaching anywhere more than in those strange surroundings.

Personal contacts, of course, were a large part of the chaplain’s opportunity. He was with his parishioners in every kind of experience—eating, sleeping, hiking, bathing, and working. I was on a rope-making detail for a while, and on several details in the fields. For a time in Mindanao I was the only active Protestant chaplain among 2,000 fellow prisoners, and was able to spend most of my time working as a chaplain. During this period it was my privilege to read aloud each day to as many as 50 men whose eyesight had become more impaired than my own. This was also rather practical since books were scarce. I found reading aloud a couple of hours each day to be very good training.

When the Japanese feared an invasion of Mindanao, the prisoners were transferred back to Luzon and sent to Cabanatuan via Bilibid Prison in Manila. On the first stage of their return trip, from the camp to Davao, the prisoners “were jammed into open trucks”; their shoes were removed; all were blindfolded; and a Japanese guard was seated on the cab armed with a stick (in addition to his gun) which he used to beat any caught trying to peek under the blindfold or who began talking. Brewster wrote:

It would be quite difficult to describe adequately our trips in Jap ships where we were jammed below decks, even into dirty coal bunkers infested with rats. There was not even enough room for all of us to sit down at one time. We had to try to sleep in relays, and any adequate rest was impossible. Food (rice twice a day) and water (one Canteen a day) were terribly scarce. There was no bathing. On our trip back to Luzon most of us did not remove our clothing for the 3 weeks en route. Our friends in Bilibid Prison, upon our arrival there (on our way back to Cabanatuan) said that we were the worst looking large group they had seen, and they had seen some bad ones. It was nice to come back through Bilibid again and see many of my old friends of the Canacao hospital staff (Bilibid remained largely a hospital unit) and others.

The sea trip from Mindanao to Luzon took almost three weeks, with 1,200 men packed in two small dirty holds.
Brewster was sent back to Cabanatuan, but was again returned to Bilibid on request of the Japanese commander (a doctor). A special truck was sent from Cabanatuan to transport Brewster to Manila. “I am told,” commented Brewster, “that I am the only one-man detail the Japs ever sent out from Cabanatuan—a dubious distinction, but it resulted in my being retained in Manila.” The special duty assignment at Bilibid prevented Brewster from being included in the company of prisoners sent to Japan in the closing days of 1944. This exception probably saved his life.

Throughout his prison experience, a period of more than three years, Brewster carried on his religious activities as far as his strength permitted and other circumstances allowed. He reported that one of his hardest tasks was that of conducting burial services for 40 men who died in one day at Cabanatuan. As a form of punishment for some minor offense, the Japanese often banned the holding of Divine Services. At one time, the Japanese ruled that, while reading from the Bible and singing were permitted, preaching was forbidden. Commenting on this, Brewster said: “I would just look at my Bible and say, ‘If I were preaching I would say this’ and give my sermon.”

Brewster’s account continues:

My work as a Protestant chaplain in Bilibid was as enjoyable as could be expected under the circumstances, and it was a real privilege to work with fellow prisoners, even though they were down physically and consequently low as far as morale was concerned. The food ration (rice, corn, and a few so-called vegetables) for the last 3 months got as low as 800 calories a day, which speaks for itself. The average weight of the 800 prisoners released there was 113 pounds. I missed the October draft to Japan (there were 5 survivors out of 1,700 prisoners) because the Japs retained me as the lowest ranking reserve chaplain. I was sent out to Fort McKinley with 400 cripples about the middle of November, not to return to Bilibid until 5 January 1945, which was 3 weeks after the last group (300 survivors out of 1,600) had left for Japan. Many of my best friends were in these last two drafts, and it was heart rending to see them half starved and sick, waiting as doomed men, which most of them proved to be.

I spent Christmas and Thanksgiving of ’44 at Fort McKinley, where they almost starved us for 7 weeks. We had nothing with which to celebrate, but some of the men still had inner resources, which caused them to be able to hold up their chins and hope for a better day. We had nothing but rice and watery soup (no meat) twice a day— the same as other days. Most of what little meat we did get from time to time was so spoiled that you could smell it from across a street. But, in spite of everything we were able, by the grace of God, to hold services, reading groups, and even have some special observance of Christmas and Thanksgiving. For the Christian Christmas, Easter and Thanksgiving are always meaningful.

Coming back into Manila on 5 January 1945 I found that I was the only Protestant chaplain there—all the others (several Army and three Navy) had been included in the December draft. They had retained a Catholic Army chaplain, apparently anticipating my return to fill the quota which the Japs had allowed during the whole time at Bilibid. Now, there were 800 men in Manila, which was nearly two-thirds of the military prisoners left in the Philippines, since there were about 500 cripples left at Cabanatuan, whose peak population had been at least 20 times that number. These 500 were liberated, as is well known, by the Rangers a week or so before the 1st Cavalry and the 37th Infantry came into Manila.

In the closing days of his incarceration in Bilibid, Brewster was conducting funerals every day. These services were often interrupted by air-raid alarms when American planes flew overhead. “We did not object,” wrote Brewster, “for it meant that the day of our possible release was drawing nearer.” The great day of deliverance came on 4 February 1945. Brewster was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for “meritorious conduct” while detained by the Japanese …. The terrible bombing Cavite received on 10 December 1941 was the signal for a general exodus of all possible American shipping from the Manila Bay area. The Canopus, however, with her chaplain, F. J. McManus, (see fig 2-3), remained behind to tend her brood of submarines still operating in Philippine waters. On Christmas Eve, the Japanese again bombed Cavite and the Canopus narrowly escaped being hit. Since the Americans were moving all strategic supplies and available forces as rapidly as possible out of Manila to Bataan and Corregidor, the tender was
ordered to Marivales Bay on the southern tip of Bataan. There she continued to serve her submarines. A camouflage was hastily improvised but this did not prevent her from being attacked on the 29th when bombs fell all around the helpless ship. She took one direct hit that left many casualties.

In the citation for the Silver Star Medal, awarded posthumously to Chaplain McManus, the following reference is made to the chaplain’s heroic service when the Canopus was hit.

“When an armor-piercing bomb exploded in the vicinity of the after magazine crushing or exploding 70 rounds of ammunition, killing 6 men and wounding 6 others, and starting fires in adjacent compartments, Chaplain McManus, with complete disregard for his own safety, entered the smoke and steam filled engine room, assisted in removing the wounded and administered the last rites to the dying. His courageous action, beyond the call of duty and in the face of grave danger, is in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

The last American submarines were ordered out of the Bay on 31 December, but it was then too late for the mother ship to slip by the Japanese blockade. When the Canopus
was bombed again a week later, she was left with such a list that the Japanese evidently thought she was a derelict. The officers of the Canopus did not disillusion the enemy and made no attempt to right the vessel. Activity, however, continued aboard especially at night when the ship’s machine shop rendered valuable aid in a multitude of ways to the defenders of Bataan.

During the weeks and months of the siege before being transferred to Corregidor, Chaplain McManus made frequent trips from the Canopus to the island fortress in order to minister to Catholic personnel there and especially to members of the Fourth Marine Regiment. “This was far beyond the normal call of duty,” wrote an Army chaplain, “and in addition to his other work.”

As the fortunes of the defenders became increasingly desperate, it was finally decided to move the naval forces from Mariveles Bay to Corregidor. This was done in the night of April 6—7. Under cover of darkness, the Canopus was moved to deeper water and scuttled. Bataan fell on 9 April. Corregidor held out for about four more agonizing weeks and then on 6 May it, too, surrendered.

The fourth naval chaplain to be included in the surrender of American forces to the Japanese in the Philippines was H. R. Trump, who left Shanghai with the Fourth Marines on 27—28 November 1941. They reached Manila the week before the outbreak of war. The Marines played a valiant role in the defense of Bataan and Corregidor. Chaplain Oliver, who had opportunity to see Chaplain Trump at work, wrote of his tireless services in behalf of his men:

Upon arriving at Corregidor late in the evening of 27 December 1941, Chaplain Trump learned that final radio messages could be sent to the United States from military personnel and although very tired from the hazardous trip from Olongapo, when his regiment was forced to evacuate to Corregidor, he sat up all night collecting messages and money from the men for transmission home and censored over 800 of these radiograms. It was the final message many people received from their men who were later killed in action or died as prisoners of war.

Chaplain Trump’s regiment was widely scattered over Corregidor, but he was most faithful in visiting them and conducting services for his men under enemy shelling and bombing.

Following the surrender of Corregidor, both McManus and Trump elected to go with their men. On 2 July 1942, Kentner, the faithful diarist of Bilibid Prison, noted in his journal:

The following named United States Navy chaplains arrived from Corregidor this date: LCDR H. R. Trump, CHC, U. S. Navy; LT F. J. McManus, CHC, U. S. Navy. Trump and McManus remained at Bilibid for only one night and were then sent to Camp No. 1, at Cabanatuan, where they found Chaplain Brewster. Navy chaplains joined with Army chaplains at this same camp in providing Divine Services, religious instruction, and in other expressions of their spiritual ministry. The prisoners were able to construct a chapel with materials they found or salvaged, large enough to seat about 30. The roof was thatched.

All faiths used this chapel. Because the seating capacity of the chapel was so small, most of the congregation attending Divine Services had to remain outside, but they could still hear the voice of the speaker.

Among the prisoners was a Jewish cantor. Protestant chaplains took turns in assisting him conduct services for those of the Jewish faith.

Chaplain A. C. Oliver, USA, also a prisoner at Cabanatuan, in his testimony of 1 November 1945, commented as follows upon the faithful ministry rendered by Chaplain McManus:

In Military Prison Camp No. I, Cabanatuan, Chaplain McManus constantly visited the sick, gave generously of very limited personal funds for the purchase of food for the sick . . . and frequently worked on details so that a sick man would not have to go out. Many times he volunteered to take the place of a sick Chaplain so that he would not have to work on the prison farm, airport project, or in cleaning the Japanese Guard Company area. He had the profound respect of men of all faiths and was a potent factor in bolstering their morale.

According to Oliver, both Army and Navy chaplains often held Divine Services contrary to the orders of the Japanese. Such was done at the risk of the life of the officiating chaplain. Oliver made special mention of Chaplains McManus and Trump carrying on under these dangers and difficulties. Oliver’s commendation of Trump included the following:

In Philippine Military Prison Camp No. 1, Cabanatuan, Chaplain Trump constantly
visited the sick, acted as welfare officer for Group I for a period of 5 months, worked on Japanese details in order to be near his men, and in the course of this was beaten severely several times when he interfered in the interest of the men as a Japanese guard was beating them. In addition, Chaplain Trump carried on an excellent religious program and his services constantly attracted a large group of men. He had the respect of the men of all faiths and was a potent factor in keeping up their morale.

Chaplain John E. Borneman, another Army chaplain who was held prisoner in Camp No. 1 and who also observed the Navy chaplains at work, told how the Protestant chaplains conducted Bible and discussion classes at night, all unknown to the Japanese and contrary to their orders. Chaplain Trump led a series of meetings on the subject: “The Man Everybody Should Know.” Protestant Army chaplains joined in this project by presenting other subjects. The attendance averaged about 80. The chaplains felt that such classes were most important, not only for the opportunity they presented for religious instruction, but also for the contribution they gave in maintaining morale.

In the meantime, Chaplain Quinn was also carrying on such religious services under similar difficult conditions in camp No. 3. Chaplain Borneman reported that when Chaplain Quinn returned to camp No. 1, he joined in the Bible class that met at night and led a series of studies in the life of Paul. Among the survivors of the prison camp and of the terrible voyage on three different prison ships to Japan in January 1945 was Chief Yeoman Theodore R Brownell whose testimony regarding his experience throws further light on the work the Navy chaplains:

I’m certain if facilities had been placed at our disposal, the chaplains would have carried on much the same as they would have under peace conditions, but they were as much deprived by the Japanese as any other one of us and were having a difficult time keeping themselves alive. I do believe, however, that Chaplain McManus was probably the most outstanding chaplain with us. Chaplain Cummings [U. S. Army] and Chaplain H. R. Trump were “in there pitching too,” but McManus had a quality rarely found in an individual. He was convincing in every undertaking and I personally have found him to be a man who believed in what he preached (pardon the expression). As Camp Sergeant Major for the Cabanatuan Prison Camp No. 1, I was in a position to meet and know not only the chaplains, but every other officer and man who had occasion to come near the office or, well, I now realize that I must have personally known thousands. The programs for religious services were prepared in my office. I took care of passes through to our “makeshift” hospital for chaplains and all.

Late in 1944, the Japanese, realizing that they might lose the Philippines, decided to transfer to Japan the allied prisoners still held in the Islands. On 13 October, many prisoners were moved from Cabanatuan to Bilibid Prison preparatory for shipment to Japan, including Chaplains Trump, Quinn, and McManus. Brownell has given the following vivid account of the harrowing experiences through which the unfortunate prisoners passed:

On the 13th of December 1944, the Japanese marched 1,639 officers and men from Bilibid Prison to Pier 7, Manila, Philippine Islands. A roundabout way was selected to help humiliate we prisoners in the eyes of the Filipinos and Japanese military in Manila. The day was a scorching-hot one and the march was not an easy one for men in the poor physical condition that then prevailed in our ranks. We were loaded like cattle into the forward and after hold of the ship the Oryoko Maru. It was just a matter of hours before many deaths resulted from heat exhaustion and suffocation.

Statements by survivors tell of men, emaciated from three years’ malnutrition and ill treatment, collapsing and dying under the horrible conditions which existed below decks. One of the survivors, Ensign Jimmy Mullins, testified: “Many deaths occurred among the naval personnel on board this ship in the night of 14 December 1944 due to suffocation.” The ship was spotted by American planes after it left Manila Bay, and, since the vessel displayed no markings to identify her as a prison ship, was bombed. There were no casualties among the prisoners that day. The vessel put in at Olongapo, Subic Bay, where American planes bombed her again on the 15th, inflicting many casualties among the prisoners. Brownell’s account continues:

... off Olongapo, Philippine Islands, the ship was strafed by the American flyers and
eventually bombed. Many officers and men were killed instantly or suffered major wounds when a bomb exploded at the base of the mainmast. Part of the mast fell into the hold and, together with hatch covers, numerous men were buried in the debris.

A couple of miserable days were spent on a tennis court in plain sight of attacking planes and then we were loaded into trucks and transported to a theater in San Fernando, Pampanga, on the Island of Luzon again. A couple of miserable days and nights spent in cramped positions but, for a change, a little more rice in our stomachs, we were loaded into oriental-type (small) boxcars like cattle. Men again met death on a crawling trip to San Fernando, LaUnion, from heat exhaustion and lack of water. I recall that my buddy, William Earl Surber, USA (now deceased), and I took turns sucking air through a little bolt hole in the rear of the car we were packed into.

It is known that the three Navy chaplains were among those who reached the shore at Olongapo and that they shared the terrible experiences of their comrades on the tennis court and the train ride to San Fernando. Brownell’s revealing and almost unbelievable description of conditions follows:

This miserable train ride ended at San Fernando, LaUnion still on the Island of Luzon. This was on Christmas Eve. The following day we were marched into a schoolyard where we were furnished with a more plentiful portion of rice and limited supply of water. That night we were herded into ranks and marched to another point several kilometers away and placed on the sands of a beach. We waited there all that following day and night in the hot sun while horses were being unloaded from some Japanese ships. The next day, men and officers dying from the usual causes (dysentery mostly) were loaded into the forward and after holds of these cattle carriers for the second leg of a trip (beyond the belief of people in our so-called civilized age) and after scraping up the manure into piles in order to make sufficient room, we formed ourselves into groups of about 30 men per group; this being done in order to have some sort of order maintained in drawing anticipated rice and soup.

The second transport was boarded the 28 or 29 of December and the Japanese again started for Japan. No words can adequately describe the horrible sufferings endured on this second hell-ship. Men died from slow starvation, lack of water, brutal beatings, exposure, and disease. Many of the men suffered from diarrhea and dysentery.

On 9 January 1945, shortly before its arrival at Takao, Formosa, American planes spotted the vessel and bombed it. Ensign Mullins inserted a notation in his testimony that “Lieutenant David Long Quinn, 63952, USN, had previously died on ‘7 January’ 1945 en route to Formosa.

Brownell’s account of the voyage from Formosa to Japan, on the third vessel with an account of the passing of Chaplain Trump, follows:

On the 14th of January, 1945, the Americans bombed us off Takao, Formosa. Some five hundred or so were instantly killed in the forward hold (mostly all officers) and some three hundred and twenty-some odd injured or killed in the after hold. From that ship we were transferred to another pile of junk and thus started a freezing trip to Southern Japan to Moji to be exact.

Chaplain H. R. Trump, USN, laid on the deck at my feet and was cheery and had high morale, but he was (had been) a big man and seemed to require more water and rice than a small man like myself. Each day, he was wasting away and finally, on the 27th of January, 1945, about 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning, he “went to sleep.” Dying from starvation and exposure has more mental than physical agony. His last few days alive were his “hell” for the want of water. An average of about two tablespoonfuls a day were, I would consider, about maximum received. A Chaplain Murphy died the day before that. His demise was caused mostly from malnutrition—diarrhea. He shook constantly from the cold as he wouldn’t stay snuggled up close to someone else as we were all doing.

We landed in Moji on the 31st of January 1945, with less than 400 of the original 1,639!

According to the statement of another survivor, LTJG A. W. Long, “LT. Francis Joseph McManus died during the last week of January.” Only Earl Brewster of the four Navy chaplains taken prisoners in the
Philippines survived. He escaped because he was left behind at Bilibid Prison.

Chaplains of all services performed many acts of valor in combat during World War II.

The following article is reprinted in its entirety as published in the Air Force Magazine, Jan 98, entitled, “Heroic Noncombatants.” It was written by John L Frisbee.

By definition chaplains are noncombatants, yet in the Pacific Theater alone, more than 20 chaplains were killed in action while ministering to the spiritual and physical needs of the troops. One of the most notable examples of sustained heroism among chaplains was that of Robert Preston Taylor.

During the campaign to hold the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines, Taylor spent many days in the battle area, searching out and caring for the physically wounded and disheartened, sometimes behind enemy lines. By his example, he brought hope and religious faith to those who had lost both and created a new faith among some who had none. These were hallmarks of his ministry throughout the war. He was awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action.

During the death march that followed the surrender of Bataan, Taylor suffered many beatings and calculated torture for his attempts to alleviate the suffering of other POWs. At Cabanatuan, the largest of the POW compounds, the inspirational Taylor soon became the best known and respected of the officers. He volunteered for duty in the worst of all areas, the hospital, where the average life of a patient was 19 days. Many men could have been saved if the Japanese had provided a minimum of medication, of which they had ample supplies.

Taylor devised a plan for getting medical supplies from Philippine guerrillas and smuggling them into camp—an offense punishable by death. The plan was carried out largely by a corporal who was assigned work at railroad yards near the camp. The supplies could be obtained by Clara Phillips, an American woman who had contacts with the guerrillas. As medication began to filter into the camp, the death rate among patients declined drastically.

Eventually the smuggling operation was exposed. Phillips was sentenced to life imprisonment and several participants were executed. Taylor was threatened with immediate death by the brutal camp commandant, Captain Suzuki, then confined in a “heat box”—a four-by-five-foot cage placed in the blazing sun—where he was expected to die. With barely enough food and water to keep him alive in the pest-infested cage, Taylor survived the box for nine weeks. His example encouraged others in the boxes to not give up. Near death, Taylor was moved to the hospital to die. Against all odds, he survived.

A new and more humane commandant replaced Suzuki. Conditions began to improve, in part due to Taylor’s influence over the new man. In October 1944, the Japanese ordered all American officers at Cabanatuan to be shipped to Japan. The Americans now were within 200 miles of Manila. Defeat stared Japan in the face. Some 1,600 officers were moved to Manila, where they were held nearly two months while the enemy assembled a convoy to take them and others to Japan.

Early in December, the hottest and driest month in the Philippines, the men were marched to the docks. The 1,619 from Cabanatuan were assigned to Oryoku Maru, which once had been a luxury liner. The men were forced into the ship’s three sweltering, unventilated holds. About two square feet of space was available for each man. There were no sanitary facilities. The first night, 30 men died in just one of the holds.

After an attack on the convoy by US bombers whose crews did not know there were Americans aboard, only Oryoku Maru survived and it was anchored in Subic Bay. The next morning it was bombed and left sinking. Taylor was severely wounded but continued to help others out of the doomed vessel. As those who could swim neared the shore, Japanese troops opened fire on them, killing many.

Jammed into a succession of equally crowded, unsanitary hulks, and with the barest minimum of food and water, the officers from Cabanatuan finally reached Japan on Jan. 30 in freezing weather for which they were not
clothed. Only 400 of the original 1,619 survived the horrible experience in the “hell ships,” as they became known. Throughout the long months at Cabanatuan and the terrible voyage to Japan, Taylor never ceased to encourage hope among the POWs and to enlighten their spiritual lives.

When Taylor regained some strength as his wounds healed, he was assigned to work in the coal mines at Fukuoka. Soon formations of B-29s began to fill the skies of Japan. For that country, the war clearly was lost. The POWs were moved to Manchuria until the war ended. Only two chaplains who were aboard the hell ships survived.

After the war, Taylor remained in the Air Force. He was assigned to wing and command chaplain posts at several US bases and ultimately was named Air Force Chief of Chaplains with the rank of Major General. On his retirement in 1966, he returned to his native Texas to continue a life of service. Throughout his years that were marked by the horrors of war and by great personal suffering, he never lost the faith that sustained him and that he engendered in those whose lives he touched. He and the many chaplains who have devoted their lives to the service of others are a part of the Air Force tradition of valor.

The next article is entitled, “Escape and Evasion: The Chaplain’s Role.” It appears in an Army Training document. It is written by Chaplain Daniel Minjares, who is endorsed by the Church of the Nazarene. He is describing his experience in survival training:

The Blackhawk helicopter swooped in low and swift over the treetops, settling in a downward rush of heavy wind and receding engine noises to the landing strip at North Fort Hood. Eight pilots and I looked anxiously out of the windows. We could see the MP guards that were at the far end of the strip. As the aircraft touched down in the grassy field, the crew chief opened the door and we quickly seized the opportunity before us, jumping out and sprinting toward a nearby tree line. This was our chance to put into practice the escape and evasion techniques we had learned.

Unfortunately, the MPs reacted too quickly to our escape attempt. One of the pilots and I soon found ourselves face down in the grass with MPs handcuffing and searching us. We were POWs! I am the chaplain for the 15th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation). I recently participated with 24 pilots from my unit in phased training related to Escape and Evasion and Conduct as a Prisoner of War.

During the Escape and Evasion training, I trained with CSM John Gregorcyk, a Vietnam and Desert Storm veteran with 10 years’ experience in Special Forces. At the beginning of our exercise, the Observer/Controller gave us two destinations via grid coordinates and told us to avoid capture by the Opposing Forces (OPFOR). Midway through our training, instructors from the Air Force Survival School taught classes on survival, escape and evasion techniques, and how to undergo interrogation. We also received an MRE, which was to be our only food for the two-day exercise. We were prisoners of war in the Corps Interrogation Facility (CIF), operated by Company A, 163d Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation). In the CIF we learned what it is like to actually be a prisoner of war. We were searched again, and then we waited to be questioned. Each pilot was given information that the interrogators were to attempt to uncover during their questioning. When I identified myself as a chaplain, and indicated that I was to be a detained person, the military police allowed me to keep the New Testament and inspirational cards that I carried to continue ministry to my fellow POWs. After several hours in the CIF, the
exercise was concluded, but not before I learned critical lessons that I outline here.

**LAND NAVIGATION IS CRUCIAL**

During the Escape and Evasion phase of the training, our ability to navigate was seriously tested. Since we were attempting to avoid capture, the terrain features and vegetation dictated our route to conceal our movement as much as possible. We could not rely only on azimuth readings, pace counts or following roads to avoid the OPFOR. A key factor affecting the ability to navigate is that virtually all movement during evasion would be done at night. The important use of terrain features as “handrails” for navigation cannot be underestimated. By carefully observing terrain (river beds, ridge lines) during daylight hours, you will be able to improve your navigation during hours of darkness.

**STAY CALM, BE PATIENT**

It is important to stay calm while attempting to evade captors. It is easy to panic. You must stop and think about what you are going to do before acting. Soldiers need to learn the importance of patiently waiting for the right moment to act. Carefully thinking through a course of action will pay great dividends. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady successfully evaded Serbian troops for six days in war-torn Bosnia. His commander noted that O’Grady’s ability to “maintain his cool” played a key role in this achievement. O’Grady moved slowly and carefully while avoiding hostile troops, never venturing more than two miles from the spot where he initially landed.

**FATIGUE AND HUNGER MAKE EVERYTHING MORE DIFFICULT**

Fatigue and hunger will confuse your thinking. After 10 miles of walking though dense undergrowth and “wait-a-minute” vines, the sergeant major and I were very tired and anxious to get to the end point (destination). Due to our fatigue, we made a serious mistake in reading our map. We had not gone as far as we thought we had, and crossed a creek nearly one kilometer from where we thought we were. As a result, thinking we were in the safe zone around the next point, when in reality we were not, we were captured. Such mistakes in war time can obviously spell disaster. Fatigue and hunger also play a significant role during interrogation. The Escape and Evasion phase covered more than 12 miles of difficult terrain. The sergeant major and I didn’t reach the end point until 0300 hours on the second day. I covered myself with my poncho and lay on the wet, hard ground to sleep. When I awoke after a couple of hours of restless sleep, I joined the other pilots for our flight to the Corps Interrogation Facility. I was not in the best of shape when I arrived. Fatigue and hunger reduces one’s ability to withstand the pressures of interrogation. Interrogators are trained manipulators, and they are skilled in easing information from unsuspecting soldiers. What may start as iron clad resolve may disappear quickly after several days of hiding from the enemy. An Interrogation Technician for the 163d Military Intelligence Battalion, Warrant Officer Stacy Strand, states the best strategy to take during interrogation is simply not to give any information beyond name, rank and service number. Any other information may be exploited and used as a lever against you or other prisoners. WO 1 Strand adds these tips: Don’t give the interrogator anything to key on, such as being thirsty, hungry or how long it has been since you heard from your spouse or family. Give careful short answers to questions; try to show no emotion through facial expressions or body language.

**HAVE CONFIDENCE IN YOUR ABILITIES**

Confidence in your abilities to use all aspects of land navigation is critical in avoiding capture. Knowing you can read a map accurately, identify terrain features, and navigate will give a tremendous boost to your confidence when you need it most. Facing a real life evasion scenario is not the time to try and figure these things out. Continual practice and review will help keep skills fresh and confidence high.

**PREPARATION FOR MINISTRY**

While preparing for the escape and evasion exercise, I thought about what I would need, at a minimum, to continue my ministry in a POW environment. All I would have was what I could carry on my load bearing equipment and survival vest.

What do I need to continue to function as a chaplain? What did I want to have to perform my mission despite the circumstances? What do I need to have on me at all times in the event I am captured? These are important questions to consider and the answers will vary for all chaplains. For this exercise, I
took a small New Testament, and some inspirational cards to give to the pilots.

Additionally, chaplains need to prepare themselves spiritually and mentally for combat. This is an obvious point that bears repeating. With adequate preparation, my own fears and concerns will be under control, which then frees me to assist others POWs. Without this preparation, I can unwittingly limit my own ministry. It is difficult to give to others what I don't have myself.

Ministry as a POW

Once I have decided what I want or think I need for ministry, how do I go about my work as a POW? Individual ministry may be the main focus during captivity. Opportunities for group worship will probably be limited or nonexistent. Captors likely will not allow groups of prisoners to gather for any reason.

Maintaining Hope

During last year’s Escape and Evasion exercise, I prepared a class on POW survival. I found some interesting statistics that underscore the importance of maintaining hope. I believed, before then, that POWs were not likely to survive the ordeal of captivity. But the following information shows a very different reality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WWII</th>
<th>KOREA</th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Captured/Interned</td>
<td>130,201</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>138,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>16,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>116,129</td>
<td>4,418</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>121,198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—Statistics from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders: A Handbook for Clinicians, Tom Williams, Published by Disabled American Veterans, 1987. These statistics indicate that 87.7% of POWs returned to their homes.

Chaplains, therefore, need to assist POWs in fighting the normal feelings of helplessness, despair, and depression. We cannot allow them to give up hope. Viktor Frankl’s book, Man’s Search for Meaning, is an excellent resource for chaplains to study this important issue.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

These are some additional questions to consider. Do I work with the captors? Do I cooperate with them to gain concessions for the prisoners? Do I give some information in an attempt to have more freedom to do ministry?

Article 3 of the Code of Conduct states “If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid other to escape....” How does this apply to me, as a chaplain? Do I attempt to escape or stay with prisoners still detained? There are no schoolbook solutions to these questions. Each chaplain will have to come to his or her own position on these issues.

CONCLUSION

The Escape and Evasion exercise at Fort Hood taught me the importance of thinking about potential captivity during field training. I admit that during my four years as an armor battalion chaplain, the thought of becoming a POW never crossed my mind. I ministered with soldiers during rotations at the CMTC and NTC, and I deployed to Desert Storm and Desert Shield without giving captivity even a passing thought. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady fortunately survived his harrowing trial by fire and the rigors of escape and evasion. Training and preparation were critical to his success, although he readily admits that prior to the incident, the thought of such a near tragedy was “unthinkable.” We need to remember that unthinkable events occur in war, and preparation is the key to our survival.
COMMON QUALITIES THAT AIDED SURVIVAL

Learning Objective: To recall some insights into commonly accepted spiritual growth exercises and how enforced isolation and hardship can enhance these into a reality for survival.

All of these experiences identify a commonality that a lot of people take for granted. Basically it became the need for a value system and the need for others to share in that same system. Each of these stories stresses the soul searching that each individual struggled with about who they were and, ultimately, why they were there, while imprisoned. Once they accepted their traumatic experience and responded to the values they had been taught, they were able to endure the worst of treatment. The noblest part of this endeavor was each individual’s growth became dramatic when they were able to help a comrade.

Family background, any religious training and the bonding of the military community itself, worked in a positive way to strengthen each of these individuals in their struggle with the unknown. Once stripped of their status and relatively comfortable support systems, each of these individuals had the opportunity to identify what was of true value. They learned how to be compassionate because of the suffering and learned how to love from the hatred they witnessed. Faith and hope became the watchwords of survival. The process of Dr. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, although primarily suggested for those in the trauma of death, aptly applies here. The denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance stages are reflected in all their stories in various intensities. Once the final stage of acceptance was reached then each of these POW’s was able to cope and become supportive and effective in their own survival of those of their shipmates.

It is common to most spiritual traditions that some type of “retreat” where one isolates him or herself from the world to reflect on their very existence is recommended. Per force POW’s are given this opportunity. Generally it is also suggested that this type of experience be within a community setting. Again, the bonding of intra communication between the POW’s was the very lifeline that made their suffering endurable. The ingenuity and talents of each member became vital. Cooperation transcended personal differences and became endemic. The development of the “tap” code showed the resourcefulness of the POW’s when all else failed or seemed insurmountable. Obviously, this was a no win scenario and yet their determination made it survivable.

The soul searching required that the important values of their cultural, social and military discipline be chosen carefully for this challenge. No matter what the deprivation, their spiritual powers could not be taken away. For those who had to endure isolation, they used this time constructively. Ultimately each individual became aware that taking care of each other was their primary need. How each POW survived depended upon each one’s maintenance of their own spiritual, mental and physical well-being and that of their comrades. Truly the expression of living one day at a time became their reality.

In her book, “The Gulf between Us: Love and Terror in Desert Storm,” Cynthia B. Acree writes about her struggle on the home front awaiting her Marine Aviator Husband’s return from being held as a POW during the Gulf War. See Appendix I, "Further Reading."

FAMILIES: FIGHTING THEIR OWN WAR

Learning Objective: To raise the level of awareness that the needs of family members of prisoners are significant and require resourceful help from caregivers on the homefront.

If those held prisoners in Vietnam viewed themselves as continuing the war in captivity, their families were faced with fighting a war of their own. Daily, over a period of years, the wives and children of American prisoners of war lived with the extremes of uncertainty, loneliness, and hope. Just as the Communist propaganda machine brutally dictated rules of life for those imprisoned in a total institution thousands of miles from home, so, too, political circumstances seemed to dictate the hopes and fears of family members.

Nearly every prisoner of war, at the time of shootdown, assumed in blissful ignorance that his imprisonment would probably last about 6 months, and then it would all be over. Families, on the waiting end of this unknown, struggled to maintain normalcy,” while at the same time lobbying for information and influence. The war fought on the home front consisted
of learning and deepening basic life values of faithfulness, constancy in adversity, and honor. The stories of the families, like the stories of the prisoners, have to do with the search for meaning in the midst of extreme circumstances.

Included among the waiting families were those whose wait would not end in 1973. Hundreds of these families of servicemen missing in action (MIAs) continue to live with unresolved grief. During the Vietnam years, of course, many women were not certain whether they were wives or widows, due to the fact that a list of confirmed prisoners was not made available until the time of release. For example, a wife might have been informed initially that her husband had been killed in action (KIA), only to receive news as many as 2 years later that he was, in fact, in the prison system.

Further, the nearly 600 prisoners of war repatriated in 1973 represented only a portion of the total number of families affected directly by captivity, as the families of MIAs will confirm. It is actually the experience of families, not only that of the prisoners themselves, which warrants the degree of attention paid to wartime captivity. While captivity would appear to be a unique, infrequent occurrence, statistics indicate that there were over 4,000 American servicemen captured during World War I; over 142,000 captured in World War II; and 766 captured and interned in Vietnam.

When the number of anxious family members left behind waiting multiplies these numbers; the real impact of captivity on society becomes more significant. Research into the effects of captivity on both prisoners and families has never been undertaken more intentionally than it was during the Vietnam years. Operation Homecoming, originally organized in 1972 under the more cumbersome name “Egress Recap,” was a full-scale effort at the Department of Defense level to ensure that the repatriated prisoners received a hero’s welcome with plenty of re-entry assistance, both psychologically and materially. The Naval Aerospace Medical Institute (NAMI) in Pensacola, Florida (since renamed NOMI, Naval Operational Medicine Institute) began conducting medical follow-up exams of each prisoner in January 1974. These medical exams still take place, annually.

Additionally, the Family Studies Branch of the Center for Prisoner of War Studies (CPWS) was established in 1971 to focus specifically on how families were coping with the highly ambiguous and stressful situation of captivity; and what issues repatriation would introduce to the changing family dynamic. Consequently, there are from the Vietnam era a number of documented studies on such family concerns as the effect of father-absence on children, role identification in a changed family structure, and post-reunion adjustment. The value and implications of these findings for other types of military separations (e.g., routine deployments and special operations) are obvious.

One of the more illuminating accounts of how one family experienced the ordeal of captivity is provided in the book, *In Love And War*, by Jim and Sybil Stockdale. Particularly moving, and unique among POW autobiographies because the Stockdales each wrote alternate chapters, *In Love And War* truly reveals a war fought on two fronts. The sections on captivity written by Admiral Stockdale have been alluded to in the previous section of this package. The chapters contributed by Mrs. Stockdale, in turn, provide insights which the empirical research of CPWS confirms, and an emotional dimension which the data lack. The following are some significant conclusions and recommendations to be drawn from both the book, and the research.

1. As much as shootdown and capture are a shock for the prisoner, these events carry their own unique shock for families receiving the news. The first notification, which Mrs. Stockdale received, of her husband’s capture was that he was “missing.” It was seven months before she received, in April 1967, a letter from him dated December 1966. Prior to this, the details of his whereabouts and well being were simply nonexistent, other than the fact that his parachute had been sighted. Mrs. Stockdale describes her first reaction to the news, thus: “No tears gushed forth. No screams of anguish. Just a puzzling sensation of shock that this was happening to me. Then I began to shake all over.”

   Later that same day she recalls trying to detect whether her intuition was telling her that her husband was alive or dead, but realized that she “had absolutely no intuitive feelings about it one way or another.” Another wife interviewed for this writing noted that she found it difficult to make major decisions in the immediate aftermath of receiving news of her husband’s capture, and that, in fact, it was good that she did not make any major decisions for about the first three months.” Thinking, planning, and exercising sound judgment were not only difficult because of the lack of information; these were functions which required considerable energy — energy which was

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being diverted into maintaining emotional stability. Interestingly, service members at risk of capture are taught in survival training about a similar phenomenon, known as “capture shock”: that initial period in which one’s whole system is saying, “I can’t believe this is happening to me.” Depending on the circumstances of capture, and the personality of the individual, this period may last for as little as two days, or as long as a few weeks.

Escape plans made while one is in shock typically fail, because complete attention cannot be given as it should to crucial details. In the case of families, the period of shock may last longer than it would for the prisoner, depending, among other factors, on how soon information can be obtained which is unambiguous. Of the two parties, the family is in the more ambiguous situation; and ambiguity prolongs, even delays, grief.

2. Prior connections and contacts are essential. In much the same way that a foreign visitor will revert to his or her language of birth in times of stress or crisis, families left to cope with events such as war time captivity, which pose the possibility of significant loss, require a supportive network of family or friends with whom they are absolutely comfortable, and can trust. Mrs. Stockdale describes being unable to sleep the first night after she had received the news of her husband’s capture. She immediately called on her closest friend to stay with her. Further, in much the same way that the prisoners struggled to maintain communication with one another in captivity because of the emotional support it provided, the ability of the wives to initiate and nurture new contacts played a very important role in their survival, growth, and, as a group, their effectiveness in influencing world opinion regarding North Vietnam’s treatment of prisoners of war.

3. Depending upon the overall health of the marriage, and of the family’s life together prior to captivity, families’ experiences of survival and growth differ widely. Just as some families come through a routine deployment stronger and more committed than they were before, while others become alienated and fragmented, not all the families of prisoners of war responded identically. Some marriages ended in divorce, either during the captivity itself, or following repatriation; others flourished at a new level of maturity. Some children immediately evidenced problems adjusting to and coping with their father’s absence; for other children, the effects were delayed, more subtle. Some families had positive experiences with the Navy system, in regard to financial policy, communication, and support; others did not. However, all the families were deeply affected by captivity, and in certain similar ways. In this light, two important generalizations may be made, based on CPWS research, for future insight and use:

   a. Following the initial shock of notification, most wives remained in a “limbo” state for one to two years. Whether this period was characterized as “marking time in place” or “vegetating,” its prolongation was detrimental to day-to-day functioning. Wives eventually had to “close out” the husbands’ roles within the families, whether partially or totally, and make major decisions as though their husbands were no longer a part of the family unit. On the whole, the better able wives were at making this adjustment, the better their children were at coping with the long years of separation.

   b. When POW families were interviewed one year following repatriation, the key to successful re-negotiation of roles appeared to depend on the extent to which husband and wife were able to agree on and resolve role relationships. Whether the family structure was traditional, egalitarian, or role reversed, was not as important as whether or not an unresolved discrepancy of values had arisen between husband and wife. Almost 30 percent of the reunited families were divorced after one year, a percentage which matched the divorce rate in the civilian sector in 1974. Nevertheless, the percentage in the comparison group was only 11 to 12 percent, or about one-third as high as the POW families. The indelible scars left on prisoners by their captivity experience meant that, in some cases, they had trouble making decisions. In marked comparison with their wives, who had had to become, if not completely comfortable, at least accustomed to making all the family decisions, most of the prisoners had just come from an environment in which it was normal to spend several hours of the day deciding, for example, when or whether to smoke the rationed cigarette. There were no other decisions to make. Thus, extreme shifts in roles and responsibilities occurred to a degree not normally experienced during a deployment, and over a far greater length of time (years, as opposed to months). Renegotiation and redefinition of role relationships was essential, and difficult, and not always successful.

4. Immediate and responsive assistance at the institutional level goes a long way toward defusing the anxiety, frustration, and despair associated with war-time, or terrorist captivity. Families’ “captivity” can result in an emotional isolation which active support, without becoming intrusive or impositional, can alleviate. Sharing information through any
available network of communication reinforces the message to families that they have not been forgotten, and those politically influential powers are still aware of the prisoners’ plight. Mrs. Stockdale, who founded the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia during her husband’s captivity, repeatedly discovered the value of simply bringing wives together to talk about how they were doing and what they were feeling.

In 1969, when she first began extending her efforts beyond the San Diego area via a letter to 60 POW wives whom she knew throughout the country, countless replies poured in by phone call and letter from those who had no concept that there were others in their same situation. One woman in Anniston, Alabama, indicated that her husband had been missing for 3 years, and that Mrs. Stockdale was the first person she had ever heard from who was “in the same boat.”

As the League became an increasingly organized and influential entity, more and more officials in the Department of Defense and the Department of State began listening to their pleas that international attention be focused on the North Vietnamese’ lack of adherence to the terms of the Geneva Convention. Of course, the emotional support to be gained within the individual League chapters was still a factor of great significance to the families; but knowing that their solidarity carried an influence that extended far beyond their boundaries, freed many from futility.

5. Coincident with support offered to prisoners’ families, opportunities should be provided for children, specifically, to participate in group counseling. Some of the former POWs interviewed for this report, when asked what they considered, in retrospect, might have served their families well during the captivity period, mentioned the need for counseling for their children. Perhaps because the family unit headed solely by the mother necessarily became insular and private, even involvement in outside activities where there are “significant other” adults could not address the need for emotional support, intentionally offered, and guided within a group of one’s peers. Further, mothers’ own needs probably diminished the full degree of emotional energy that they may have been able to muster for their children under different circumstances.

6. Exposure to the media is not an activity for which all families are enthusiastic. Even for those who are fairly comfortable giving magazine interviews or appearing on television, media activities can be stressful. While some may find it personally helpful, even healing, to bring their message to the news media, those who do not find it so should be encouraged to discover other activities which are healing. In this, as in other areas, not all families are alike.

Perhaps the greatest lesson learned from the extensive research and study of families during the Vietnam captivity, is that family programs which are well-planned, responsive, and able to be implemented quickly in a crisis, will play an essential role in families’ healthy adjustment and readjustment for years to come. Prisoners and their families learned through their respective ordeals that they are able to take on far more stress than they had ever dreamed possible. Reinforcing strength and confidence in these abilities enables victory in the face of the toughest odds.

ISSUES IN COMMON

Learning Objective: To distinguish between the historical realities and conditions of captivity in the various wars and to identify the common spiritual effects that Prisoners of War share.

Even a superficial reading of accounts of captivity during World War II and Vietnam quickly reveals the vast differences in conditions and treatment. If common issues were to be identified on the basis of circumstances alone, one might be hard pressed to find similarities.

For example, those interned in Japanese prison camps in the Philippines suffered terribly from both the immediate and long-term effects of diseases associated with malnutrition and exposure. Various gastrointestinal diseases, tuberculosis, beri-beri, avitaminosis, and pneumonia, as well as diseases endemic to the Far East (e.g., malaria and dengue-type fevers), decimated the numbers of American prisoners by the thousands. The Bataan Death March (April 1942) caused the deaths of thousands more through starvation. The atrocities associated with physical survival alone were compounded by the brutal and capricious treatment of the Japanese. Starving, malnourished prisoners were routinely assigned to heavy work details, and beaten severely for little or no reason at all.

Upon repatriation, unlike prisoners returning from Vietnam, the 9,732 who survived discovered to their disillusionment that their stories of what took place were not believed. Many doctors dismissed their harrowing accounts as gross exaggerations. The
former prisoners were mistakenly perceived as seeking glory and adulation, rather than needing to share the pain of what they had experienced. Additionally, medical treatment from the Veterans Administration hospitals was denied, due to the perception that their maladies were not “service connected.” Numerous first-hand accounts of painful post-repatriation experiences are documented, alongside accounts of the atrocities of the prison camps.

The thousands of Americans imprisoned during the Korean conflict met, for the first time, such tactics of the enemy as extortion, propaganda, and “re-education.” While much has been made of “brainwashing” from this era, the changed convictions of those who either divulged valuable intelligence information, or who became openly sympathetic to the enemy cause, may be attributed to an actual change of will, not to any hypnotic transformation of the mind. Many government officials and citizens were alarmed at the prospect that any American fighting man could be persuasively tempted by the enemy to “sell out” the American way of life. Of the 4,000 who were repatriated, Major Mayer estimated that approximately one-third became “progressives”: “By the Communists’ own definition, this meant that a man was either a Communist sympathizer or a collaborator — or both — during his stay in a prison camp.”

In reality, what Major Mayer and others observed sounds very similar to current debate on the state of American education. A significant number of American soldiers either did not understand their nation’s history, or did not feel a strong personal investment in the American way of life, or both. Consequently, they were vulnerable, under the horrifying pressures and conditions of prison life, to attempts at “re-education” by the enemy.

The 591 Americans imprisoned in North Vietnam, and the somewhat smaller number (117) imprisoned in South Vietnam, was an exceptional group, for a variety of reasons. Not only were the vast majority well-educated, highly committed military professionals; but also their smaller number, at least compared with previous wars, led to tighter management and control by the Vietnamese, and ultimately, to a kind of propaganda war on the world stage.

While the propaganda war backfired when world opinion turned against the North Vietnamese, this result occurred only after the prisoners had been exposed over a period of years to severe pressure to become propagandists against their own country. The prisoners profiled in the first section (above), and many of the articles reproduced in these chapters, attest to the unique community formed by this particular group of prisoners, due in part to the political circumstances of the Vietnam War.

The above discussion is provided merely to point out that the actual captivity circumstance, both in physical and psychological terms, can vary, and has varied widely from war to war. However, there is value in identifying issues in common, not only in order to prepare more effectively for future captivity, but also to highlight some universally shared aspects of the prisoner experience.

From CDR Holt’s research paper Prisoners of War: Prescriptive Conduct and Compliance in Captive Situations:

All prisoners, albeit to varying degrees, share degradation and dehumanization by the enemy. Whether in the form of torture, political exploitation, or extreme physical deprivation and injury, it is the feelings that result from such treatment which are common: loneliness, profound sense of loss and abandonment, and despair.

Because prisoners of war are, in nearly every case, military members, their shared military training and values become bedrock assets in a captivity environment. Part of the reason why American prisoners in North Vietnam were able to form an effective community, was because they were almost all aviators.
Whether Navy or Air Force, the flying “club” constituted a powerful bond. Another aspect of military training is a common code of ethics. American prisoners in Vietnam, in the wake of the experience in North Korea with Communist propaganda, had specified rules of behavior known as the Code of Conduct. Again and again, prisoners from the Vietnam era cite the Code as a powerful guide and motivator during those torturous years.

The extreme deprivation of the captivity circumstance will inevitably bring individuals together around the following four shared human needs:

1. Communication (emotional contact)
2. Humor
3. Meaning (beyond survival)
4. A clear conscience
5. Captors, regardless of their country and culture, tend to use the same tactics to manipulate prisoners, and to increase dependence:
6. Humiliation
7. Guilt
8. Threat
9. Reward and punishment
10. Frank attempts directed toward attitudinal change by appeal to reason.

In the light of these common issues, American service members are typically trained to develop their will to resist. As prisoner after prisoner in a variety of wartime captivity settings will affirm, the prisoner of war status invariably drives a person inward, into the earliest memories and lessons of childhood and basic schooling. The resistance tools, they say, lie within, in the world of the soul and the will. Therefore, training, to be effective, must acquaint the individual with his or her inner world, where invisible, often underdeveloped values await the chance to emerge.

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. In the scenario of imprisonment, whether as a POW or a hostage, reflect on what would become important to you when you are deprived of all semblance of human dignity?

2. In our everyday lives, we are allowed the opportunity to consciously care about other people. In the confinement expressed in this chapter, what nature of commitment do you feel would be needed to “love” your captors?

3. The selflessness expressed in the lives of the POW’s both in Vietnam and especially the chaplains in WW II is heroic. Discuss how our daily experiences can even today, allow us to attain this goal?
CHAPTER 3

THE LESSONS OF WARTIME IMPRISONMENT

In this chapter we will review an article about Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training, consider some elements of survivability and repatriation, be introduced to the philosophy and teachings of Epictetus, identify political aspects of captivity and the goals of the captor, and present personal considerations in thinking about the possibility of becoming a POW (POW medal, fig 3-1).

Figure 3-1.—POW Medal.
SERE SCHOOL

Learning Objective: Recall the strengths and weaknesses of SERE school as perceived through the experiences of Vietnam POWs.

It is a weather perfect September day in Maine. The “hands-on” survival phase of SERE school has begun in almost benign fashion. Deep in the woods, 52 students proceed with backpacks across moss-carpeted hills and ridges, leading, following, and practicing silent communication with one another. Were it not for an occasional camouflage instructor, and the eerie silence with which each procession moves slowly along, this would appear to be an almost normal camping trip.

It is, of course, anything but a normal vacation. The pleasant surroundings are, partly, a function of the time of year; partly, a fortuitous weather pattern. (Maine is fly-infested in the summer, and bitterly cold in the winter; September turns out just right). The current leisurely, untrammeled pace through the woods is strictly temporary, everyone knows. This is training for an unwanted circumstance. Sooner than any would wish, the “enemy” will appear and so alter the surroundings, it will be hard to believe that one is still in a free United States.

After day two of survival and evasion, the weather perfection subtly changes, almost as if by foreknowledge of what will occur. Despite the attention to every detail of training by the school staff, the change in weather is neither within their control nor at their request, although it aptly mirrors the progress of training. The mood of the week’s events is changing. Fatigue and hunger are beginning to set in, even as sunny skies fade.

An underlying assumption of the capture scenario is that once shot down, aircrew would have the opportunity for evasion. At least in a school setting, practicing evasion techniques is excellent training for the possibility that, one day, this knowledge might save one’s life. (Captivity lessons of the past indicate that in the majority of cases, particularly in Vietnam, air crew parachuted from their burning airplanes into the waiting arms of villagers and armed militia). As day three of SERE School approaches, evasion is less a group camping trip, and more a personal confrontation with one’s own resourcefulness and understanding of physical surroundings. While teamwork and awareness of others’ situations remain important, the student inevitably moves to a more isolated stance. Once capture takes place, the isolation will be total.

Day four is foggy, rainy, and cold. The transformation of surroundings could not be more complete. From the change in weather, to the loss of personal freedom, “hands-on” survival training has now turned from enjoying the beauty of the woods of Maine, to entering a simulation of the World of Epictetus. There is the shock and outrage of an enemy power taking control of one’s possessions and one’s person; looking on helplessly as one’s fellow survivors are made to do things they do not want to do; realizing that this will all get worse before it gets better; and, perhaps most frightening of all, not knowing how much worse it will get. The outsider will immediately observe that this is “not the real thing,” that it is “only training.” For the participant, that is hard to believe.

Before they ever embark on the survival phase, students are told that they will experience capture shock, time disorientation, and constant anxiety. In captivity, they are warned, the mind will imagine the worst in what is a naturally depressing situation, a downhill slide, in which, initially, there seems to be nothing else to do but brood over the question, “Why did I ever decide to go into this profession?” They are, however, also reminded that once the externals are stripped away, they will have their values to hold on to; and they are directed to review the first and last articles of the Code of Conduct. “The majority of what happens,” says one instructor, “happens in your head.”

Despite the unlikelihood of 52 Americans being captured and imprisoned together in a compound, SERE training uses the camp setting as a convenient tool to teach groups of air crew and intelligence personnel what such terms as “habit of compliance,” “price-tagging,” and “capture shock” feel like. SERE School is also straightforward about “counterindoctrinating”: faith, heritage, unity, and religion are specifically and openly referred to as the foundational values of “our side,” and just as vehemently challenged by the enemy. For this reason, a week of SERE training
probably subjects students to more emotional highs and lows than they will experience again in their lives; unless, of course, they are captured by a foreign, hostile power.

Does simulated training of this type really prepare people for captivity, and does it provide them with the survival tools they need to resist coercion? When asked this question, many former POWs answer with a qualified “yes,” not because their training was ineffective, but because the “real thing” was so much worse. Regarding physical abuse and torture, Admiral Stockdale recalls his stunned realization at how much more frightening and expert the real, professional extortionists were, compared to his SERE instructors. Vice Admiral Martin summarized the difference in one phrase: “They cannot simulate despair.” Captain Norrington commented that the training is “as good as it can be; but, no, it cannot possibly fully prepare you for captivity.” What he recommends — and he is not alone in this suggestion — is that the lessons learned in SERE School, preliminary as they are, be reinforced through critical reflection. Those who have attended SERE School should be encouraged to examine how they can protect their inner resources, or, as Captain Norrington expresses it, how they might “polish the tools.” If a methodology for reinforcement were Navy-wide policy, SERE training could be built upon as a foundation, rather than viewed as a singular training experience. Captain Coskey, echoing the importance of using situations that occur in everyday life as teaching moments, identifying the chain of command, and communication, are aspects of normal military life which the captivity scenario at SERE School dramatized for him.

Every prospective Sailor is taught that the military operates according to the chain of command; and that two-way communication, both up and down the chain, is what connects juniors with seniors. In captivity, juniors’ obedience of seniors actually saved the lives of the group; and communication became, literally, the vital network by which the chain of command functioned.

The officer designated “SRO” (Senior Ranking Officer) of the SERE “prisoners” shows the strain of the past four days in his face. “It was the classic no-win situation,” he says. “Regardless of what I did to protect and represent the group, I was always torn between their needs on one side, and the demands of the enemy on the other. I hope I never have to go through that in real life.” In “real life,” of course, this officer will probably be better prepared to handle such a situation, should that ever happen, because he is now better acquainted with himself, and with the world of Epictetus. Other students in the group, both enlisted and officer, relate newly acquired “SERE stories” with an interesting combination of euphoria and seriousness. Many are euphoric over the fact that, eventually, they were able to resist the enemy’s “soft sell” and “hard sell” tactics. For this, they feel stronger and more confident. They also feel, though, more vulnerable, knowing that, because of their professions, someone out there might use a variety of painful means to extract highly desirable information from them. Some turn particularly serious and reflective as they recall how they felt in “captivity.” One student said that, during the imprisonment phase, he did not want to communicate; he just wanted to be left alone. Another student mentioned, that to his surprise, many passages of Scripture which he had learned as a child were extraordinarily meaningful to him, and he was chagrined that he could not remember more. He had already committed himself to embarking on a Scripture memorization program as soon as he returned to his command.

With the memories of the past 48 hours still fresh in their minds, each individual is now debriefed on the captivity phase of training. Despite their having had some opportunity already to share experiences with one another, nearly everyone feels confused; and the staff is aware of this. Capture and isolation are emotionally and physically shocking events, in which what is mostly familiar, becomes suddenly and totally unfamiliar. One neither thinks clearly at the time, nor analyzes effectively afterward. Prisoners are told very little about what is “really” going on, if they are told anything at all. They certainly may not ask questions, without taking a considerable risk. They are not even allowed to see what is happening around them, unless their captors decide that they may.

Sensory deprivation (sight, sound, speech, and intellectual participation) is, in fact, a key management issue for the imprisoning power. Total control of every move and activity eventually drives the prisoner deep into his or her own thoughts and feelings, without the intellectual benefit or emotional comfort of communication with one’s fellow prisoners. The resulting isolation is confusing and frightening. As they walk into their respective debrief sessions, most of the students are not fully aware of their lingering confusion. Nevertheless, an observer can see in their faces some residual wariness left over from the past 48 hours as they sit across the table from their debriefer: “Is this a real debrief? Can I be myself?” This, too, the
staff understands. They are consummate professionals. Students quickly become and reveal “themselves” as they are guided out of their confusion, and into critical reflection.

The reunion scene at the airport more closely resembles the end of a long deployment than it does a return from a one-week training exercise. Having just experienced the total deprivation of freedom, albeit for a mercifully short period of time, many returning students may be seen clinging to their families with a renewed sense of urgency. In a “real life” circumstance, this separation might have lasted years instead of days. Emotionally, if not physically, this group of SERE students has been away from home far longer than a week. They have entered another world, the world of captivity; and they have come back, realizing that technological know-how is not a useful survival skill in that environment. Why not? What kind of skill is “useful”?

SURVIVAL AND REPATRIATED PRISONER OF WAR

Learning Objective: Recall the three parts of survival and difficulties associated with repatriation.

With today’s ultramodern communications and locating devices, one is much less likely to be faced with surviving in a hostile geographic environment than as a prisoner of war (POW). Some of the helpful techniques and concepts that have been learned or proven from the Vietnam experience are included in this discussion from the point of view of a captured servicemember.

FAMILY PREPARATION

The letter shown in insert 3-2 reveals how a family reacts, and copes, with the news that a son and brother has been shot down. Even the best preparations do not adequately prepare family members. But some basic steps can be taken to ensure basic living needs are taken into consideration. If the service member is missing in action or held captive, family quality of life is greatly enhanced when the service member completes the seemingly mundane administrative paperwork associated with deployments. For example, is the Page 2 current to ensure pay, insurance payments, and other benefits are in place for the family? There may be need for Powers of Attorney or other legal documents to keep the family solvent – medical care, residence maintenance and other crises that may arise in the event of the service member’s capture and imprisonment.

“SHOOT DOWN” AND CULTURE SHOCK

In her autobiography, “She Went to War” (then) Major Rhonda Cornum, U. S. Army flight surgeon who was held as a prisoner of war during the Persian Gulf War, describes her initial contact with the enemy after the Black Hawk helicopter she was aboard was shot down in enemy territory.

“I was badly injured, (two broken arms, a smashed knee and a bullet wound) but I knew I’d heal eventually. The crash had been so devastating that I should have died then, and I regarded every minute I was alive as a gift. The Iraqis could have killed us easily when they found us at the crash site, but they chose not to. Then in the circle of men, a slight pressure on a single trigger would have been enough to kill us, but we had been spared. It was just enough good luck for me to grab on to and hold. I vowed to survive.”

She goes on to speak of the first hours after being captured,

“As long as I didn’t move anything, my arms didn’t hurt. The brain is very good at knocking out pain when it’s not useful. I was withdrawn, pulled inside myself, concentrating on staying conscious because it would have been so easy to have just given up and relaxed, drifting off into sleep. Stay awake. Remain an active participant.”

Elsewhere in her book she provides helpful insight on survivor guilt and how it impacts personnel.

“Fighter pilots frequently feel bad when they have to eject, and often they blame themselves for being shot down. Usually, there is nothing they could have done differently, but that rarely makes the guilt disappear. I knew that some POWs from Vietnam and other wars, especially pilots, suffered from survivor’s guilt because they have lived and their crews had died. Or they felt they were failures because they had been captured. I knew from experience with wrecks at Fort Rucker that even in peacetime pilots feel bad if they survive a crash and someone on board doesn’t. I was fortunate to have had other experiences.
that prepared me to live with that kind of failure.”

One of the more poignant insights Major Cornum shares is how her family background enhanced her own survival skills:

“My grandfather was from Kentucky, where the Hatfield and McCoy feud was not just something in books. He knew first hand about tradition and loyalty to family, feelings that were cemented during four years in the Marine Corps and at Iwo Jima and Guadalcanal. He never talked to me about the horrible things he must have seen during the war, but he did talk about integrity, friendship, and honor. He told me about virtue and how a person’s word meant everything. There were many things worse than dying, my grandfather said, and one of them was living with dishonor.”

For a few pilots shot down in the Vietnam conflict, the abrupt transition from the highly ordered, time-structured, mechanized world of the cockpit to the anachronistic, agrarian, illiterate world on the ground was momentarily disorganizing, producing a feeling of unreality. This persisted until one set about laying realistic plans and trying to cope, even though captured. The best preparation for this stress should be SERE school.

COPING IN CAPTIVITY

There are many things that one can do in captivity to enhance the ability to survive. The greatest single shock to the POW was breaking under torture, and the unbelievable rapidity with which it could happen. It simply did not fit with the POW’s image of himself as a red-blooded American fighting man. This rent the man from his identification with his group and produced enormous guilt and depression that could usually only be alleviated by sharing the experience with a fellow POW. Mutual understanding and encouragement between POWs brought relief for both.

Code of Conduct

Although the Code of Conduct was a rallying point, it was meant to be applied flexibly, and it is so
stated in the Code. Those who applied it rigidly because of their early SERE training were prone to be broken needlessly over information or behavior of minimal value. Unified resistance was extremely important for morale, and it made each POW much less vulnerable to the enemy’s blandishments and torture. But, the POW’s soon learned that it made more sense not to resist to the point of confusion or insensibility because, then, one might give truly valuable information to the captor without realizing it. It was better to stop just short of that point and give some misleading or useless bit of information.

In the oriental environment of Vietnam, saving face was an important concept in the give-and-take with the captor. If the captor was required by his superiors to extract a bit of information or behavior from a POW, he had to return with something. It did not matter what it was or, at times, even whether it made sense; knowing this could sometimes save a POW needless injury. Conversely, if one could figure out how to put the captor in one’s debt, the face-saving concept could again be turned to advantage for the POW, with the captor overlooking some bit of forbidden behavior or perhaps providing medical care.

**Understanding the Captor**

Saving face was also a problem for some of the POW’s who felt constrained to “go to the mat” at the slightest provocation from their captor. It often took several beatings for a POW to realize that this was a foolish and losing game and that pride consisted of more important things.

Torture could be and was applied again and again over weeks and months. The POW’s learned roughly how much they could endure before breaking, that they could recuperate, and, depending on the gravity of the injuries inflicted, about how long it would take. They gradually realized that one could survive even extensive torture, and this in itself was reassuring. This realization underscored the importance of keeping fit to improve to the utmost one’s recuperability. Three or four hours a day might be devoted to physical fitness exercises of various sorts. POW’s soon appreciated that “healthy bodies meant healthy minds.” Food was equally important in this regard. The POWs learned to eat things that were normally revolting, though of some nutritional value. It has been shown from earlier wars that weight loss in captivity was the only apparently significant variable that could be related to disability which developed as late as 8 to 10 years after repatriation.

**Keeping One’s Mind Busy**

Shortly after capture, the POW was tortured to extract short-lived information. Then, he was normally isolated, sometimes for months, even years. To avoid boredom, depression, or a break with reality, the POW had to “keep busy.” This could be done either inside or outside one’s head. One had to be involved, to move into some kind of future, even, paradoxically, if it meant exploring the past. One of the first things a POW did was to go over his entire life, in a piecemeal fashion. This might take 3 to 4 months; the longer, the better. He would recall events or people he had not thought of in years. He might, for example, recall everyone in his third grade class. He reevaluated all the decisions and choices he had made. Sometimes major shifts in values occurred. It was a private psychoanalysis. This process could be repeated several times before it burned itself out. Then, the POW might engage in imaginary activities, such as building an entire housing subdivision or a house or a truck, brick by brick or bolt by bolt.

**Communicating**

POWs who could communicate studied languages, history, or philosophy, played chess or worked calculus problems. Some studied the local insects, playing games or experimenting with them. Depressing thoughts had to be avoided. As one POW put it, “they could ruin your day.”

The need to communicate with fellow prisoners was so strong that one would risk torture to do so, and all sorts of measures were devised. A tap code could be sent by tapping, sweeping, spitting, coughing, etc. Carbon or the lead from toothpaste tubes was used to scribble notes left in secret hiding places.

Communication was the cornerstone of another basic necessity for survival-unity and group identification, with a hierarchy of leadership. As one POW put it, war with the enemy had not ceased upon ejection from his aircraft; only the mode and the front had changed. As “home with honor” was the slogan for survival, unity and communication were the means by which it was achieved. If a man was not incorporated quickly into the communication network, he was fair game for the enemy to divide and conquer. The tactics of the captor were to find weak links among the POWs and then to persuade them to collaborate either by force, leniency, deception, or blackmail. Leaders especially were their targets, and they suffered most. A few were isolated for several years to sequester them.
from their men and they were subjected to frequent and intense torture.

**Resisting Indoctrination**

In this connection, the prisoners were subjected to incessant propaganda and classes in communist ideology. Most authorities reject the term “brainwashing” because it suggests that by some magical and nefarious means the prisoner’s mind is erased clean of former convictions and loyalties, and these are supplanted by communist ideology and attitudes espoused willingly and permanently. They prefer the term “thought reform,” which is a lengthy process of confession and persuasion in a group setting by the behavioral conditioning of reward and punishment. Successful thought reform, however, requires that the prisoner have been brought up in an environment where group orientation is a very strong and potent force for influence. The methods of the Vietnamese captors were regarded as crude by Western POW’s and were essentially ineffective. Any propaganda that appeared to have been absorbed was quickly repudiated when the pressure was removed. The few exceptions were those POW’s who had been extremely naive, passive, rootless, or isolated in their own countries, with no firm convictions or loyalties to begin with.

**Recovery Knowledge**

In other times and places, more forceful and relentless tactics, such as drugs, sensory and sleep deprivation, torture, and endless interrogation were applied to a few persons with results that might be termed “brainwashing,” but even here there is room for doubt.

This does not mean that one cannot be made to lose one’s sensibilities for a time, to become disoriented, or even subject to hallucinations, but at least one can be reassured that this is not a permanent state of affairs (see fig 3-2).

Organic brain syndromes with hallucinations occurred in the context of physical abuse, sleep deprivation, or malnutrition, or a combination of all of them. These symptoms remitted and at the present time there is no sign of residual symptoms. This again provides reassurance that one can survive and even recover from enormous amounts of physical abuse and torture. Realizing this ahead of time can add to one’s survivability by relieving a person of much of the fear of anticipated permanent disability. Sexual functions appeared not to be a problem after repatriation as some prisoners feared.

Some POW’s worried about dreaming at first, until they discovered that they only dreamed pleasant escape dreams. These dreams always ended, however,
with the necessity for returning to the prison environment. When one prisoner in his dream refused to go back, he claimed he never dreamed again in captivity.

**Physical and Mental Recovery**

There is a suggestion that a certain amount of time, somewhere between six weeks and six months, was required to adapt to the shock of capture and captivity. The time was necessary for anxiety and depression to subside to at least tolerable levels so that the individual could begin to function again, to move ahead in his daily life, and to contemplate a future, however uncertain and bleak. A few who were repatriated with a shorter period of captivity were still likely to be quite anxious and to have difficulty sleeping, making decisions, performing complex manual tasks, and thinking, concentrating, and remembering. This may be an aspect of the initial depression because the symptoms are similar to those of any typical depression, and the time required to adapt reflects the time typically required to recover from an untreated depression in any other setting. Frequently, this period of depressive symptoms was terminated, often rather abruptly, when the prisoner made a firm decision to survive and began to look and plan ahead. Recovery was especially facilitated by the relief of sharing his initial capture and torture experience with a fellow POW (see fig. 3-3).

**REPATRIATION**

In captivity, time to think, to ponder, to deliberate, to make the most minute, inconsequential decision, was abundant. When repatriation finally occurred, the pressure of events and people and, by contrast, the frequent demand for rapid, important decisions and for equally rapid role reintegration resulted in reentry or reverse culture shock. This often was as stressful and devastating for a few as the initial one. This might last from as little as a month to as long as a year. It was variously reflected in persistent anxiety, insomnia, indecision, depression, difficulty driving, and for a few, excessive drinking. In most cases, marital discord was the commonest expression. This discord was often intensified by unconscious hostility on the part of the wife over having been abandoned (during captivity) and was compounded by her realistic anger if the

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“OUT OF THE NIGHT THAT COVERS ME, BLACK AS THE PIT FROM POLE TO POLE, I THANK WHAT GODS MAY BE FOR MY UNCONQUERABLE SOUL.”

WILLIAM ERNEST HENLEY, 1893-1903

Read the article “Experiences as a POW in Vietnam” by RADM James B. Stockdale, USN, in Appendix I.

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Figure 3-3.—POW Alfred Sorenson, captured 1942 on his way home.
repatriated prisoner of war (RPW) seemed thoughtlessly to allow his time to be monopolized by well-meaning relatives, friends, and well-wishers, numerous banquets, public appearances, and requests for speeches to which he felt obligated to respond. It was not uncommon for some RPWs to experience guilt at having been captured in the first place. Unwilling to consider themselves as heroes, they harbored a sense of embarrassment or shame that had made some mistake which led to their capture. This subtle but real dilemma was a hurdle many POWs faced throughout their captivity and repatriation. Regardless, the great majority of the RPW’s negotiated repatriation successfully.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON SURVIVABILITY

Learning Objective: Recall four reactions of POWs to their imprisonment, ADM Stockdale’s reflections regarding his POW experiences, and how the philosophical teachings of Epictetus and others helped prepare ADM Stockdale for imprisonment.

Dr. Doyle in his book, A Prisoner’s Duty, offers the following conclusions, “Motivations (for survival) vary with the actual circumstances, especially those entwined with experiences that generated great fears. In general, however, POWs, internees, and hostages found themselves having to choose from four alternatives: (1) survive the captivity experience by avoiding the captor’s close scrutiny and pass the time in quarantine quietly; (2) survive it by actively resisting, even baiting and cajoling the captors to the breaking point; (3) survive by collaborating, even from time to time assimilating into the captor’s culture; or (4) survive by escaping.”

This is an article written by:

Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale, USN
“The World of Epictetus”

In 1965, I was a forty-one year old commander, the senior pilot of Air-Wing 16, flying combat missions in the area just south of Hanoi from the aircraft carrier Oriskany. By September of that year I had grown quite accustomed to briefing dozens of pilots and leading them on daily air strikes; I had flown nearly 200 missions myself and knew the countryside of North Vietnam like the back of my hand. On the ninth of that month, I led about thirty-five airplanes to the Thanh Hoa Bridge, just west of that city. That bridge was tough; we had been bouncing 500-pounders off it for weeks.

The September 9 raid held special meaning for Oriskany pilots because of a special bomb load we had improvised; we were going in with our biggest, the 2000-pounders, hung not only on our attack planes but on our F-8 fighter-bombers as well. This increase in bridge-busting capability came from the innovative brain of a major flying with my Marine fighter squadron. He had figured out how we could jury-rig some switches, hang the big bombs, pump out some of the fuel to stay within takeoff weight limits, and then top off our tanks from our airborne refuelers while en route to the target. Although the pilot had to throw several switches in sequence to get rid of his bombs, a procedure requiring above-average cockpit agility, we routinely operated on the premise that all pilots of Air-Wing 16 were above average. I test flew the new load on a mission, thought it over, and approved it; that’s the way we did business.

Our spirits were up. That morning, the Oriskany air wing was finally going to drop the bridge that was becoming a North Vietnamese symbol of resistance. You can imagine our dismay when we crossed the coast and the weather scout I had sent on ahead radioed back that ceiling and visibility were zero-zero in the bridge area. In the tiny cockpit of my A-4 at the front of the pack, I pushed the button on the throttle, spoke into the radio mike in my oxygen mask, and told the formation to split up and proceed in pairs to the secondary targets I had specified in my contingency briefing — what a letdown.

The adrenaline stopped flowing as my wingman and I broke left and down and started sauntering along toward our “milk run” target: boxcars on a railroad siding between Vihn and Thanh Hoa, where the flak was light. Descending through 10,000 feet, I unsnapped my oxygen mask and let it dangle, giving my pinched face a rest — no reason to stay uncomfortable on this run.

As I glided toward that easy target, I’m sure I felt totally self-satisfied. I had the top combat job that a Navy commander can hold and I was in tune with my environment. I was confident — I knew airplanes and flying inside out. I
was comfortable with the people I worked with and knew the trade so well that I often improvised variations in accepted procedures and encouraged others to do so under my watchful eye. I was on top. I thought I had found every key to success and had no doubt that my Academy and test-pilot schooling had provided me with everything I needed in life.

I passed down the middle of those boxcars and smiled as I saw the results of my instinctive timing. A neat pattern — perfection. I was just pulling out of my dive low to the ground when I heard a noise I hadn’t expected — the boom, boom, boom of a 57-millimeter gun — and then I saw it just behind my wingtip. I was hit — all the red lights came on, my control system was going out and I could barely keep that plane from flying into the ground while I got that damned oxygen mask up to my mouth so I could tell my wingman that I was about to eject. What rotten luck — and on a “milk run”!

The descent in the chute was quiet except for occasional rifle shots from the streets below. My mind was clear, and I said to myself, “five years.” I knew we were making a mess of the war in Southeast Asia, but I didn’t think it would last longer than that; I was also naive about the resources I would need in order to survive a lengthy period of captivity.

The Durants have said that culture is a thin and fragile veneer that superimposes itself on humankind. For the first time I was on my own, without the veneer. I was to spend years searching through and refining my bag of memories, looking for useful tools, things of value. The values were there, but they were all mixed up with technology, bureaucracy, and expediency, and had to be brought up into the open.

Education should take care to illuminate values, not bury them amongst the trivia. Are our students getting the message that without personal integrity intellectual skills are worthless?

Integrity is one of those words that many people keep in that desk drawer labeled “too hard.” It’s not a topic for the dinner table or the cocktail party. You can’t buy or sell it. When supported with education, a person’s integrity can give him something to rely on when his perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when he’s faced with hard choices of right or wrong. It’s something to keep him on the right track, something to keep him afloat when he’s drowning; if only for practical reasons, it is an attribute that should be kept at the very top of a young person’s consciousness.

The importance of the latter point is highlighted in prison camps, where everyday human nature, stripped bare, can be studied under a magnifying glass in accelerated time. Lessons spotlighted and absorbed in that laboratory sharpen one’s eye for their abstruse but highly relevant applications in the “real time” world of now.

In the five years since I’ve been out of prison, I’ve participated several times in the process of selecting senior naval officers for promotion or important command assignments. I doubt that the experience is significantly different from that of executives who sit on “selection boards” in any large hierarchy.

The system must be formal, objective, and fair; if you’ve seen one, you’ve probably seen them all. Navy selection board proceedings go something like this.

The first time you know the identity of the other members of the board is when you walk into a boardroom at eight o’clock on an appointed morning. The first order of business is to stand, raise your right hand, put your left hand on the Bible, and swear to make the best judgment you can, on the basis of merit, without prejudice. You’re sworn to confidentiality regarding all board members’ remarks during the proceedings. Board members are chosen for their experience and understanding; they often have knowledge of the particular individuals under consideration. They must feel free to speak their minds. They read and grade dozens of dossiers, and each candidate is discussed extensively. At voting time, a member casts his vote by selecting and pushing a “percent confidence” button, visible only to himself, on a console attached to his chair. When the last member pushes his button, a totalizer displays the numerical average “confidence” of the board. No one knows who voted what.
I’m always impressed by the fact that every effort is made to be fair to the candidate. Some are clearly out, some are clearly in; the borderline cases are the tough ones. You go over and over those in the “middle pile” and usually you vote and revote until late at night. In all the boards I’ve sat on, no inference or statement in a “jacket” is as sure to portend a low confidence score on the vote as evidence of a lack of directness or rectitude of a candidate in his dealings with others. Any hint of moral turpitude really turns people off. When the crunch comes, they prefer to work with forthright plodders rather than with devious geniuses. I don’t believe that this preference is unique to the military. In any hierarchy where people’s fates are decided by committees or boards, those who lose credibility with their peers and who cause their superiors to doubt their directness, honesty, or integrity are dead. Recovery isn’t possible.

The linkage of men’s ethics, reputations, and fates can be studied in even more vivid detail in prison camp. In that brutally controlled environment a perceptive enemy can get his hooks into the slightest chink in a man’s ethical armor and accelerate his downfall. Given the right opening, the right moral weakness, a certain susceptibility on the part of the prisoner, a clever extortionist can drive his victim into a downhill slide that will ruin his image, self-respect, and life in a very short time. There are some uncharted aspects to this, some traits of susceptibility which I don’t think psychologists yet have words for. I am thinking of the tragedy that can befall a person who has such a need for love or attention that he will sell his soul for it. I use tragedy with the rigorous definition that Aristotle applied to it: the story of a good man with a flaw who comes to an unjustified bad end. This is a rather delicate point and one that I want to emphasize. We had very very few collaborators in prison, and comparatively few Aristotelian tragedies, but the story and fate of one of these good men with a flaw might be instructive. He was handsome, smart, articulate, and smooth. He was almost sincere. He was obsessed with success. When the going got tough, he decided expediency was preferable to principle. This man was a classical opportunist. He befriended and worked for the enemy to the detriment of his fellow Americans. He made a tacit deal; moreover, he accepted favors (a violation of the Code of Conduct). In time, out of fear and shame, he withdrew; we could not get him to communicate with the American prisoner organization.

I couldn’t learn what made the man tick. One of my best friends in prison, one of the wisest persons I have ever known, had once been in a squadron with this fellow. In prisoners’ code, I tapped a question to my philosophical friend: “What in the world is going on with that fink?” “You’re going to be surprised at what I have to say,” he meticulously tapped back. “In a squadron he pushes himself forward and dominates the scene. He’s a continual fountain of information. He’s the person everybody relies on for inside dope. He works like mad; often flies more hops than others do. It drives him crazy if he’s not Red. He tends to grovel and ingratiate himself before others. I didn’t realize he was really pathetic until I was sitting around with him and his wife one night when he was spinning his yams of delusions of grandeur, telling of his great successes and his pending ascension to the top. His wife knew him better than anybody else did; she shook her head with genuine sympathy and said to him: “Gee, you’re just a phony.”

In prison, this man had somehow reached the point where he was willing to sell his soul just to satisfy this need, this immaturity. The only way he could get the attention that he demanded from authority was to grovel and ingratiate himself before the enemy. As a soldier, he was a miserable failure, but he had not crossed the boundary of willful treason; he was not written off as an irrevocable loss, as were the two patent collaborators with whom the Vietnamese soon arranged that he live.

As we American POWs built our civilization, and wrote our own laws (which we leaders obliged all to memorize), we also codified certain principles that formed the backbone of our policies and attitudes. I codified the principles of compassion, rehabilitation, and forgiveness with the slogan: “It is neither American nor Christian to nag a repentant sinner to his grave.” (Some didn’t like it, thought it seemed soft on finks.) And so, we
really gave this man a chance. Over time, our efforts worked. After five years of self-indulgence he got himself together and started to communicate with the prisoner organization. I sent the message, “Are you on the team or not?”; he replied, “Yes,” and he came back. He told the Vietnamese that he didn’t want to play their dirty games anymore. He wanted to get away from those willful collaborators and he came back and he was accepted, after a fashion.

I wish that were the end of the story. Although he came back, joined us, and even became a leader of sorts, he never totally won himself back. No matter how forgiving we were, he was conscious that many resented him — not so much because he was weak but because he had broken what we might call a gentleman’s code. In all of those years when he, a senior officer, had willingly participated in making tape recordings of anti-American material, he had deeply offended the sensibilities of the American prisoners who were forced to listen to him. To most of us, it wasn’t the rhetoric of the war or the goodness or the badness of ‘this or that issue’ that counted. The object of our highest value was the well being of our fellow prisoners. He had broken that code and hurt some of those people. Some thought that as an informer he had indirectly hurt them physically. I don’t believe that. What indisputably hurt them was his not having the sensitivity to realize the damage his opportunistic conduct would do to the morale of a bunch of Middle American guys with Middle American attitudes which they naturally cherished. He should have known that in those solitary cells where his tapes were piped were idealistic, direct, patriotic fellows who would be crushed and embarrassed to have him, a senior man in excellent physical shape, so obviously not under torture, telling the world that the war was wrong. Even if he believed what he said, which he did not, he should have had the common decency to keep his mouth shut. You can sit and think anything you want, but when you insensitively cut down those who want to love and help you, you cross a line. He seemed to sense that he could never truly be one of us.

And yet he was likable — particularly back in civilization after release — when tension was off, and making a deal did not seem so important. He exuded charm and “hail fellow” sophistication. He wanted so to be liked by all those men he had once discarded in his search for new friends, new deals, and new fields to conquer in Hanoi. The tragedy of his life was obvious to us all. Tears were shed by some of his old prison mates when he was killed in an accident that strongly resembled suicide some months later. The Greek drama had run its course. He was right out of Aristotle’s book, a good man with a flaw who had come to an unjustified bad end. The flaw was insecurity: the need to ingratiate himself, the need for love and adulation at any price.

He reminded me of Paul Newman in The Hustler. Newman couldn’t stand success. He knew how to make a deal. He was handsome, he was smart, he was attractive to everybody; but he had to have adulation, and therein lay the seed of tragedy. Playing high-stakes pool against old Minnesota Fats (Jackie Gleason), Newman was well in the lead, and getting more full of himself by the hour. George C. Scott, the pool bettor, whispered to his partner: “I’m going to keep betting on Minnesota Fats; this other guy [Newman] is a born loser — he’s all skill and no character.” And he was right, a born loser — I think that’s the message.

How can we educate to avoid these casualties? Can we by means of education prevent this kind of tragedy? What we prisoners were in was a one-way leverage game in which the other side had all the mechanical advantage. I suppose you could say that we all live in a leverage world to some degree; we all experience people trying to use us in one way or another. The difference in Hanoi was the degradation of the ends (to be used as propaganda agents of an enemy, or as informers on your fellow Americans), and the power of the means (total environmental control including solitary confinement, restraint by means of leg-irons and handcuffs, and torture). Extortionists always go down the same track: the imposition of guilt and fear for having disobeyed their rules, followed in turn by punishment, apology, confession, and atonement (their payoff). Our captors would go to great lengths to get a man to compromise his own code, even if only slightly, and then
they would hold that in their bag, and the next time get him to go a little further.

Some people are psychologically, if not physically, at home in extortion environments. They are tough people who instinctively avoid getting sucked into the undertows. They never kid themselves or their friends; if they miss the mark, they admit it. But there’s another category of person who gets tripped up. He makes a small compromise, perhaps rationalizes it, and then makes another one; and then he gets depressed, full of shame, lonesome, loses his willpower and self-respect, and comes to a tragic end. Somewhere along the line he realizes that he has turned a corner that he didn’t mean to turn. All too late he realizes that he has been worshiping the wrong gods and discovers the wisdom of the ages: life is not fair.

In sorting out the story after our release, we found that most of us had come to combat constant mental and physical pressure in much the same way. We discovered that when a person is alone in a cell and sees the door open only once or twice a day for a bowl of soup, he realizes after a period of weeks in isolation and darkness that he has to build some sort of ritual into his life if he wants to avoid becoming an animal. Ritual fills a need in a hard life and it’s easy to see how formal church ritual grew. For almost all of us, this ritual was built around prayer, exercise, and clandestine communication. The prayers I said during those days were prayers of quality with ideas of substance. We found that over the course of time our minds had a tremendous capacity for invention and introspection, but had the weakness of being an integral part of our bodies. I remembered Descartes and how in his philosophy he separated mind and body. One time I cursed my body for the way it decayed my mind. I had decided that I would become a “Gandhi.” I would have to be carried around on a pallet and in that state I could not be used by my captors for propaganda purposes. After about ten days of fasting, I found that I had become so depressed that soon I would risk going into interrogation ready to spill my guts just looking for a friend. I tapped to the guy next door and I said, “Gosh, how I wish Descartes could have been right, but he’s wrong.” He was a little slow to reply; I reviewed Descartes’ deduction with him and explained how I had discovered that body and mind are inseparable.

On the positive side, I discovered the tremendous file cabinet volume of the human mind. You can memorize an incredible amount of material and you can draw the past out of your memory with remarkable recall by easing slowly toward the event you seek and not crowding the mind too closely. You’ll try to remember who was at your birthday party when you were five years old, and you can get it, but only after months of effort. You can break the locks and find the answers, but you need time and solitude to learn how to use this marvelous device in your head which is the greatest computer on earth.

Of course, many of the things we recalled from the past were utterly useless as sources of strength or practicality. For instance, events brought back from cocktail parties or insincere social contacts were almost repugnant because of their emptiness, their utter lack of value. More often than not, the locks worth picking had been on old schoolroom doors. School days can be thought of as a time when one is filling the important stacks of one’s memory library. For me, the golden doors were labeled history and the classics.

The historical perspective which enabled a man to take himself away from all the agitation, not necessarily to see a rosy lining, but to see the real nature of the situation he faced, was a truly a thing of value.

Here’s how this historical perspective helped me see the reality of my own situation and thus cope better with it. I learned from a Vietnamese prisoner that the same cells we occupied had in years before been lived in by many of the leaders of the Hanoi government. From my history lessons, I recalled that when metropolitan France permitted communists in the government in 1936, the communists who occupied cells in Vietnam were set free. I marveled at the cycle of history, all within my memory, which prompted Hitler’s rise in Germany, then led to the rise of the Popular Front in France, and finally vacated this cell of mine halfway around the world (“Perhaps Pham Van Dong lived here”). I came to understand what tough people these were. I
was willing to fight them to the death, but I grew to realize that hatred was an indulgence, a very inefficient emotion. I remember thinking, “If you were committed to beating the dealer in a gambling casino, would hating him help your game?” In a Pidgin English propaganda book the guard gave me, speeches by these old communists about their prison experiences stressed how they learned to beat down the enemy by being united. It seemed comforting to know that we were united against the communist administration of Hoa Lo prison just as the Vietnamese communists had united against the French administration of Hoa Lo in the thirties. Prisoners are prisoners, and there’s only one way to beat administrations. We resolved to do it better in the sixties than they had in the thirties. You don’t base system beating on any thought of political idealism; you do it as a competitive thing, as an expression of self-respect.

Education in the classics teaches you that all organizations since the beginning of time have used the power of guilt; that cycles are repetitive; and that this is the way of the world. It’s a naive person who comes in and says, “Let’s see, what’s good and what’s bad?” That’s a quagmire. You can get out of that quagmire only by recalling how wise men before you accommodated the same dilemmas. And I believe a good classical education and an understanding of history can best determine the rules you should live by. They also give you the power to analyze reasons for these rules and guide you as to how to apply them to your own situation. In a broader sense, all my education helped me. Naval Academy discipline and body contact sports helped me. But the education, which I found myself using most, was what I got in graduate school. The messages of history and philosophy I used were simple.

The first one is this business about life not being fair. That is a very important lesson and I learned it from a wonderful man named Philip Rhinelander. As a lieutenant commander in the Navy studying political science at Stanford University in 1961, I went over to philosophy corner one day and an older gentleman said, “Can I help you?” I said, “Yes, I’d like to take some courses in philosophy.” I told him I’d been in college for six years and had never had a course in philosophy. He couldn’t believe it. I told him that I was a naval officer and he said, “Well, I used to be in the Navy. Sit down.” Philip Rhinelander became a great influence in my life.

He had been a Harvard lawyer and had pleaded cases before the Supreme Court and then gone to war as a reserve officer. When he came back he took his doctorate at Harvard. He was also a music composer, had been director of general education at Harvard, dean of the School of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford, and by the time I met him had by choice returned to teaching in the classroom. He said, “The course I’m teaching is my personal two-term favorite — “The Problems of Good and Evil” — and we’re starting our second term.” He said the message of his course was from the Book of Job. The number one problem in this world is that people are not able to accommodate the lesson in the book.

He recounted the story of Job. It starts out by establishing that Job was the most honorable of men. Then he lost all his goods. He also lost his reputation, which is what really hurt. His wife was badgering him to admit his sins, but he knew he had made no errors. He was not a patient man and demanded to speak to the Lord. When the Lord appeared in the whirlwind, he said, “Now, Job, you have to shape up! Life is not fair.” That’s my interpretation and that’s the way the book ended for hundreds of years. I agree with those of the opinion that the happy ending was spliced on many years later. If you read it, you’ll note that the meter changes. People couldn’t live with the original message. Here was a good man who came to unexplained grief, and the Lord told him: “That’s the way it is. Don’t challenge me. This is my world and you either live in it as I designed it or get out.”

This was a great comfort to me in prison. It answered the question, “Why me?” It cast aside any thoughts of being punished for past actions. Sometimes I shared the message with fellow prisoners as I tapped through the walls to them, but I learned to be selective. It’s a strong message that upsets some people.

Rhinelander also passed on to me another piece of classical information that I found of great value. On the day of our last session
together he said, “You’re a military man, let
me give you a book to remember me by. It’s a
book of military ethics.” He handed it to me,
and I bade him goodbye with great emotion. I
took the book home and that night started to
read it. It was the Enchiridion of the
philosopher Epictetus, his “manual” for the
Roman field soldier.

As I began to read, I thought to myself in
disbelief, “Does Rhinelander think I’m going
to draw lessons for my life from this thing?
I’m a fighter pilot. I’m a technical man. I’m a
test pilot. I know how to get people to do
technical work. I play golf; I drink martinis.
I know how to get ahead in my profession. And
what does he hand me? A book that says in
part, ‘It’s better to die in hunger, exempt from
guilt and fear, than to live in affluence and with
perturbation.’” I remembered this later in
prison because perturbation was what I was
living with. When I ejected from the airplane
on that September mom in 1965, I had left the
land of technology. I had entered the “world of
Epictetus,” and it’s a world that few of us,
whether we know it or not, are ever far away
from.

In Palo Alto, I had read this book, not with
contentment, but with annoyance. Statement
after statement: “Men are disturbed not by
things, but by the view that they take of them.”
“Do not be concerned with things which are
beyond your power.” And “demand not that
events should happen as you wish, but wish
them to happen as they do happen and you will
go on well.” This is stoicism. It’s not the last
word, but it’s a viewpoint that comes in handy
in many circumstances, and it surely did for
me. Particularly this line: “Lameness is an
impediment to the body but not to the will.”
That was significant for me because I wasn’t
able to stand up and support myself on my
badly broken leg for the first couple of years I
was in solitary confinement.

Other statements of Epictetus took on added
meaning in the light of extortions that often
began with our captors’ callous pleas: “If you
are just reasonable with us we will compensate
you”. You get your meals, you get to sleep,
you won’t be pestered, you might even get a
cellmate.” The catch was that by being
“reasonable with us” our enemies meant being
their informers, their propagandists. The old
stoic had said, “If I can get the things I need
with the preservation of my honor and fidelity
and self-respect, show me the way and I will
get them. But, if you require me to lose my
own proper good, that you may gain what is no
good, consider how unreasonable and foolish
you are.” To love our fellow prisoners was
within our power. To betray, to propagandize,
to disillusion conscientious and patriotic
shipmates and destroy their morale so that they
in turn would be destroyed was to lose one’s
proper good.

What attributes serve you well in the extortion
environment? We learned there, above all else,
that the best defense is to keep your conscience
clean. When we did something we were
ashamed of, and our captors realized we were
ashamed of it, we were in trouble. A little
white lie is where extortion and ultimately
blackmail start. In 1965, I was crippled and I
was alone. I realized that they had all the
power. I couldn’t see how I was ever going to
get out with my honor and self-respect. The
one thing I came to realize was that if you don’t
lose integrity you can’t be had and you can’t be
hurt. Compromises multiply and build up
when you’re working against a skilled
extortionist or a good manipulator. You can’t
be had if you don’t take that first shortcut, or
“meet them halfway,” as they say, or look for
that tacit “deal,” or make that first
compromise.

Bob North, a political science professor at
Stanford, taught me a course called
“Comparative Marxist Thought.” This was not
an anticommunist course. It was the study of
dogma and thought patterns. We read no
criticism of Marxism, only primary sources.
All year we read the works of Marx and Lenin.
In Hanoi, I understood more about Marxist
theory than my interrogator did. I was able to
say to that interrogator, “That’s not what Lenin
said; you’re a deviationist.”

One of the things North talked about was
brainwashing. A psychologist who studied the
Korean prisoner situation, which somewhat
paralleled ours, concluded that three
categories of prisoners were involved there.
The first was the redneck Marine sergeant
from Tennessee who had an eighth-grade
education. He would get in that interrogation room and they would say that the Spanish-American War was started by the bomb within the Maine, which might be true, and he would answer, “B.S.” They would show him something about racial unrest in Detroit. “B.S.” There was no way they could get to him, his mind was made up. He was a straight guy, red, white, and blue, and everything else was B.S! He didn’t give it a second thought. Not much of a historian, perhaps, but a good security risk.

In the next category were the sophisticates. They were the fellows who could be told these same things about the horrors of American history and our social problems, but had heard it all before, knew both sides of every story, and thought we were on the right track. They weren’t ashamed that we had robber barons at a certain time of our history; they were aware of the skeletons in most civilizations’ closets. They could not be emotionally involved and so they were good security risks.

The ones who were in trouble were the high school graduates who had enough sense to pick up the innuendo, and yet not enough education to accommodate it properly. Not many of them fell, but most of the men that got entangled started from that background. The psychologist’s point is possibly over simplistic, but I think his message has some validity. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.

Generally speaking, I think education is a tremendous defense; the broader, the better. After I was shot down, my wife, Sybil, found a clipping glued in the front of my collegiate dictionary: “Education is an ornament in prosperity and a refuge in adversity.” She certainly agrees with me on that. Most of us prisoners found that the so-called practical academic exercises in how to do things, which I’m told are proliferating, were useless. I’m not saying that we should base education on training people to be in prison, but I am saying that in stress situations, the fundamentals, the hardcore classical subjects, are what serve best.

Theatrics also helped sustain me. My mother had been a drama coach when I was young and I was in many of her plays. In prison, I learned how to manufacture a personality and live it, crawl into it, and hold that role without deviation. During interrogations, I’d check the responses I got to different kinds of behavior. They’d get worried when I did things irrationally. And so, every so often, I would play that “irrational” role and come completely unglued. When I could tell that pressure to make a public exhibition of me was building, I’d stand up, tip the table over, attempt to throw the chair through the window, and say, “No way. Goddammit! I’m not doing that! Now, come over here and fight!” This was a risky ploy, because if they thought you were acting, they would slam you into the ropes and make you scream in pain like a baby. You could watch their faces and read their minds. They had expected me to behave like a stoic. But a man would be a fool to make their job easy by being conventional and predictable. I could feel the tide turn in my favor at that magic moment when their anger turned to pleading: “Calm down, now calm down.” The payoff would come when they decided that the risk of my going haywire in front of some touring American professor on a “fact-finding” mission was too great. More important, they had reason to believe that I would tell the truth — namely, that I had been in solitary confinement for four years and tortured fifteen times — without fear of future consequences. So theatrical training proved helpful to me.

Can you educate for leadership? I think you can, but the communists would probably say no. One day in an argument with an interrogator, I said, “You are so proud of being a party member, what are the criteria?” He said in a flurry of anger, “There are only four: you have to be seventeen years old, you have to be selfless, you have to be smart enough to understand the theory, and you’ve got to be a person who innately influences others.” He stressed that fourth one. I think psychologists would say that leadership is innate, and there is truth in that. But, I also think you can learn some leadership traits that naturally accrue from a good education: compassion is a necessity for leaders, as are spontaneity, bravery, self-discipline, honesty, and above all, integrity.
I remember being disappointed about a month after I was back when one of my young friends, a prison mate, came running up after a reunion at the Naval Academy. He said with glee, “This is really great, you won’t believe how this country has advanced. They’ve practically done away with plebe year at the Academy, and they’ve got computers in the basement of Bancroft Hall.” I thought, “My God, if there was anything that helped us get through those eight years, it was plebe year, and if anything screwed up that war, it was computers!”

**SOME HISTORY OF EPICTETUS**

Below is the history of Epictetus as related by Albert Salomon in the English translation of Enchiridion (1948).

Epictetus was the son of a woman slave, born between 50 and 60 A.D. at Hieropolis in Phrygia. We do not know how he came to Rome. He was there as slave to one of Nero’s distinguished freedmen who served as the Emperor’s secretary. While still in service, Epictetus took courses with Musonius Rufus, the fashionable Stoic philosopher, who was impressed by the sincere and dynamic personality of the young slave and trained him to be a Stoic philosopher. Epictetus became a free man and began teaching philosophy on street corners, in the market, but he was not successful. During the rule of Domitian, Epictetus with many other philosophers was exiled from Rome, probably between 89 and 92 A.D. He went to Nicopolis, across Actium in Epirus, where he conducted his own school. He was so well regarded and highly esteemed that he established the reputation of the place as the town of Epictetus’ school. Students came from Athens and Rome to attend his classes. Private citizens came to ask his advice and guidance. Some of his students returned to their homes to enter the traditional careers to which they were socially obligated. Others assumed the philosophic way of life in order to escape into the sphere of Stoic freedom.

Among the students was a young Roman, Flavius Arrian, who took courses at Nicopolis when Epictetus was already old. Flavius, who was born in 108 A.D., was one of the intimates of Hadrian, who made him consul in 130 A.D. He probably studied with Epictetus between the years 123 and 126 A.D. The informal philosophical talks which Epictetus had with his students fascinated him. Needless to say there were also systematic courses in the fields of philosophy. But it was the informal discourses that convinced Arrian that he had finally discovered a Stoic Socrates or a Stoic Diogenes, who was not merely teaching a doctrine, but also living the truth. Arrian recorded many of the discourses and informal conversations of Epictetus with his intimate students. He took them down in shorthand in order not to lose the ineffable liveliness, grace, and wit of the beloved teacher. Arrian retired into private life after the death of Hadrian in 138 A.D. and dedicated himself to his literary work. He published his notes on Epictetus’ teaching under the title: Discourses in Four Books. The Enchiridion, which was also arranged by Arrian, is a brief summary of the basic ideas of Stoic philosophy and an introduction to the techniques required to transform Stoic philosophy into a way of life.

Thus we do not have any original writings of Epictetus. Like G. H. Mead in recent times, he was completely dedicated to the human and intellectual problems of his students. He left it for them to preserve what they considered to be the lasting message of the teacher.

The actual text itself consists of 51 paragraphs. Each one with some statement of wisdom about living and dealing with life’s events. Some of these paragraphs are several sentences in length; others are just one sentence. The gist of the manual is to guide the reader into becoming a philosopher. For example, in Paragraph 5, the first sentence states, “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things.” Then, in Paragraph 10, “Upon every accident, remember to turn toward yourself and inquire what faculty you have for its use.”

As a member of the Roman culture of his time, his belief in the role of the divinity in life is well stated in Paragraph 31. “Be assured that the essence of piety toward the gods lies in this – to form right opinions concerning them, as existing and as governing the universe justly and well.”
It is understandable as one reads the *Enchiridion* how this helped Admiral Stockdale in his own life. Probably one of the most salient statements can be found in Paragraph 46: “Never proclaim yourself a philosopher, nor make much talk among the ignorant about your principles, but show them by actions”.

**POLITICAL CONTEXT AND GOALS OF THE CAPTOR**

Learning Objective: *Recall the circumstances and reactions of the captive as identified by the “Stockholm Syndrome” and the five goals of the captor.*

**SOCIETAL STOCKHOLM SYNDROME**

The term Stockholm Syndrome was coined in the early 70’s to describe the puzzling reactions of four bank employees to their captors. On August 23, 1973, three women and one man were taken hostage in one of the largest banks in Stockholm. They were held for six days by two ex-convicts who threatened their lives but also showed them kindness. To the world’s surprise, all of the hostages strongly resisted the government’s efforts to rescue them and were quite eager to defend their captors. Indeed, several months after the police saved the hostages, the hostages still had warm feelings for the men who threatened their lives. Two of the women eventually got engaged to the captors.

The Stockholm incident compelled journalists and social scientists to research whether the emotional bonding between captors and captives was a “freak” incident or a common occurrence in oppressive situations. They discovered that it’s such a common phenomenon that it deserves a name. Thus the label, Stockholm Syndrome, was born. It has happened to concentration camp prisoners, cult members, civilians in Chinese Communist prisons, pimp-procured prostitutes, incest victims, physically and/or emotionally abused children, battered women, prisoners of war, victims of hijackings, and of course, hostages. Virtually anyone is susceptible to the Stockholm Syndrome if the following conditions are met:

- Perceived threat to survival and the belief that one’s captor is willing to act on that threat.
- The captive’s perception of small kindnesses from the captor within a context of terror.
- Isolation from perspectives other than those of the captor.

- Perceived inability to escape.
- Stockholm Syndrome is a survival mechanism. The men and women who get it are not lunatics. They are fighting for their lives. They deserve compassion, not ridicule.

**CAPTOR GOALS**

Captor goals against the captive can be diverse and complex. Theoretically limited to neutralization, they are most likely to include exploitative processes to gain reprisal, intelligence, propaganda, legal justification, concession and ideological conversion.

**Reprisal**

Reprisal is an inevitable issue in every conflict. Atrocity, a subspecies of reprisal, is a loaded term and sees such variants as the killing of the enemy wounded in the field.

**Intelligence**

Popular legend supports an image of excruciating torture of the captive in an attempt to induce him to divulge secrets. The use of physical duress does not go unrecorded, of course, but its frank use poses problems for the captor. Almost every captive will be exploited for intelligence, but the nature of the exploitation will frequently take avenues not anticipated by the captive.

Known captor treatment, good or bad, has a marked effect on a prisoner in his precapture status. Anticipated good treatment by an enemy will cause many to throw down their arms rather than fight to the death. Once captured, the prisoner becomes a new target for the captor who has any concern for public opinion, either national or international.

**Legal Justification**

As far as the legal justification, some of the mentioned propaganda statements allege the criminality of the captive’s personal participation in the conflict. The use of captives for extortion, for ransom, or to obtain concession is as old as recorded history.

**Concession and Ideological Conversion**

A complex of captor requirements may dictate on his part a concerted effort to realign captive beliefs and attitudes, to expose the prisoner to “thought reform” or
“brainwashing.” A prisoner who switches allegiance is obviously more tractable; he will write his own propaganda broadcasts or letters with sincerity; he may deliver up to the captor the intelligence information he desires. But the rhetorical and sinister frequently enter here to cloud another possible enemy goal: a sincere and deeply held conviction of the righteousness of his own cause which presses him to convey its “rightness” to the captive: to show him how he can mend his ways. This is not to deny that the captor may use such a realigned captive for his own devious ends, or, in fact, that in some captors the realignment itself may be viewed as a devious process.

RECOGNIZING THE POSSIBILITY OF BECOMING A HOSTAGE

Learning Objective: Note the same principles in rehabilitating the POW are applicable in the situation of hostage taking.

Terror is commonly defined using synonyms such as agitation, alarm, anxiety, panic, horror, and fear. On close examination, fear emerges as the common thread in defining all of these synonyms, thus terror can be labeled as fear. But we do not claim to experience terror every time we are frightened. Terror implies prolonged, intense fear. Man has always experienced terror from one source or another. In fact, terror is quite natural.

It is terrorism, the production and application of terror, that is artificial or ‘man-made.’ Army Regulation (AR) 190-52 defines terrorism as: “The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.”

Nonpolitical motivations to use terror to force compliance falls into two general categories — psychologically disturbed and criminal. Criminals use terrorist practices for personal or organizational gain (for example, profit or safety from police). Individuals with emotional or personality disorders resort to terrorist actions to express their hostility toward other individuals or society.

Terrorism is not new. Armies have tried to strike terror into the hearts of their enemies since armed conflict began. The reasoning behind this was that the terrified enemy would either not fight at all, or do so poorly because of fear and a sense of hopeless. In short, terror was a means whereby the enemy’s behavior could be modified.

Terror used as a tactic by one group to compel others to behave in a certain way through fear is also an ancient practice. A traceable historic example frequently used to illustrate terror as a group effort is the Zealots (circa 6-70 AD). The Zealots were an extremist Jewish faction that opposed interaction with Rome or with any other foreign culture.

To enforce their views of ethnic and particularly religious purity, they killed those whom they identified as doing “evil” (that is, not conforming to the behavior the Zealots determined to be correct or “good”). As has been the case with most attempts to change people through terror, the Zealots failed. Their actions helped to split Jewish society and ultimately provided the excuse for Rome to conquer and dominate much of what now constitutes the states of Lebanon and Israel.

Through the centuries, terror has been used to compel behavior on the part of victims and potential victims for various purposes. While our definition recognizes ideological, religious, and political motivations, in the long term all become political because all eventually call for public policy to reflect the views held by the terrorizing group.

A commonly used example of a group that employed terror for political purposes is the eleventh century Hashashini or Assassins. This group, which originated in Iran and spread to the Mediterranean, used religious teachings to perpetuate itself for over
two hundred years. During that period, their attempts to dictate public policy through murder (assassination), sometimes carried out at the cost of the perpetrator’s life spread terror from India to the Nile. Thus, martyrdom was introduced into the terrorists’ arsenal.

Recognizing that the use of fear (terror) to compel behavior has been a factor in the dynamics of human social history for as far back as we can trace, it was only in the closing years of the eighteenth century that terrorism was identified. During the period 1793-94, at the height of the French Revolution, terror was systematically applied on a nationwide scale. Terror was used to eliminate socially dangerous groups (the aristocracy) and those who opposed the new government’s programs. Terror had evolved into the calculated generation of fear for political purposes or, as used today, terrorism.

The next critical step in the evolution of modern terrorism took place in the late eighteenth century. Radical political groups were still using terror tactics, but their actions focused on the assassination of government officials. While those actions were successful tactically, their objectives were never attained. With the murder of one official, another would simply take his place. Nothing was changed, and increased security made the new target more difficult to attack. In effect, the terrorists discovered that modern nation states were less sensitive to individual personalities than earlier forms of government.

During the period 1870-1900, groups that accepted violence as a means to political ends debated a fundamental change in strategy. The new approach was to assault neutral or innocent people to generate demands on the political leadership for action (that is, compliance with the terrorists’ demands). Not all groups involved in political violence accepted the new concept. Those who did surrendered any claim to moral justification for their acts. In any cultural context, it is difficult to convince an audience that killing and maiming those whom you are allegedly trying to help is in the victim’s best interests. Regardless of how noble the cause may be, a terrorist is a terrorist, and terrorism cannot be hidden under the cloak of “Freedom Fighter,” “Patriot,” or “Crusader.”

Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century, the practice of terrorism had moved beyond the pale of civilized behavior. As the century progressed, terrorists redefined their rules of engagement to the point where today, for most terrorist groups, there are no innocents.

**TERRORISM**

A critical factor in understanding modern terrorism is the importance of the emotional impact of the terrorist act on an audience other than the victim(s). If we do not know about the act, it has no impact on our thinking. This is why news media coverage is important to terrorists who are attempting to excite public fear or gain attention for their cause. The thirst for attention determines, to a great extent, the terrorist’s tactics.

Another determinant of tactics and target selection is the role that the terrorist group perceives itself as playing. Terrorism can be an element of an insurgency or revolutionary effort when employed with other military and political activities designed to gain autonomy or to supplant the existing government. It can also be used as an overt or covert aspect of a political movement engaged in a power struggle being waged within an existing political system. Finally, terrorism can be a mere gesture used in isolation from any meaningful political effort. In the latter case, the terrorists frequently claim affiliation with some vague cause and or remote political group to give their actions a claim to respectability.

**TERRORIST TACTICS**

The immediate objectives of any given terrorist attack fall into one or more categories — attract attention to the group or its cause(s), demonstrate the group’s power, exact revenge, obtain logistical support, or cause a government to overreact. Just as a terrorist incident may have several objectives, the tactics used may also be combined. The more common tactics employed by contemporary terrorist groups are:

- **Assassination.** Euphemism for murder that is generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as traitors who defect from the group. There are as many variations to assassination techniques as there are ways to kill a human being.

- **Arson.** Less dramatic than most tactics arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator and requires only a low level of technical knowledge.

- **Bombing.** The IED (improvised explosive device) is the contemporary terrorist’s tactic of choice and is used more frequently than other
types of explosives. IEDs are inexpensive to produce and, due to the various detonation techniques available, pose a low risk to the perpetrator. Other advantages include their attention getting capacity and the ability to control casualties through time of detonation and placement of the device. From 1983 through 1986, approximately half of all recorded terrorist incidents worldwide involved the use of IEDs. In Europe, IEDs were used in 70 percent of all terrorist incidents during 1985.

- Hostage-taking. This usually is an overt seizure of one or more people with the intent of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the hostage(s). While dramatic, hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the perpetrator when executed in an unfriendly environment. Comparisons of how the environment affects the outcome of hostage-taking situations may be made by comparing the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1981 with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979. In the former incident, only one terrorist survived; in the latter all of the hostage takers survived.

- Kidnapping. While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant differences. Kidnapping is usually a covert action wherein the perpetrators may not be known for some time. News media attention is usually less intense since the event may extend over a prolonged period. Because of the time involved, a successful kidnapping requires elaborate planning and logistics although the risk to the terrorist is less than in the hostage situation.

- Raids. Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken for one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast capabilities in order to make a statement; to demonstrate the government’s inability to secure critical facilities; or for logistical purposes (for example, bank or armory robbery).

- Seizure. Similar to the hostage situation, the seizure usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of the audience. Publicity is the principal objective. There is some risk to the terrorist because security forces have time to react and may opt to use force to resolve the incident since few or no innocent lives are involved.

- Sabotage. The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how vulnerable society is to the terrorists’ actions. Industrialized societies are more vulnerable to sabotage than less highly developed societies. Utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of any one affects them all and gains immediate public attention. Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilities is one means of identifying the target while making a statement of future intent.

- Hijacking. Sometimes employed as a means for escape, hijacking is normally carried out to produce a spectacular hostage situation. Although trains, buses, and ships have been hijacked, aircraft are the preferred target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability.

- Hoaxes. Any terrorist group that has established credibility can employ the hoax with considerable success. A threat against a person’s life causes that person and those associated with him to devote time and effort to security measures. A bomb threat can close down a commercial building, empty a theater, or delay a plane flight at no cost to the terrorist. The effects of “false alarms” on the security forces are more dangerous than the temporary disruption the hoax causes. Repeated threats that do not materialize dull the analytical and operational efficacy of essential security personnel.

It should be noted that although chemical and biological weapons have not been widely used to date, there is a potential for their use. These types of weapons, relatively cheap and easy to make, could be used in place of conventional explosives in many situations. The potential for mass destruction and the deep-seated fear most people have of chemical and biological weapons could be attractive to a group wishing to make the world take notice.

Although a nuclear device is widely acknowledged to be beyond the reach of most, if not all, terrorist groups, a chemical or biological weapon is not. The technology is simple and the cost per casualty, for biological weapons in particular, is extremely low, much lower than for conventional or nuclear explosives.

Fear of alienation by peer and support populations has probably inhibited the use of chemical and biological weapons to date, but this obstacle could
evaporate as the competition for news headlines increases and public opinion softens.

**TERRORIST GROUPS**

A terrorist group’s selection of targets and tactics is also a function of the group’s governmental affiliation. For some years security forces categorized terrorist groups according to their operational traditions—national, transnational, and international. National groups operated within the boundaries of a single nation. Transnational groups operated across international borders. International groups operated in two or more nations and were usually assumed to receive direction from a foreign government. Ease of international travel and the growing tendency toward cooperative efforts among terrorist groups have rendered these categories of little use operationally. Terrorist groups are categorized by government affiliation to help security planners anticipate terrorist targets and their sophistication of intelligence and weaponry. Three general categories that have gained acceptance are:

Non-State Supported. A terrorist group that operates autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government (for example, Italy’s Red Brigades and the Basque terrorist organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna known as Basque E.T.A.)

State Supported. A terrorist group that generally operates independently but receives support from one or more governments (for example, People for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the Middle East).

State Directed. A terrorist group that operates as an agent of a government receiving substantial intelligence, logistics, and operational support (for example, Libyan “hit teams”).

**TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS**

As with any organization, terrorist groups develop organizational structures that are functional for the environment in which they operate. Since terrorists must, by definition, operate in a hostile environment, security is the primary consideration. As a result, the organization of terrorist groups is usually cellular, with each cell relatively isolated. This type of organization protects members of the group. In the event of defection or capture, no one member can identify more than a few of the others. Some groups have multi-functional cells that combine several skills in one operational entity, while others create cells of specialists that come together for an operation on an ad hoc basis. The latter procedure is similar to tailoring or task organizing military forces.

Larger terrorist groups (100 or more members) normally have a central command and control element with one or more subordinate elements that are based on geographical regions. The regional commands direct the actions of the operational and support cells in their region. Smaller groups (50 or fewer members) may have a single command element that directly controls all of the operational and support cells regardless of where they are established.

Even though terrorist groups generally structure themselves in a manner similar to military organizations, few, if any, groups are tightly disciplined enough to function along clear lines of authority and functionality. Group dynamics, egos, and philosophical differences override organizational principles and create opportunities for security forces to identify members, penetrate the organization, and prevent terrorist actions. These personalistic factors cause terrorist groups to splinter into new faction(s), adding to the growing list of organizational titles in world terrorism. Along with the commonly used deception technique of claiming credit for an action in the name of a previously unknown group, splintering complicates the intelligence efforts of security forces.

In a broader context, terrorist organizations, especially those with little or no access to government resources, need a support structure. As shown in the figure, a typical organization consists of operational members who are functionally organized as outlined above and two categories of supporters. At the top is the leadership that defines policy and directs action. Typically, leaders are completely committed to the cause that the group purports to serve and may be charismatic figures. If the group is state supported or directed, the leadership will include one or more members who have had extensive training or education by the sponsoring state. The active cadre are the doers, the men and women who carry out terrorist attacks and train others. As in the leadership element, many of the doers are deeply committed to the group’s cause. The professionals who may or may not be ideologically motivated are also part of the active cadre.

Active supporters are people who do not actually commit violent acts, but who assist the terrorists through money, intelligence, legal or medical services, and provision of safe-houses or forged documents. Active supporters are frequently ideologically in agreement with all or some of the terrorist group’s goals, but may be ambivalent concerning the use of
violence. Another motivation is the vicarious thrill derived from safe involvement in violence. Most terrorist groups recruit much of their cadre from the ranks of the active supporters since these people have proven their loyalty and, to some extent, their skills over a period of time.

Passive supporters are more difficult to define and, in practice, more difficult to identify. Most of these people are sympathetic to the terrorist group’s cause(s), but either cannot or will not assume an active role. Family and acquaintances of activists sometimes fall into this category, especially in cultural environments where family and regional loyalties are strong. The terrorist group relies on passive supporters for financial assistance, displays of public support, and minor logistical or operational tasks.

TERRORIST TARGETS — AMERICANS

It is sometimes difficult for Americans to understand why terrorism seems to thrive in the environment that offers least justification for political violence, (for example, democracies and ineffective authoritarian regimes). Equally puzzling is the relative absence of terrorism in those societies with totalitarian and effective authoritarian governments. The reasons for this apparent paradox can be summarized as being a matter of social control. The terrorist operates covertly. In societies where little is done without the knowledge of internal security agencies, covert activity for any appreciable period of time is impossible. The same principle applies to acquisition of weapons, communications equipment, and explosives. The third factor is public information. Since terrorist objectives include gaining the attention of a target audience through violence, terrorists can be denied that objective in an environment where information media are tightly controlled.

The reasons why the United States is a target for so many terrorist groups around the world are complex. These must be understood in order to effectively combat terrorism in the long term. One reason that some terrorist groups target the United States and its citizens is ideological differences. United States is a leading industrial power and the leading capitalist state. These reasons are enough to excite the animosity of some groups that are committed to totally different social systems.

Of greater importance is the exaggerated perception of the ability of the U.S. government to dictate to other governments. U.S. influence is so pervasive that many people around the world mistake influence for control. They think that by pressuring the United States through acts of terror, the U.S. government will order their own government to comply with terrorist demands.

Mere presence is another factor. Americans are all over the world in capacities ranging from diplomatic service to tourists. Being available makes targeting Americans easy even for relatively poorly trained non-state supported groups. It also adds to the chances of Americans being killed or injured unintentionally. These same considerations apply to members of the U.S. military forces with the added factor of symbolic value. Since the armed forces are clearly visible symbols of U.S. power and presence, terrorists find both installations and personnel as appealing targets.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM

While the United States has one of the highest levels of social violence in the world, the incidence of terrorism is very low compared to Europe, Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. There are several reasons for this seeming inconsistency. First, the United States does not have a tradition of violence for political purposes. There is no history of deep ideological commitment justifying the taking or sacrifice of life. The second factor is the absence of ethnic concentrations or restrictive legislation that causes separatist movements. Puerto Rico is the exception that proves the rule with several pro-independence groups practicing terror tactics.

Caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions exclusively from the experiences of the past. Although low levels of domestic terrorism have occurred in the United States to date, terrorism is still a threat in CONUS. Right wing extremist organizations constitute a growing threat to public order. Agents of external causes and foreign powers pose a potential threat that needs only a transoceanic flight or border crossing to become active.

As shown in the next figure, terrorism is a factor across the spectrum of conflict. Terrorism is normally viewed as violence in an environment where there is no armed conflict. Thus, it may be considered as a mode of conflict. In the context of peace, terrorism attracts a great deal of attention and few question its real and potential capacity to kill and destroy. The same can be said of terrorism as an aspect of insurrections or other forms of internal conflict. Under conditions of opened-armed conflict, however, terrorism tends to be
ignored. The reason for this is our attention (the audience’s) is spread over battles and mobilization activities at home and abroad. Thus, acts of terrorism are lost in the sensation rich atmosphere of war.

Although the military commander may not have terrorism brought to his attention during war as it is in times of peace, terrorism does not disappear. The same types of acts that gain attention in peace can hinder military operations in war. Targeting strategies may change and terrorism may be relegated to a tactic rather than a mode of conflict, but the violent acts remain the same. The label may change to sabotage, but the skills required to carry out the attacks are those of the terrorist. More importantly, the defensive practices developed in peace to prevent terrorist acts are the same as those that are needed in war to thwart sabotage and level I rear area threats.

U.S. Government Policy and Legal Considerations

Since the mid-1970’s, terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens have caused the problem of terrorism to be elevated from a police matter to an aspect of national policy. As policy evolved it was necessary to delineate major responsibilities and legal constraints regarding policy execution. The following outlines the policy and jurisdictional responsibilities generally applicable to the U.S. Army.

United States Government Policy

Over the last decade, the government of the United States has developed a policy regarding terrorism that encompasses acts against Americans, both at home and abroad. That policy is summarized as follows:

- All terrorist actions are criminal and intolerable, whatever their motivation, and should be condemned.
- All lawful measures will be taken to prevent terrorist acts and to bring to justice those who commit them.
- Concessions will not be made to terrorist extortion, because to do so invites further demands.
- The United States presumes that the host government will exercise its responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its territories. When Americans are abducted or held captive, the host government is expected to do its utmost to effect the safe release of the hostages.
- During incidents affecting Americans, close and continuous contact will be maintained with host governments, supporting them with all practicable intelligence and technical services. Also, the United States will offer advice on how to respond to specific terrorist demands.
- International cooperation to combat terrorism is a fundamental aspect of U.S. policy. All avenues to strengthen such cooperation will be pursued.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following information shows the legal ramifications and areas of expertise as found necessary because of the threat of terrorist actions.

THE LAW OF WAR

Terrorist acts are criminal acts, whether committed in peacetime or wartime. One difference in terrorism counteraction in wartime involves jurisdiction to punish terrorists. In peacetime, terrorist acts are punishable under domestic (local) criminal law. This is also true for a low-intensity conflict (LIC), which is characterized by police actions to maintain the legitimate government. If, however, the conflict is internationally recognized as an insurgency, then the protections under article III common to the four Geneva conventions apply. Article III requires that noncombatants, including captured terrorists, be treated humanely.

Even in an internationally recognized war or conflict (conventional, limited, or civil war), a terrorist act is a criminal act. Only combatants can legitimately attack proper military objectives. Lawful combatants who commit violations of the law of war, such as attacking unlawful targets, are entitled to prisoner of war status and are subject to the law of war. Terrorists, by definition, do not meet the four requirements necessary for combatant status (wear distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, commanded by someone responsible for their actions, and conduct their operations in accordance with the law of war). Therefore, they are not afforded prisoner of war status. However, the law of war requires that we treat captured terrorists humanely. Terrorists can be tried under local criminal law or under military jurisdiction by a court-martial or a military tribunal.
A commander’s authority to enforce security measures and to protect persons and property increases with the level of conflict. Commanders must coordinate with their legal advisors to determine the extent of their authority to counter terrorism in time of conflict.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

The constitution restricts the use of military forces to enforce federal laws. When civil law enforcement agencies are unable to control events, however, constitutional exceptions permit the U.S. government to use military forces to preserve law and order within its territorial limits. These exceptions include:

- Emergency Authority. This authorizes prompt and vigorous federal action, including the use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property. Emergency authority is used to restore governmental functioning and public order when duly constituted local authorities cannot control the situation. This may occur during unexpected civil disturbances or disasters.

- Protection of Federal Property and Functions. This authorizes federal actions, including the use of military forces, to protect federal property and functions. This authority is used when duly constituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY

The Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC 1385) restricts the use of military personnel within the United States or its possessions. This act does not apply in foreign countries, nor to actions on military bases, nor to actions in military contracted buildings or spaces, nor to guarding military property in transit. Outside of the United States, a host nation has primary authority as set forth in applicable SOFAS (status-of-forces agreements). Within the United States, except as authorized by statute or the constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of DOD uniformed personnel from assisting civilian law enforcement officers in carrying out civilian law enforcement duties. The same prohibition applies to the use of troops to execute federal laws. Title 10 (USC 371378) and AR 500-51 provide for military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies through sharing information, providing equipment, and by training and advising.

Congress, pursuant to its constitutional authority, has provided a broad range of legislation authorizing the President to use active duty military forces and federalized reserve and civilian forces to execute the laws. The President is currently empowered to use military forces to:

- Restore and maintain public order,
- meet specified contingencies,
- cope with domestic emergencies, and
- protect public safety.

AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

At the national level, the Department of State is the lead agency for response to terrorist incidents that take place outside the United States. The DOJ (Department of Justice) is the lead agency for domestic terrorism, with the exception of acts that threaten the safety of persons aboard aircraft in flight or that involve nuclear weapons. These are the responsibility of the FAA and the NRC (National Response Center), respectively. All federal agencies that have resources for responding to terrorism are linked together through agency command centers and crisis management groups to ensure effective coordination of the U.S. response.

Major organizations with jurisdictional authority in a terrorist incident involving military assets in the United States are the DOJ, the FBI, and the DOD. The DOJ is responsible for overseeing the federal response to acts of domestic terrorism. The Attorney General of the United States, through an appointed Deputy Attorney General, makes major policy decisions and legal judgments related to each terrorist incident as it occurs.

The FBI has been designated as the primary operational agency to work toward the prevention of terrorist incidents occurring within the United States. If an incident occurs, the first reaction is generally from the special agent in charge (SAC) of the incident area. The SAC is under the supervision of the Director of the FBI. The FBI maintains liaison with each governor’s office and renews it with each change of administration. There is a SAC of each of the 59 field offices throughout the United States. Due to concurrent jurisdiction in many cases, the FBI cooperates with state and local law enforcement authorities on a continuing basis.

In accordance with a DOD, DOJ, and FBI Memorandum of Understanding, all military
preparations and operations, including the employment of military forces at the scene of a terrorist incident, is the primary responsibility of the SECDEF. In discharging these functions, the SECDEF observes law enforcement policies as determined by the Attorney General. DOD responsibilities are carried out principally through DA, since the Secretary of the Army has primary responsibility for these matters as the DOD executive agent. The Attorney General, through the FBI, coordinates the activities of all federal agencies involved in resolving the incident, administers justice in the affected area, and coordinates these activities with state and local agencies. Upon notification of presidential approval to use military force, the Attorney General advises the Director of the FBI who notifies the SAC. The SECDEF advises the military task force commander.

The military commander and the SAC coordinate the transfer of operational control to the military commander. Responsibility for the tactical phase of the operation is transferred to military authority when the SAC relinquishes command and control and the on-site military task force commander accepts it. However, the SAC may revoke the military commitment at any time prior to the assault phase if he determines that military intervention is no longer required. The military commander must agree that a withdrawal can be accomplished without seriously endangering the safety of personnel involved in the incident. When the military task force commander determines that he has completed the assault phase of the operation, command and control will be promptly returned to the SAC.

On a military installation, the military commander is responsible for the maintenance of law and order, and may take immediate action in response to a terrorist incident. The FBI is notified as soon as possible of all terrorist incidents on military installations. The Attorney General or his designated representative determines if the incident is of significant federal interest. If it is, the FBI assumes jurisdiction and the Attorney General coordinates the federal response. Should military assistance be required, it is furnished in accordance with the procedures described in the memorandum of understanding. If the FBI declines to exercise its jurisdiction, military authorities take appropriate action to resolve the incident.

For incidents on OCONUS installations, the installation commander’s responsibilities under specific instructions are the same as those for on-post CONUS incidents — with the added requirement to notify the host nation and the Department of State. The Department of State has the primary responsibility for dealing with terrorism involving Americans abroad. The installation’s response is subject to agreements established with the host nation.

The response to off-post OCONUS incidents is the sole responsibility of the host nation. U.S. military assistance, if any, depends on the applicable SOFA or memorandums of understanding, and is coordinated through the U.S. Embassy in that country. Military forces will not be provided to host nation authorities without a directive from DOD that has been coordinated with the Department of State. The degree of Department of State interest and the involvement of U.S. military forces depend on the incident site, the nature of the incident, the extent of foreign government involvement, and the overall threat to U.S. security.

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM

Increasingly, U.S. military personnel are becoming targets for terrorist activity. Any member of the U.S. military can become a target for terrorists — not just high-ranking leaders. The purpose of the following information is to give you general guidance on how to avoid acts of terrorism and what actions to take should you or your family become victims of a terrorist attack.

BASIC PRECAUTIONS

The most important basic precaution you can take regarding security is to have an attentive and vigilant attitude about security matters. You can lessen your and your family’s chances of becoming a terrorists target by taking the following precautions. At all times:

- Encourage security awareness in your family and discuss what to do if there is a security threat.
- Be alert for surveillance attempts, or suspicious persons or activities, and report them to the proper authorities.
- Vary personal routines whenever possible.
- Get into the habit of “checking in” to let your friends and family know where you are or when to expect you.
- Know how to use the local telephone system. Always carry “telephone change.” Know the
emergency numbers to use for local police, fire, ambulance, and hospital.

- Know the locations of civilian police, military police, government agencies, the U.S. Embassy, and other safe locations where you can find refuge or assistance.

- Avoid public disputes or confrontations. Report any trouble to the proper authorities.

- Know certain key phrases in the native language, such as “I need a policeman,” “Take me to a doctor,” “Where is the hospital?,” and “Where is the police station?”

- Set up simple signal systems that can alert family members or associates that there is a danger.

- Carry identification showing your blood type and any special medical conditions. Keep one week’s supply of essential medication on hand.

- Keep a low profile. Shun publicity. Do not flash large sums of money.

- Do not unnecessarily divulge your home address, telephone number, or family information.

- Watch for unexplained absences of local citizens as an early warning of possible terrorist actions.

- Maintain your personal affairs in good order. Keep wills current, have powers of attorney drawn up, take measures to ensure family financial security, and develop a plan for family actions in the event you are taken hostage.

- Do not carry sensitive or potentially embarrassing items.

Take the following actions at home:

- Have a clear view of approaches to your home.

- Install strong doors and locks.

- Change locks when you move in or when a key is lost.

- Install windows that do not allow easy access.

- Never leave house or trunk keys with your ignition key while your car is being serviced.

- Have adequate lighting outside your house.

- Create the appearance that the house is occupied by using timers to control lights and radios while you are away.

- Install one way viewing devices in doors.

- Install intrusion detection alarms and smoke and fire alarms.

- Do not “hide” keys or give them to very young children.

- Never leave young children at home alone.

- Never admit strangers to your home without proper identification.

- Use off street parking at your residence, if possible.

- Teach children how to call police.

- Avoid living in residences that are located in isolated locations, on one-way streets, dead-end streets, or cul-de-sacs.

- Avoid residences that are on the ground floor, adjacent to vacant lots, or on steep hills.

- Carefully screen all potential domestic help.

- Do not place your name on exterior walls of residences.

- Do not answer the telephone with your name and rank.

- Personally destroy all envelopes and other items that reflect personal information.

- Close draperies during periods of darkness. Draperies should be opaque and made of heavy material.

- Avoid frequent exposure on balconies and in windows.

- Consider owning a dog to discourage intruders.

Take the following actions while traveling:

- Vary times and routes.

- Be alert for suspicious looking vehicles.

- Check for suspicious activity or objects around your car before getting into or out of it.

- Know your driver.

- Equip your car with an inside hood latch and a locking gas cap.

- Drive with windows closed and doors locked.

- Travel on busy routes and avoid isolated areas and dangerous areas.

- Park cars off the street in secure areas.
• Lock your car when it is unattended.
• Do not always use the same taxi or bus stop. Buses are preferred over taxis.
• If you think you are being followed, move as quickly as possible to a safe place such as a police station.
• If the car breaks down, raise the hood and remain inside the car with doors locked and windows up. Ask anyone who offers assistance to call the police.
• Do not pick up hitchhikers.
• Drive on well-lit streets.
• The driver should open the door for you.
• Prearrange a signal with your driver to indicate that it is safe to get into the vehicle.
• If the driver is absent, do not get into the car.
• If possible, tell your driver your destination only after the car has started.
• Keep your gas tank at least half full.
• Take the following actions in hotels:
  • Keep your room key on your person at all times.
  • Be observant for suspicious persons loitering in the area.
  • Do not give your room number to strangers.
  • Keep your room and personal effects in a neat and orderly fashion so that you will recognize tampering or strange out-of-place objects.
  • Know the location of emergency exits and fire extinguishers.
  • Do not admit strangers to your room.
  • Know how to locate hotel security guards.
• Take the following actions if you are a victim. During the attack:
  • Maintain the safety of yourself and your family as your first concern.
  • In general, comply with the demands of the attacker or captor to avoid serious injury or death.
  • Remember that the use of weapons by untrained/unskilled people should be avoided.
• Try to remember facts about your attacker(s) such as sex, age, height, build, race or nationality, complexion, hairstyle, scars, tattoos, or other unusual features. Try to remember information about the vehicle(s) of the attacker(s) such as the state and the number of the license plate(s), style, color, make, year, damage, or other characteristics.

Take the following actions if you are held captive:
• Try to stay calm and alert. If you are part of a group of hostages, try to be inconspicuous.
• Remember that the primary objective of your family and law enforcement officials is to secure your safe return as quickly as possible.
• Do not attempt to fight back.
• Comply with instructions of your abductors as well as you can without aiding their cause.
• Do not discuss what actions might be taken by your family, friends, or unit.
• Make a mental note of as many details as possible; movement direction, distance, speeds, landmarks, special orders, distinctive sounds.
• Make a mental note of the characteristics of your abductors.
• Avoid making provocative remarks to your abductors. They may be unstable individuals who will react irrationally.
• Request special medicine or medical attention immediately if you have a disease or physical condition that requires treatment.
• Try to establish some type of rapport with your captors; you will be less likely to be harmed. This must be done slowly so you do not arouse suspicion.
• Do not be alarmed by the passing of time as it is usually an indication that events are working in your favor. Over time you may develop, to greater or lesser degrees, feelings of sympathy for your captors (the Stockholm syndrome). Do not allow those feelings to influence your behavior.
• Do not reveal classified information.
• Ask for permission to communicate with the local U.S. Embassy or other U.S. government representative, your commander, or family.
Establish a daily routine to lull your captors and to help you stay alert.

Try to keep a diary, both to occupy your mind and to assist you to recall events following your rescue.

If you understand the terrorists’ language, it may be to your advantage to conceal this fact.

Try to maintain your composure, dignity, and self respect no matter how primitive your living conditions may be.

While your captors may try to scare you by threatening death, statistically the odds favor a hostage being released alive. You are more valuable to your captors alive than dead.

During a negotiated release, follow directions and avoid sudden movements.

During rescue attempts, remain calm, do not panic. The safest response is to drop to the floor and lie as flat as possible.

Escape attempts, except during the initial abduction, usually should be avoided. Do not attempt to escape unless you have a 100 percent chance to succeed. Escape efforts may fail and can endanger your life and may delay or negate rescue efforts.

Take the following actions after you are released:

Obtain and follow appropriate guidance from organizational authorities prior to press conferences.

As soon as possible, write out everything you can remember about the incident to aid in the debriefing process.

COMBAT STRESS CONTROL IN JOINT REPATRIATION OPERATION

Learning Objective: Recall the results of joint services cooperation in repatriating POWs, to include stress management, the four “R”s and the meaning of the acronyms PIES and BICEPS.

The medical support systems of all four Services share the basic principles for the prevention and treatment of the dysfunctional combat stress reactions: “battle fatigue,” (BF) and misconduct combat stress behaviors (MCSB). This is referred to as combat stress control.

Prisoner or hostage repatriation is often a joint operation. The POWs may come from two or more services. The Air Force is likely to fly the survivors from their release point to one of the service’s hospitals for a thorough physical examination and treatment of any injuries or illness. There they will be subjected to intensive intelligence debriefings whose primary purpose is to document facts about their captors and captivity. They will also be the subject of intensive media interest and perhaps interviews. Their families may also be involved for the nation-wide or world-wide attention, and may be flown to the medical facility.

COMBAT STRESS CONTROL ISSUES

Army stress management teams have had extensive experience in hostage release scenarios, ranging from:

- a cruise ship and airliners briefly seized by terrorists (with loss of life),
- to individual hostages held for years under extreme hardship and deprivation,
- to POWs repatriated at the end of Operation Desert Shield.

The stress control challenge in this hectic process is to provide therapeutic critical event debriefing and reunion assistance in the midst of conflicting demands, while minimizing secondary trauma from the repatriation process itself. The principle of “Treat with PIES” (explained below) applies. It is essential that a positive expectation of full recovery, not of future psychopathology, be conveyed. Contact with a specially trained Mental Health/ Combat Stress Control team should begin as far forward as possible. Special training is especially important when working with ex-prisoners of war. Ideally, the same MH individuals will travel back with the released persons to complete the process. If that is not possible, the “hand off” to a second team should be clear and positive to the ex-prisoners. Joint coordination and participation in this process is essential.

COMMON PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

Control of stress and the prevention of stress casualties is a command and leadership responsibility. Psychiatric and other mental health expertise in the services’ medical systems plays a key role in supporting command with prevention and in evaluating and treating cases.
The medical support systems of all four services share the basic principles for the prevention and treatment of dysfunctional combat stress reactions: “battle fatigue,” (BF) and misconduct combat stress behaviors (MCSB). The following acronyms are principles that have been learned from history.

The Army expresses the basic principles for intervention for BF in the memory aid “Treat with PIES” (Proximity, Immediacy, Expectancy, Simplicity).

- Proximity: treat in or close to the service member’s unit
- Immediacy: begin intervention immediately on recognition
- Expectancy: give positive expectation of rapid recovery and return to duty.
- Simplicity: use straight-forward, non-mysterious interventions

The Air Force and Navy often teach the same principles with the acronym “BICEPS” (Brevity, Immediacy, Centrality, Expectancy, Proximity, Simplicity).

- Brevity: everyone involved knows from the beginning that treatment will be brief (hours to days).
- Centrality: stress casualties are treated at a central location separate from the sick and wounded.

The Army also subscribes to brevity and to the clear separation of stress cases. However, the “central locations” (plural) will usually be dispersed as far forward as possible (in accordance with the principles of Proximity and Immediacy), but under “central control.”

The simple (austere) intervention methods for treating BF are summarized by the “Four Rs”:

- Reassure of normality,
- Rest from extreme stress,
- Replenish physiologic well-being,
- Restore confidence by treating the person as a service member, not a “patient,” by debriefing (retelling the stressful events), and by work activities.

**SUMMARY**

Personality and temperament are undoubtedly important variables not only in coping with torture, but also in unwittingly inviting it. The Center for Prisoner of War Studies is exploring these variables and their relation to resistance postures. Does the hysterical unconsciously invite torture by “going to the mat” at every provocation no matter how slight; does the passive or schizoid person escape attention; is the compulsive person more apt to capitulate and cooperate or, through rigidity, to bring excessive torture upon himself? How does the intensely sensitive person fare, or the calm, tough-minded individual with a high threshold for anxiety and pain?

In retrospect, it would appear that survivability from shootdown to repatriation ultimately depends upon and requires recovery of self-esteem through reintegration with the group (the POW group in captivity and the military, the family, and society at large upon repatriation). To the degree that there is failure in this, there will be symptoms and signs of psychopathology.

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. What directions would you give in your ministry to aid service members to prepare for isolation?

2. Based on the experiences of the military community, is there a format for preaching and/or classes you could develop that would prepare your command personnel as a spiritual and emotional fortification for possible POW/hostage situations?

3. One of the issues touched on briefly in this chapter is the personal relationship between the captor and the captive. Discuss the possibility of a positive relationship developing in this scenario.
CHAPTER 4

MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SURVIVING CAPTIVITY

All members of the Armed Forces are expected to measure up to the standards embodied in the Code of Conduct. Although designed for Prisoner of War (POW) situations, the spirit and intent of the Code is applicable to service members subjected to other hostile detention. Such members should conduct themselves, consistently, in a manner that will not discredit themselves and their country.

CODE OF CONDUCT

Learning Objective: Recall the articles of the Code of Conduct and their application as discussed in military directives.

The Code of Conduct, cited in the six brief articles below, addresses those situations and decision areas that, to some degree, will be encountered by all military personnel. The Code includes basic information useful to U.S. POWs in their tasks of surviving honorably while resisting their captor’s efforts to exploit them to the advantage of the enemies’ cause and the disadvantage of their own. Such survival and resistance requires varying degrees of knowledge of the meaning of the six articles of the Code of Conduct.

The following is Department of Defense Instruction 1300.21, dated January 8, 2001. The Code of Conduct, as promulgated by Executive Order 10631 and amended by E.O. 12633 on March 28, 1988, removed gender specific terminology.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

THOUGH THE FOLLOWING IS EXTRACTED DIRECTLY FROM MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS, IT DOES NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR DOD 1300.21

WHICH SHOULD BE CONSULTED IN ITS ENTIRETY AS THE OFFICIAL SOURCE ON CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

ARTICLE I

I AM AN AMERICAN, FIGHTING IN THE FORCES THAT GUARD MY COUNTRY AND OUR WAY OF LIFE. I AM PREPARED TO GIVE MY LIFE IN THEIR DEFENSE.

A. Article I of the Code of Conduct applies to all service members at all times. A member of the Armed Forces has a duty to support the interests and oppose the enemies of the United States regardless of the circumstances, whether in active participation in combat or in captivity.

B. Medical personnel and chaplains are granted by virtue of their special retained status under the Geneva Conventions, certain latitude under the Code of Conduct. This flexibility is directly related to the policies of the captors as to whether they adhere to the Geneva Conventions’ requirement to let medical personnel and chaplains perform their professional duties. All personnel, medical, chaplain and other, should understand the latitude and limits of this flexibility.

C. Past experience of captured Americans reveals that honorable survival in captivity requires that a Service member possess a high degree of dedication and motivation. Maintaining these qualities requires knowledge of and a strong belief in the following:

1. The advantages of American democratic institutions and concepts.

2. Love of and faith in the United States and a conviction that the U.S. cause is just.

3. Faith in and loyalty to fellow POWs.
Possessing the dedication and motivation fostered by such beliefs and trust shall enable POWs to survive long and stressful periods of captivity, and return to their country and families honorably with self-esteem intact.

**ARTICLE II**

**I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL. IF IN COMMAND, I WILL NEVER SURRENDER THE MEMBERS OF MY COMMAND WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.**

A. Members of the Armed Forces may never voluntarily surrender. Even when isolated and no longer able to inflict casualties on the enemy or otherwise defend themselves, it is their duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly force.

1. Only when evasion by members is impossible and further fighting would lead only to their death with no significant loss to the enemy might the means to resist or evade be considered exhausted.

2. The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of command, even if isolated, cut off, or surrounded, while the unit has the power to resist, break out, or evade to rejoin friendly forces.

3. Specifically Service Members must: Understand that when they are cut off, shot down, or otherwise isolated in enemy-controlled territory, they must make every effort to avoid capture. The courses of action available include concealment until recovered by friendly rescue forces, evasive travel to a friendly or neutral territory, and evasive travel to other prebriefed areas. AND: Understand that capture does not constitute a dishonorable act if all reasonable means of avoiding it have been exhausted and the only alternative is death.

**ARTICLE III**

**IF I AM CAPTURED I WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE. I WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE NOR SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY.**

A. The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue resistance to enemy exploitation by all means available is not lessened by the misfortune of capture. Contrary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, enemies which U.S. forces have engaged since 1949 have regarded the POW compound as an extension of the battlefield. The United States Prisoners of War (USPW) must be prepared for this fact.

1. In disregarding the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the enemy has used a variety of tactics to exploit the POWs for propaganda purposes or to obtain military information. The Code of Conduct requires resistance to captor exploitation efforts. Physical and mental harassment, general mistreatment and torture, medical neglect, and political indoctrination have all been used against USPWs in the past.

2. The enemy has tried to tempt POWs to accept special favors or privileges not given to other POWs in return for statements or information desired by the enemy or for a pledge by the POW not to try to escape.

3. A USPW must not seek special privileges or accept special favors at the expense of his fellow POWs.

4. The Geneva Conventions recognize that the regulations of a POW’s country may impose the duty to escape and that the POWs may attempt to escape. Under the guidance and supervision of the senior military person and the POW organization, POWs must be prepared to take advantage of escape opportunities whenever they arise. In communal detention, the welfare of the POWs who will remain behind must be considered. A POW must “think escape,” must try to escape if able to do so, and must assist others to escape.

5. The Geneva Conventions authorize the release of POWs on parole only to the extent authorized by the POW’s country, and prohibit compelling a POW to accept parole. Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisoner of war to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of special privileges, such as release from captivity or lessened restraint. The United States does not authorize any service member to sign or enter into any such parole agreement.

6. Personnel historically should be familiar with, and prepared for, the implications of the Communist Block Reservation used for Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Article 85 offers protection to a POW legally convicted of a crime committed before capture. Understand that Communist captors then often threatened to use their reservation to Article 85 as a basis for adjudging all members of opposing armed forces as “war criminals.” As a result, POWs may find themselves accused of being “war criminals” simply because they waged war against their
Col. Donald G. Cook

Bath Iron Works' fifteenth ARLEIGH BURKE Class Destroyer is named in honor of Marine Corps Vietnam War hero, Col. Donald G. Cook. Col. Cook was awarded the Medal of Honor for his extraordinary courage while a prisoner of war. Col. (then Captain) Cook volunteered for a temporary 30 day tour in Vietnam as an observer from Communications Company, Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division. Accompanying elements of the 4th Vietnamese Marines, Col. Cook was wounded and captured by a vastly superior Viet Cong force on New Years Eve 1964 near Binh Gia, Phuc Tuy Province, South Vietnam, while on a search and recovery mission for a downed American helicopter crew. The 33 year old Brooklyn, New York, native and father of four set an example standard for his fellow Americans contrary to the Viet Cong's goal of breaking down the prisoners. Col. Cook's rigid adherence to the code of conduct won him the respect of his fellow prisoners and his Communist captors. Col. (then Captain) Cook was wounded in the leg and captured. Col. Cook was taken to a Viet Cong POW camp in the jungles of South Vietnam near the Cambodian border where he quickly established himself as the senior American (even though he was not) and provided guidance and strength to his fellow prisoners. Col. Cook actions were in direct defiance of his captors who attempted to remove all semblance of military rank and structure among the POWs. He impressed upon the Viet Cong that he was senior among the POWs, and therefore spokesman for the group, fully aware that his actions would lead to harsh treatment for himself. Col. Cook was subjected to physical and isolation but he resisted his captor's efforts to break his will and was used as a "bad" example by his Communist guards. Surviving on limited rations, Col. Cook tried to maintain his health in his ten foot square cage. He could be seen by other prisoners exercising and running for hours. Once, while assigned to a work detail with a VC guard, Col. Cook stepped up the pace to embarrass his captors. Still, the jungle prison took its toll on Col. Cook's health and he and the other prisoners found themselves in a weakened state. Perhaps due to this weakened condition, Col. Cook contracted malaria shortly before moving to a new camp. He was so weak that he staggered when he walked, could not traverse log bridges, and lost his night vision due to vitamin deficiency. Still, he persevered refusing to allow anyone to carry his pack or otherwise put a strain on themselves to help him. By the time the new camp was reached, even the camp commander complimented Col. Cook on his courage. Although he regained some of his strength at the new camp, Col. Cook still suffered from the effects of malaria. As illness struck the other prisoners, Col. Cook unhesitatingly took on the bulk of their workloads in order that they might have time to recover. His knowledge of first aid prompted him to nurse the severely sick by administering heart massage, moving limbs, and keeping men's tongues from blocking their air passages. He was instrumental in saving the lives of several POWs who were convulsing with severe malaria attacks. Even though he was on half-rations, Col. Cook shared his food with the weaker POWs even giving up his allowance of penicillin. Because he was isolated, Col. Cook devised a drop off point for communications, instructing his fellow POWs to continue resistance and offering the means to do so. Time and again he refused to negotiate for his own release knowing full well it would mean his imprisonment for the entire war. After a failed escape attempt, a gun was held to his head and Col. Cook calmly recited the pilot's nomenclature showing no fear whatsoever. Surely he knew in his deteriorated condition that he would not survive a long imprisonment yet he continued to offer food and badly needed medicine to other POWs. In this respect, he went far above and beyond the call of duty by risking his life to inspire other POWs to survive. Col. Donald G. Cook was last seen on a jungle trail by a fellow American prisoner, Douglas Ramsey, in November 1967. When Mr. Ramsey was released in 1973, he was told that Cook had died from malaria on 3 December 1967 while still in captivity. No remains were ever returned by the Vietnamese government. On 26 February 1980, Col. Cook was declared dead under the Missing Service Persons Act of 1942. On 15 May 1980, a memorial stone was placed in Arlington National Cemetery and the flag from the empty grave presented to his wife, Laurette. The following day Colonel Donald G. Cook was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. The ship's motto, "Faith Without Fear" epitomizes his courage and faith in God and country. Therefore the Medal of Honor is posthumously awarded to Captain Donald G. Cook, United States Marine Corps, for his extraordinary acts of heroism while a prisoner of war as above described.

Captors before capture. The U.S. Government does not recognize the validity of this argument.

7. A successful POW escape causes the enemy to divert forces that might otherwise be fighting, provides the United States valuable information about the enemy and other POWs in captivity, and serves as a positive example to all members of the US Armed Forces.
B. Members of the Armed Forces must be familiar with the complications of escape after arrival at an established prisoner of war camp; such as, secure facility and experienced guard system, usually located far from friendly forces, debilitated physical condition of prisoners, psychological factors which reduce escape motivation (barbed wire syndrome) and the often differing ethnic characteristics of escape and the enemy population. Captured personnel should:

1. Understand the importance of being alert for escape opportunities, especially for POWs immediately after capture or when confined alone.

2. Understand the command supervisory role of the senior military person and the POW organization in escapes from established prisoner of war camps. Understand the responsibilities of escapees to their fellow prisoners.

3. Understand the acceptance of parole means a POW has agreed not to engage in a specific act, such as to escape or to bear arms, in exchange for a stated privilege and that U.S. policy forbids a POW to accept such parole.

4. Understand the effects on prisoner organization and morale, as well as the possible legal consequences, of accepting a favor from the enemy that results in gaining benefits or privileges not available to all prisoners. Such benefits and privileges include acceptance of release prior to the release of sick or wounded prisoners or those who have been in captivity longer. Special favors include improved food, recreation, and living conditions not available to other POWs.

ARTICLE IV

IF I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I WILL KEEP FAITH WITH MY FELLOW PRISONERS. I WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY COMRADES. IF I AM SENIOR, I WILL TAKE COMMAND. IF NOT, I WILL OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF THOSE APPOINTED OVER ME AND WILL BACK THEM UP IN EVERY WAY.

A. Officers and noncommissioned officers will continue to carry out their responsibilities and to exercise their authority in captivity.

1. Informing, or any other action detrimental to a fellow POW, is despicable and is expressly forbidden. Prisoners of war must especially avoid helping the enemy to identify fellow POWs who may have knowledge of value to the enemy and who may, therefore, be made to suffer coercion.

On 18 July 1965, Admiral Jeremiah Denton, USN, was shot down during a combat mission over Vietnam. A POW for 7 1/2 years, he provided the first direct evidence of torture by the enemy. WHEN HELL WAS IN SESSION
SEE APPENDIX I, “FURTHER READING.”

2. Strong leadership is essential to discipline. Without discipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival may be impossible.

3. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and care of the sick and wounded are imperative.

4. Whenever located, POWs, for their own benefit, should organize in a military manner under the senior person eligible for command. The senior person (whether officer or enlisted) within the POW camp or with a group of POWs shall assume command according to rank without regard to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not be evaded.

5. When taking command, the senior person will inform the other POWs and will designate the chain of command. If the senior person is incapacitated or is otherwise unable to act for any reason, command will be assumed by the next senior person. Every effort will be made to inform all POWs in the camp (or group) of the members of the chain of command who will represent them in dealing with the enemy authorities. The responsibility of subordinates to obey the lawful orders of ranking American military personnel remains unchanged in captivity.

6. U.S. policy concerning POW camp organization, as set forth in the foregoing paragraphs, specifies that the senior military person shall assume command. The Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war provide additional guidance to the effect that in POW camps containing enlisted personnel only, a prisoners’ representative will be elected. POWs should understand that such a representative is regarded by U.S. Policy as only a spokesman for the senior military person. The prisoners’ representative does not have command, unless the POWs elect as the representative the senior military person. The senior military person shall assume and retain actual command, covertly if necessary.
7. Maintaining communications is one of the most important ways that POWs can aid one another. Communication breaks down the barriers of isolation which an enemy may attempt to construct and helps strengthen a POW’s will to resist. Each POW will, immediately upon capture, try to make contact with fellow USPWs by any means available and will thereafter continue to communicate and participate vigorously as part of the POW organization.

8. As with other provisions of this Code, common sense and the conditions in the POW camp will determine the way in which the senior person and the other POWs structure their organization and carry out their responsibilities. What is important is that:

(a) The senior person establish an organization; and
(b) The POWs in that organization understand their duties and know to whom they are responsible.

9. Be familiar with the major ethnic, racial, and national characteristics of the enemy that can affect prisoner-captor relationships to the detriment of individual prisoners and prisoner organization.

10. Further understand that:

(a) An informer or collaborator should be insulated from sensitive information concerning POW organization, but that continuing efforts should be made by members of the POW organization to encourage and persuade the collaborator to cease such activities.
(b) Welcoming a repentant collaborator “back to the fold” is generally a more effective POW organization resistance technique than continued isolation, which may only encourage the collaborator to continue such treasonous conduct; and,
(c) There is a significant difference between the collaborator who must be persuaded to return and the resistant who, having been physically or mentally tortured into complying with a captor’s improper demand (such as information or propaganda statements), should be helped to gather strength and be returned to resistance.
(d) Understand that, in situations where military and civilian personnel are imprisoned together, the senior military prisoner should make every effort to persuade civilian prisoners that the military member’s assuming overall command leadership of the entire prisoner group, based upon experience and specific training, is advantageous to the entire prisoner community.

ARTICLE V

WHEN QUESTIONED, SHOULD I BECOME A PRISONER OF WAR, I AM REQUIRED TO GIVE NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH. I WILL EVADE ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY. I WILL MAKE NO ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS DISLOYAL TO MY COUNTRY AND ITS ALLIES OR HARMFUL TO THEIR CAUSE.

A. When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Conventions, this Code and is permitted by the UCMJ to give name, rank, service number and date of birth. Under the Geneva Conventions, the enemy has no right to try to force a USPW to provide any additional information. However, it is unrealistic to expect a POW to remain confined for years reciting only name, rank, identification number, and date of birth. There are many POW situations in which certain types of conversation with the enemy are permitted. For example, a POW is allowed, but not required by this Code, the UCMJ, or the Geneva Conventions to fill out a Geneva Conventions “capture card,” to write letters home, and to communicate with captors on matters of health and welfare.

1. The senior military person is required to represent the prisoners under his control in matters of camp administration, health, welfare and grievances. However, it must be borne constantly in mind that the enemy has often viewed POWs as valuable sources of military information and of propaganda that can be used to further the enemy’s war effort.

2. Accordingly, each prisoner must exercise great caution when filling out a “capture card,” when conducting authorized communication with the captor, and when writing letters. A USPW must resist, avoid, or evade, even when physically and mentally coerced, all enemy efforts to secure statements or actions that will further the enemy’s cause.

3. Examples of statements or actions POWs should resist include oral or written confessions, questionnaires, personal history statements, propaganda recordings and broadcast appeals to other prisoners or war to comply with improper captor
demands, appeals for surrender or parole, self-criticisms, or oral or written statements or communication on behalf of the enemy or harmful to the United States, its allies, the Armed Forces, or other POWs.

4. A POW should recognize that any confession signed or any statement made may be used by the enemy as part of a false accusation that the captive is a war criminal rather than a POW. Moreover, certain countries have made reservations to the Geneva Convention in which they assert that a war criminal conviction has the effect of depriving the convicted individual of prisoner of war status, thus removing him from protection under the Geneva Conventions. They thus revoke the right to repatriation until a prison sentence is served.

5. If a POW finds that, under intense coercion, unauthorized information was unwillingly or accidentally disclosed, then the member should attempt to recover and resist with a fresh line of mental defense.

6. Experience has shown that, although enemy interrogation sessions can be harsh and cruel, it is usually possible to resist, provided there is a will to resist.

(a) The best way for a prisoner of war to keep faith with country, fellow prisoners of war and oneself is to give the enemy as little information as possible.

(b) Understand that, short of death, it is unlikely that a POW can prevent a skilled enemy interrogator, using all available psychological and physical methods of coercion, from obtaining some degree of POW compliance with captor demands. However, understand that if taken past the point of maximum endurance by the captor, the POW must recover as quickly as possible and resist each successive captor exploitation effort to the utmost. Understand that a forced answer on one point does not authorize continued compliance. Even the same answer must be resisted again at the next interrogation session.

ARTICLE VI

I WILL NEVER FORGET THAT I AM AN AMERICAN, FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, RESPONSIBLE FOR MY ACTIONS, AND DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH MADE MY COUNTRY FREE. I WILL TRUST IN MY GOD AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A. A member of the Armed Forces remains responsible for personal actions at all times. This article is designed to assist members of the Armed Forces to fulfill their responsibilities and to survive captivity with honor. The Code of Conduct does not conflict with the UCMJ, and the latter continues to apply to each military service member during captivity (or in other hostile detention).

1. Upon repatriation, POWs can expect their actions to be subject to review, both as to circumstances of capture and as to conduct during detention. The purpose of such reviews is to recognize meritorious performance as well as to investigate any allegations of misconduct.

2. Such reviews will be conducted with due regard for the rights of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity.

3. A member of the Armed Forces who is captured has a continuing obligation to resist all attempts at indoctrination and to remain loyal to country, service and unit.

4. The life of a prisoner of war can be very hard. POWs who stand firm and united against enemy pressures will aid one another immeasurably in surviving the ordeal.

5. Prisoners of war must understand the relationship between the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Code of Conduct, and realize that failure to follow the guidance of the Code of Conduct may result in violation of the UCMJ. Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States should understand that Service members legally may be held accountable for personal actions while detained.

6. Be knowledgeable of the national policy expressed by the President in promulgating the Code of Conduct: “No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. Every available means will be employed by our Government to establish contact with, to support and to obtain the release of all our prisoners of war. Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents of the Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare.”

7. Understand that both the POW and dependents shall be taken care of by the Armed Forces and that pay and allowances, eligibility and procedures
for promotion, and benefits for dependents continue while the POW is detained.

8. Understand the importance of military members ensuring that their personal affairs and family matters (pay, powers of attorney, will, car payments, and children’s schooling) are kept current through discussion, counseling, or filing of documents before being exposed to risk of capture.

9. Understand that failure to accomplish the matters set forth in the above paragraph has resulted in an almost overwhelming sense of guilt on the part of the POWs and has placed unnecessary hardship on family members.

SPECIAL ALLOWANCES FOR MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND CHAPLAINS

The additional flexibility afforded medical personnel and chaplains, under the circumstances cited in the explanation to Article 1, is further clarified as follows:

ARTICLE I

A. Medical personnel and chaplains are granted, by virtue of their special retained status under the Geneva Conventions, certain latitude under the Code of Conduct if the policies of the captors adhere to the Geneva Conventions’ requirement permitting these personnel to perform their professional duties.

B. If the captors allow medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional duties, these personnel may exercise a degree of flexibility concerning some of the specific provisions of the Code of Conduct to perform their professional duties.

C. This degree of flexibility can only be employed if it is in the best interests of the medical and spiritual needs of their fellow military service members and their country. Like all members of the Armed Forces, medical personnel and chaplains are accountable for all of their actions.

ARTICLE II

(No additional flexibility)

ARTICLE III

A. Under the Geneva Conventions medical personnel and chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy are entitled to be considered “retained personnel” and not to be considered prisoners of war. The enemy is required by the Conventions to allow such persons to continue to perform their medical or religious duties, preferably for POWs of their own country. When the services of these “retained personnel” are no longer needed for these duties, the enemy is obligated to return them to their own forces.

“Found worms in my oatmeal this morning. I shouldn’t have objected because they have been sterilized in the cooking and I was getting fresh meat with my breakfast...I’m still losing weight and so are most of us...RUTH MARIE STRAUB, ARMY NURSE, WE BAND OF ANGELS. SEE APPENDIX 1, “FURTHER READING.”

B. The medical personnel and chaplains of the U.S. Armed Forces who fall into the hands of the enemy must assert their right as “retained personnel” to perform their medical and religious duties for the benefit of the POWs and must take every opportunity to do so.

C. If the captor permits medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions for the welfare of the POW community, special latitude is authorized these personnel under the Code of Conduct as it applies to escape.

D. Medical personnel and chaplains do not, as individuals, have a duty to escape or to actively aid others in escaping as long as they are treated as “retained personnel” by the enemy. However, U.S. experience since 1949, when the Geneva Conventions were written, reflects no compliance by captors of U.S. personnel with these provisions of the Conventions. U.S. medical and chaplain personnel must be prepared to be subjected to the same treatment as other POWs.

E. In the event the captor does not permit medical personnel and chaplains to perform their professional functions, they are considered identical to all other POWs with respect to their responsibilities under the Code of Conduct. Under no circumstances will the latitude granted medical personnel and chaplains be interpreted to authorize any actions or conduct detrimental to the POWs or the interest of the United States.

ARTICLE IV

Medical personnel are generally prohibited from assuming command over non-medical personnel, and chaplains are generally prohibited from assuming command over military personnel of any branch.
Military service regulations which restrict eligibility of these personnel for command will be explained to personnel of all services at an appropriate level of understanding to preclude later confusion in a POW camp.

ARTICLE V

This Article and its explanation also apply to medical personnel and chaplains (“retained personnel”). They are required to communicate with a captor in connection with their professional responsibilities, subject to the restraints discussed in Articles I and VI.

ARTICLE VI

(No additional flexibility)

GUIDANCE FOR DETENTION BY GOVERNMENTS DURING PEACETIME

A. Once in the custody of a hostile government, regardless of the circumstances that preceded the detention situation, detainees are subject to the laws of that government. In light of this, detainees will maintain military bearing and should avoid any aggressive, combative, or illegal behavior. The latter could complicate their situation, their legal status, and any efforts to negotiate a rapid release.

1. As American citizens, detainees should be allowed to be placed in contact with U.S. or friendly embassy personnel. Thus, detainees should ask immediately and continually to see U.S. embassy personnel or a representative of an allied or neutral country.

2. U.S. military personnel who become lost or isolated in a hostile foreign country during peacetime will not act as combatants during evasion attempts. Since a state of armed conflict does not exist, there is no protection afforded under the Geneva Convention. The civil laws of that country apply. However, delays in contacting local authorities can be caused by injuries affecting the military’s mobility, disorientation, fear of captivity, or a desire to see if a rescue attempt could be made.

3. Since the detainer’s goals may be maximum political exploitation, U.S. military personnel who are detained must be extremely cautious of their captors in everything they say and do. In addition to asking for a U.S. representative, detainees should provide name, rank, social security account number, date of birth, and the innocent circumstances leading to their detention. Further discussions should be limited to and revolve around health and welfare matters, conditions of their fellow detainees, and going home.

4. Historically, the detainers have attempted to engage military captives in what may be called a “battle of wits” about seemingly innocent and useless topics as well as provocative issues. To engage any detainer in such useless, if not dangerous, dialogue only enables a captor to spend more time with the detainee. The detainee should consider dealings with his or her captors as a “battle of wills” — the will to restrict discussion to those items that relate to the detainee’s treatment and return home, against the detainer’s will to discuss irrelevant, if not dangerous, topics.

5. As there is no reason to sign any form or document in peacetime detention, detainees will avoid signing any document or making any statement, oral or otherwise. If a detainee is forced to make a statement or sign documents, he or she must provide as little information as possible and then continue to resist to the utmost of his or her ability. If a detainee writes or signs anything, such action should be measured against how it reflects upon the United States and the individual as a member of the military, or how it could be misused by the detainer or further the detainer’s end.

6. Detainees cannot earn their release by cooperation. Release will be gained by the military member doing his or her best to resist exploitation, thereby reducing his or her value to a detainer, and thus prompting a hostile government to negotiate seriously with the U.S. Government.

7. U.S. military detainees should not refuse to accept release unless doing so requires them to compromise their honor or cause damage to the U.S. Government or its allies. Persons in charge of detained U.S. military personnel will authorize release of any personnel under almost all circumstances.

8. Escape attempts will be made only after careful considerations of the risk of violence, chance of success, and detrimental effects on detainees remaining behind. Jailbreak in most countries is a crime, thus, escape attempts would provide the detainer with further justification to prolong detention by charging additional violations of its criminal or civil law and result in bodily harm or even death to the detainee.
GUIDANCE FOR CAPTIVITY BY TERRORISTS

A. Capture by terrorists is generally the least predictable and structured form of peacetime captivity. The captor qualifies as an international criminal. The possible forms of captivity vary from spontaneous hijacking to a carefully planned kidnapping. In such captivities, hostages play a greater role in determining their own fate since the terrorists in many instances expect or receive no rewards for providing good treatment or releasing victims unharmed. If U.S. military personnel are uncertain whether captors are genuine terrorists or surrogates of governments, they should assume they are terrorists.

B. If assigned in or traveling through areas of known terrorist activity, U.S. military personnel shall exercise prudent antiterrorism measures to reduce their vulnerability to capture. During the process of capture and initial internment, they should remain calm and courteous, since most casualties among hostages occur during this phase.

C. Surviving in some terrorist detentions may depend on hostages conveying a personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors. Hostages, therefore, may discuss nonsubstantive topics such as sports, family, and clothing, to convey to the terrorists the captive’s personal dignity and human qualities. They will make every effort to avoid embarrassing the United States and the host government. The purpose of this dialogue is for the hostage to become a “person” in the captor’s eyes, rather than a mere symbol of his or her ideological hatred. Such a dialogue also should strengthen the hostage’s desire to be a “person” to the terrorist; however, he or she should never pander, praise, participate, or debate the terrorist’s cause with him or her.

D. U.S. military personnel held hostage by terrorists should accept release using guidance in Article III above. U.S. military personnel must keep faith with their fellow hostages and conduct themselves according to the guidelines of this enclosure. Hostages and kidnap victims who consider escape to be their only hope are authorized to make such attempts. Each situation will be different and the hostage must weigh carefully every aspect of a decision to attempt to escape.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Code of Conduct are to ensure that:

A. The Military Departments maintain energetic, uniform, and continuing training programs in support of the Code of Conduct, including instruction in the methods of survival, evasion, escape, and resistance under varying degrees of hostile exploitation.

B. The meaning and interpretation of the Code of Conduct are uniform at all stages of training.

C. Instructional material related to the Code of Conduct develops in all members of the Armed Forces a uniform, positive attitude that they have the ability to and must resist captor efforts to exploit them to the disadvantage of themselves, their fellow POWs, and their country. The theme of all instruction shall encourage this positive attitude.

D. Training programs impress on all trainees that the inherent responsibilities of rank, leadership, military bearing, military discipline, teamwork, devotion to fellow members, and the duty to resist the enemy are not lessened by capture.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF “HERMETIC TRANSFORMATION”

Learning Objective: Compare how the principles of alchemy are applied to the spiritual growth that can result when a person is put under pressure.

Porter Halyburton puts his thoughts into an impressive and eloquent discussion similar to Viktor Frankl’s concept of logotherapy. Read “A Search for Meaning.” See appendix I, “Further Reading.”

Having just read the Code of Conduct and the special allowances within it, consider what might happen if the captor chooses not to observe them. You know the rules. You expect the enemy, your captor, to judge you by them. You expect them to follow these same codes. But, what if they do not? What might you expect of your fellow captives, and of yourself?

Regardless of their subspecialty field, military members receive a clear message as soon as they enter the service. Knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, is power; and power enables one to influence the command environment. “If you are going to be successful in the Navy/Marine Corps,” we tell recruits and junior officers, “work hard, take advantage of every opportunity to advance in rate/rank, and obey the orders of those above you. If you do these
Code of Conduct: Guide to Keeping the Faith

By Maj. Donna Miles, USAR, American Forces Information Service

WASHINGTON — All service members receive training in the Code of Conduct at various times in their careers. Sometimes, within the security of a motor pool or on a flight line, they may wonder why. But as the military plays an ever-increasing role in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and other “operations other than war,” service members are increasingly at risk of capture by hostile forces. That’s exactly what has happened to Staff Sgt. Andrew Ramirez, Staff Sgt. Christopher Stone and Spc. Steven Gonzales, three cavalry scouts abducted March 31 by the Yugoslavian army while on a border patrol in Macedonia. President Dwight Eisenhower introduced the uniquely American code in 1955, he said, partly in response to the North Koreans’ use of prisoners for political propaganda during the Korean War. Service members who’ve been captured have cited the code as the foundation that helped them through the toughest times in their military careers, according to Al Erickson, chief of operational support at the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape Agency at Fort Belvoir, Va. The code is based on time-honored concepts and traditions that date back to the American Revolution. It embodies principles that have guided hundreds of U.S. prisoners of war and potential prisoners for almost 45 years, Erickson said. The six articles outline the obligations and responsibilities of U.S. service members in harm’s way:

- To defend the United States and its way of life.
- To avoid surrender and to evade capture at any cost short of death.
- To try to escape if captured.
- To reject favors from the enemy.
- To help fellow prisoners stay alive.
- To avoid collaborating with the enemy.
- To avoid statements or writing that discredit the United States or its allies.
- To maintain personal responsibility for all actions.
- To trust the U.S. government to care for your loved ones and work toward your release.

“Unlike the Geneva Conventions, which are an international legal guide regarding POWs, the Code of Conduct is a moral guide,” Erickson said. “If you follow it, it enables you to best serve yourself, the nation and your fellow POWs.” Though not law or regulation, the code often coincides with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, particularly those involving conduct in the face of the enemy, while evading capture or as a prisoner of war. As demanding as the Code of Conduct may appear, Erickson said, almost every former U.S. POW has called it “a lifesaver that gave them something to hold onto during their captivity.” A 1997 Code of Conduct training videotape, Production No. 613126, can be borrowed for official uses through the Defense Automated Visual Information System. The video discusses the code and the spirit it embodies, and it uses testimonials from service members who say the code helped them through the toughest days of their military careers:

Army Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Durant said he couldn’t have recited its six articles — but clearly understood the spirit of the code and let it govern his actions when he was taken captive in October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Durant suffered a broken back, a compound fracture of his right leg and a broken cheekbone when his helicopter was shot down during a firefight that ultimately cost the lives of 18 U.S. soldiers. While in captivity, Durant’s guards shot him in the arm. The Somalis also videotaped and broadcast images of his battered face. Yet, Durant said, the Code of Conduct and the high standard of behavior it demands helped him through those difficult days. “It’s important to know what’s in it and what you should and should not do, and to live by it — and up to it,” he said.

Ironically, Army Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bobby Hall had read the code just minutes before he left Camp Page, South Korea, on an ill-fated training mission in 1994. Hall and copilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 David Hilemon had been waiting for the weather to clear so they could depart. By chance, Hall looked at a nearby wall and started reading the words on a Code of Conduct poster. Those words, Hall said, helped him through 13 days of captivity after his OH-58A Kiowa helicopter accidentally strayed over the border and the North Koreans shot him down.

- Air Force Capt. Scott O’Grady said the Code of Conduct gave him the will to drive on and evade capture for six days after his F-16 fighter was shot down by a surface-to-air missile over Bosnia in 1995.

“I knew it was my duty to survive,” he said, adding that the code reminded him that, although alone behind enemy lines, “I was still part of a team working to get me out, and I had to do my part.” Following O’Grady’s rescue, then-Defense Secretary William Perry praised the pilot for exemplifying the code: “They shot his plane down,” Perry said, “but not his spirit.”

- Following the Code of Conduct “takes perseverance, motivation, bravery and courage,” according to Lt. Cmdr. Larry Slade, an F-14 Tomcat “backseater” shot down in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. But, he said, the code helped him survive 43 days in the hands of the Iraqis with honor. The military has changed countless times since the introduction of the Code of Conduct in 1955, but the code itself has changed just twice. Its words were made gender neutral. The other change, initiated after the Vietnam War, clarified that service members may provide their captors more than just what Erickson calls “the big four”: name, rank, Social Security number and birth date. The change was intended to allow prisoners some discretion if they are facing torture or other life-threatening circumstances. According to Erickson, it allows them to discuss more than just the “big four,” as long as they don’t willingly give their captors information that violates the code — even in the face of mental and physical duress.” Slade said the code helped him during his captivity, and continues to guide him in his day-to-day life: “It applies to every member of the military, every day,” he said. “It can help you every day, no matter where you are - whether you’re behind a desk, inside a tank or in an aircraft cockpit.”
things, the institution will reward you.” The implication of this message is that personal and career success are within one’s control: The more an individual knows about his or her career field, the more he or she stands to gain in terms of personal identity and professional esteem.

This is not a message restricted to the military setting, by any means. Success in any corporate structure is often depicted in concrete, objective terms, even alongside the political reality, “It’s not what you know, it’s who you know that counts.” Moreover, the message which links knowledge, power, and personal influence is not restricted to adulthood. From childhood, especially in Western culture, we are encouraged to work hard, take advantage of every opportunity to achieve, and obey those who are superior to us in authority. Even if our concept of and appreciation for authority differs drastically from traditional Western culture, as Americans, we tend to believe that certain rewards will fall naturally to those who follow the rules and “do things right.” We may grant ourselves and the rest of the world a 25% error factor to allow for Murphy’s Law; but on the whole, life is not supposed to be capricious.

Most of the time, in daily life, we can discern a cause and effect relationship between what we do or say, and what consequences follow from our behavior. For those who spend much of their time working with technologically sophisticated machines, this cause and effect relationship is clear-cut. However, those in the more people-oriented professions also employ careful planning to yield predictable results. The sense that “I made this happen, and I am rewarded for it” is not nearly as intensified here as it is in the more scientific fields.

Over a period of time, the message that knowledge can affect the environment, leads to the realization that my knowledge affects the environment. Eventually, the longer successful participation in a corporate or military structure continues, the more one’s feelings of personal value and meaning (“the internals”) depend upon institutional rewards (“the externals”). Such externals as rank insignia, wings of gold, medals, and assignment to positions of command, play a significant role in forming an individual’s self-concept.

But what happens in a prison camp when all the externals are stripped away? In particular, what happens to those people who have relied heavily on their military status for self-validation and self worth? At that point, being the Navy’s expert on thrust and drag in the high subsonic and lower supersonic flight regimes matters little, if at all, when faced with crippling physical injuries and solitary confinement. In North Vietnam, prisoners whose formal education and experience were weighted in the direction of science and technology felt the imbalance acutely. Upon return, a newly released prisoner commented to one of the chaplains, “These guys that had had some liberal arts really had it.” By this he meant that there were lessons to be learned from the humanities that were not available anywhere else. After all, why would someone tap a question through the wall about Hamlet, and be willing to wait 30 days for the answer? “There must have been some reason, other than boredom.”

The reason is that a classical education involves one in the study of human limitations and responses that, while set in various historical contexts, are timeless in their application. The trials and travels of a literary hero such as Odysseus are those of a man who repeatedly rose to the occasion in high-stress situations. The meaning of life and death, as explored in the teachings of Socrates, the tragedies of Aeschylus, and the philosophical writings of Aristotle become, in the extreme circumstance of captivity, constructive material for introspection and understanding.

History, in fact, reveals that the most universal and compelling insights into the human condition have come from those who have been tested to the limits of their strength, often in prison.
History, in fact, reveals that the most universal and compelling insights into the human condition have come from those who have been tested to the limits of their strength, often in prison. The Old and New Testament Scriptures abound with biographies of those whose greatness bloomed under adverse conditions: Joseph, the prophets, Jesus, and Paul. Socrates’ most moving speech to his students took place, according to Plato, from the prison cave where he awaited his death. Boethius, author of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, wrote his classic work while a prisoner of the emperor Theodora in the fifth century C.E. Cervantes, who discovered in himself a great gift for leadership, once he had passed through the initial depression of captivity, wrote *Don Quixote* while in prison.

These examples of greatness, these heroes, share a common bond: They were each cast into a pressure cooker of a situation in which they were compelled to plumb the depths of their existence. Theirs’ and others’ stories, with which classical history and literature is replete, reveal what happens when a person enters the pressure cooker, and is sealed off from his or her culture and familiar contacts. What the soul undergoes, if it is strong enough, is a “hermetic transformation.” Drawn and developed from the literature and thought of the Middle Ages, the idea of transmutation in the spiritual sense has been applied more recently to one of life’s extreme circumstances, wartime captivity, by Admiral James B. Stockdale and Professor Joseph Brennan of the Naval War College. What would it mean that a soul would be “hermetically” sealed, possibly changed, in certain environments?

Alchemy may appear to be one of those subjects whose origins and discoveries are too esoteric or too unscientific to be of any contemporary use. However, the practice of alchemy, which may have started with the Chinese before spreading rapidly throughout the ancient world, took on different forms and emphases, depending on the country and culture in which it was practiced. In general, the chemistry of alchemy involved combining various metals and substances, and subjecting them to complex successions of heatings, or to doses of mercury and sulfur. Under pressure, and in a tightly controlled, closed-off space, the end result of these procedures was, hopefully, some kind of “transmutation.” The new, transmuted substance was then featured as the key to a better state of existence, e.g., sickness to health, old age to youth, or earthly to supernatural existence. The ultimate aim was always a happy ending, in which some great human good would triumph. Because of its basis in what is now studied as modern chemistry, many alchemists were motivated to apply their findings to medicinal cures.

Others persisted in unsuccessful attempts at “making” gold. Still others, particularly in the Middle Ages, sought to develop an “elixir of life” for overall health, well-being, and immortality, not only for the physical body, but for the soul as well. The latter of these applications became known as the higher alchemy, because it aimed at something more important than changing lead into gold: It aimed at moral and spiritual transformation.

Most of the original value of the practice of alchemy has, of course, been assumed by modem medicine and chemistry, which, as disciplines, built upon alchemy’s discoveries of new metals and substances (e.g., nitric, hydrochloric, and sulfuric acid). However, of enduring and intriguing value is the quasi-religious symbolism of the higher alchemy: that the soul, when subjected to pressure in one of life’s crucibles, “might undergo an alchemical change — a metamorphosis of the spirit in which the ordinary stuff of humanity could turn into something precious, emerging as if from a tightly sealed cocoon.”

As Admiral Stockdale points out, “a prison is the most merciless case of sealing off a human soul in a confined space.” The experiences of prisoners, and even the events of SERE School, attest to the truth of this statement. But a prison cell is not the only crucible of the soul; and, not all crucibles involve “bad” experiences:

The boundaries of a football field seal off two teams in a test of strength, discipline, and will. The actual physical space, defined as it is by ethics and rules, effects greatness (even in the losing team) by involving each side in a classic struggle between strategies. The sea-going crucible of a deployed ship requires Sailors to face one another daily and hourly within confined spaces. Successful transmutation of these individuals into a tight community with a single-minded commitment to mission often results in a Battle “E.” A home is a sealed-off space in which families are made. The elements of a violent home are highly corrosive, those of a happy home less caustic; but each environment requires transformation of the souls who occupy that space. An unhappy marriage or childhood can be an extreme circumstance on the negative end of the scale, not unlike prison. The crucible of an abusive marriage can, potentially, bring about radical changes for the better in a husband and wife, whether the abuse is resolved in favor of the
marriage, or in the direction of divorce. All family members, even in the best of worlds, cope with lack of privacy, differing needs, and conflicting goals. The space of the home itself becomes sacred as those who live within its boundaries are humbled, enlightened, and deepened spiritually.

The most remarkable lesson that the extreme stress of captivity has taught us is that a human being does not have to settle for physical survival alone when he or she is cast into the pit. In fact, rather than physical survival serving as the prerequisite for spiritual growth, the relationship between the two seems to be the other way around. While each experience of captivity is unique, every prisoner of the North Vietnamese at some point reached a moment of decision when he said, “I’m going to make this thing because I believe that what my life stands for is stronger than any attempt to exploit it.”

With this lesson firmly in hand, the question facing commanders and those serving commands is, “How do we prepare ourselves and our families to live life in the crucible of extreme stress?” Assuming that some effective preparation is possible, what form should it take?

While the services train only those at high risk of capture (i.e., aircrews and intelligence personnel), the unpredictability of terrorist activity, especially overseas, makes the captivity circumstance a possibility not only for a broader spectrum of military, but for their family members as well. Therefore, the areas of emphasis offered in the following paragraph are relevant to both service members and their families.

THE NATURE OF EVIL AND HOW IT IMPACTS CAPTIVES

Learning Objective: Recognize from your background in ministry and life experiences that relate how the constant struggle with perceived “evils” can be used to benefit humankind.

Noted author John Sanford writes extensively about the nature of evil in his book entitled, Evil: The Shadow Side of Reality. The explains that those who espouse the Judeo-Christian faiths — with their teachings about justice, good deeds and the loving kindness of God — the presence of evil in the world raises disturbing questions. For some, the reality of evil is a roadblock that keeps them from a religious faith. Others believe that evil is a kind of instrument used by the Divine to discipline and punish human beings. Given the variety of beliefs about the nature of evil, one fact is evident, with evil comes suffering. It is the element of suffering while being held captive that holds theological implications for how chaplains minister to military people who have, or may, find themselves in the extreme circumstances of life. For training purposes we will consider the nature of evil from the vantage point of religious experience.

Religious teachings enable us to form a spiritual life. It is this spiritual formation that undergirds us in times of suffering. Spirituality helps individuals survive the unknowns, the unexplainable, and the circumstances of life that cannot be altered any other way.

Among the better-known people who experienced the evils of suffering was the man known as Job. The biblical record tells how Job, being an upright and blameless man who had a great family, lost his wealth, his family, and his health. Estranged from all that was meaningful and important to him, he suffered more than the loss of status, personal pride and integrity. There were times, it seems, when he almost lost himself — even wishing he could die.

He discovered that even simple moral reasoning fail him. His understanding of retribution is shattered when he sees that the wicked go unpunished while he, a moral man, suffers for no reason. “When I think of it, I am dismayed,” he says, “and shuddering seizes my flesh. Why do the wicked live on, reach old age, and grow mighty in power?” There is even more to Job’s circumstance to challenge the paradigms of what is normal. His friends are accusatory and faultfinding. They lay blame upon him. Job is utterly alone in the cell of misery. He is held hostage by misfortune and suffering. He is imprisoned by his inability to find a way out of his situation.

Job survived his ordeal by clinging to the religious teachings that formed his spirituality. He kept a running argument with himself and his God regarding
As chaplains it is our cherished privilege to support, encourage, and reassure service members and their families who find themselves beset by extreme circumstances. In no way is our influence more significant than in assisting them to engage their sense of hope, plumb the spiritual depths of their hearts, and, ultimately, live their personal faith.

This book is dedicated to all Prisoners of War and personnel Missing in Action in recognition of their great courage, their great sacrifices, and their miraculous humanity.

Let us join the POWs and MIAs in hope for the renewal of life, in celebration of hearts courageous. Let us celebrate their lives. God be with us as we seek to minister to them and to their families.

God be with them.

the value of his own life. What is unique in his story is the fact that he was able to acknowledge that his circumstances had made him a laughingstock to his friends. Even though he found himself in a situation where there was no mediator between himself and the punishment he was suffering. He even, finally, admits to himself that even his innocence and basic goodness as a human being, cannot protect him from calamity and the suffering that goes with it.

Job concluded that no earthly power could rescue him from his circumstances. Acknowledging the spiritual help from God, he says, “on earth it has no equal.” (Isaiah 41:33, NRSV) It is in his own personal experience that God becomes a reality that offers true freedom.

A strong factor in LCDR Gaither’s favor as one of the Vietnam POWS was the strong spiritual formation he held before becoming a captive. Though certainly not every prisoner’s experience, he, a prisoner of war in Vietnam for almost 8 years, recalls that he kept going over the words of the song “Amazing Grace” in his
mind. He cites the phrase “When we’ve been there 10,000 years” as especially significant to him.

He says that, “It wasn’t a voice or an angel. It was nothing like that. My life changed, and I felt the change in my mind. I knew it without any questions of a doubt. I knew the Lord was with me and that he would watch over me from that point on. I had a confidence in my heart that told me God would give me the strength and the patience I needed…. That period of prayer started the new trend in my life.”

Interned in a prison camp for 4 years. Never to see her husband again, a young missionary was forced to sign a confession to a crime she did not commit and face the executioner’s sword, only to be spared. In her own words, she describes her spiritual journey during and after this ordeal during WWII. Evidence Not Seen. Darlene Deibler Rose. SEE APPENDIX I, “FURTHER READING.”

Other prisoners speak of using the discipline of memory to recall lines of poetry learned over the years. Anything to keep their minds busy, they worked to remember birthdates of family members, vocabulary words from another language, lyrics of old songs, speeches they’d heard dignitaries give.

Religious writings are replete with models of spiritual survival, which mirror the real life experiences of imprisonment. Find them — read them. And use them in pastoral care moments, in preaching events, and in teaching or directing scriptural studies. Nowhere is the growth potential more fertile than in helping others to perceive their spiritual potential after they have done their best. They may be required to face their lack of perfection. Their survival may depend upon the ability to acknowledge in healthy ways, their nature as ‘frail creatures of dust.’

American prisoners of war, in Vietnam for example, were not usually afforded the luxury of having a religious worship service. Building community and mutual support among prisoners was not an objective of the captor. By and large, their spirituality and shared human needs had to be worked out alone or by ones and twos when the opportunity presented itself. All the more reason that the chaplain’s ability to correlate holy writ with the suffering of captivity is a critical tool for ministry.

A PARTICULARLY TOUCHING STORY ABOUT A MAN WHO BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH PRAYER AND THE PRESENCE OF GOD, IN SPITE OF HIMSELF, WAS DESCRIBED BY ONE OF THE CHAPLAINS AS PART OF THE SECOND BRIEFING:

He (one of the prisoners) gave me the impression that religion had not meant too much to him before he went into the problems he encountered. He wasn’t sure that he had come out with too much more than when he came in although he felt a little stronger than he had. But he said one of the things in the prayer that sort of helped him was another man had asked him to pray for him. And he said, “Well since he asked I wasn’t going to let him down.” It was his roommate. And his roommate was in a rather tough situation, and he felt that he was almost saved by a miracle. And he came back and made some rather strong thanksgiving to both God and to his friend for praying for him. It sort of put him in a bind, because he really didn’t feel that the prayers had helped any, but he couldn’t live with this fellow and not accept it, because they lived in the same cell together. So he wasn’t quite sure how he stood on prayer because he had to accept the fact that prayer worked for quite awhile, and had almost begun to believe this fellow’s miracle. It was rather amusing in the way he presented it, but deep down you could see that the facts as he saw them really were putting him in a bind. His previous thoughts just wouldn’t fit the facts. And the facts were that prayer worked and that the thanksgiving is effective and that asking God for help is a viable opportunity in the worst situations, and you’ll get it. So it really was a funny situation. Here’s a man that had had prayer proved. It worked for him and he was having trouble with it, rather than the other way around, as we often see it.

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS WHICH INCREASE SURVIVABILITY

Learning Objective: Recall the aspects of ministry of presence that aided in the POW repatriation process.
There are several practical and proactive ways to implement religious ministry for the unique circumstances of captivity. Listen sensitively to those who have endured captivity. Provide proactive support in advance to those at the command planning levels that have their own unique issues surrounding capture of a comrade. Might they harbor guilt that rescue cannot be achieved as planned? Family members face a variety of reactions and coping needs when their loved one becomes a captive.

There is a Sanskrit saying, “Forgiveness is the ornament of the brave,” which, when held in perspective of the captive, holds profound and often impossible promise for healing and resolution. No discussion of captivity is complete without addressing this act in some respect. Forgiveness in its simpler forms is a means of encouragement to leave the past behind. Contemporary thinkers may ponder the maxim, “forgive and forget.” But prisoners of war might well see the complex and horrifying aspects of forgiving one’s persecutor.

At the least, the inability to forgive taints the attitudes of others. In many cases the lack of it leaves a battle raging within the individual long after the physical ordeal is over. It can cause a surge of murderous hatred to backwash over the one who cannot let go of the hatred and need for revenge. The importance of forgiveness is that, though the persecuted may not forget, some mediation, some sense of leveling of life needs to occur to allow that person, their family and others who come after them, to maintain normalcy.

Forgiveness comes slowly. It comes uniquely to each person who has endured punishment and loss as did the POWs who have been held captive over the decades of the past. In his book, Forgiveness: Breaking the Chain of Hate, Michael Henderson writes about dozens of remarkable people of many nations and faiths who have been able to brake this chain of hate. He has interviewed survivors of the Burma Road, the Siberian Gulag, Father Jenco and Dr. Yusef Mora al-Azhari, Leif Hovelsen and Irene Laure—all have dramatic stories of imprisonment and injustice at the hands of their captors.

Dr. Donald W. Shriver, Jr., has written extensively on the topic of forgiveness. The most well-known of his writings is in An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics, which opens up a world of ideas regarding the concept of forgiveness and how it effects nations and government. Of his writing he says, “I have written this book chiefly to address the frame of mind which resists dealing with the leftover debris of national pasts that continue to clog the relationships of diverse groups of humans around the world.” It is reasonable to believe that prisoners of war, religion as an element of national power, and the process of forgiveness will increasingly be juxtaposed to impact military people in the near and distant future. Now is the time to develop discussion of these topics – to prepare of what will likely happen tomorrow. See the Appendices of this manual for periodicals for further reading and study.

The spectrum of ministry must necessarily encompass the chaplain’s ability to encourage additional venues of teaching survivability. For example, reinforce lessons of resistance by promoting reading programs developed to reflect institutional core values. A reading program does not have to be as formal as General Military Training (GMT); in fact, the more informal the structure and scheduling, and the smaller the groups involved, the more effective and spontaneous the outcome.

Resistance tools, according to those who “were there,” are within the person. Leadership’s response, therefore, to stressful circumstances by helping individuals identify their inner instincts and emotions will make a lasting contribution to their survival and growth capability. Chaplains are uniquely suited to perform these functions!

Encourage Continuing Education — Specify the value of a classical education, especially to those interested in working on an undergraduate or graduate degree. The study of history and philosophy will anchor a person’s understanding of the world, and will steer him or her away from the impression that their own life situations are totally unique and without precedent.

Highlight those documents which are foundational to the American way of life: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, speeches and polemics that illustrate the patriotic, democratic values which under gird strong inner character and the nobler survival instincts.

Be Aware of Families and Family Issues — Model a healthy family unit in your own life (applicable to any leader at any level). While observing confidentiality and protecting the privacy of personnel, caregivers who keep abreast of family issues within the command, especially alcohol abuse, and alcoholism, family violence, social and emotional isolation, are in a better position to recommend the
kinds of on-going training and support needed in the
general training cycle provided to service members.

Continually emphasize legal and financial
preparedness, especially: wills, allotments, and
mutual agreement between husband and wife on
household and family management matters, “just in
case.”

It is always to everyone’s benefit that emphasis be
placed on Casualty Assistance Call Officer (CACO)
training. The pertinent instructions for this and related
areas of training are:

- DoD Instruction 1300.9 (Casualty Calls
  Program Manual)
- NMPC Instruction 1770.1 (Casualty Assistance
  Calls Program Manual)
- OPNAV Instruction 5400.24D (Command Area
  Coordination and Command Relationships)

THE VIEW FROM THE CHAPLAINCY

Learning Objective: Recognize the difference
between the mass production process of the Korean
war repatriation and the organized and systematic
system employed for the Vietnam POWs.

Having reflected on some concrete things that can
be done in the ‘here and now,’ a look back at what
chaplains have done in the past is a good way to use
‘lessons learned’ to prepare for what chaplains may be
called upon to do in the future.

In the recollection of Rear Admiral Richard G.
Hutcheson, CHC, USN (Ret.), “welcoming prisoners
home at the close of the Korean War was somewhat
similar to an assembly line process.” The prisoners
were so eager to get back to their families, that many of
them grew impatient with the elaborate screening that
had been set for them at the various repatriation
centers. This “mass production” aspect of the Korean
prisoners’ homecoming gave Chaplain Hutcheson
misgivings at the time as to whether each man should have been required to talk with a chaplain.

Sensitivity to people’s needs, and insight into their feelings, are qualities that make a chaplain effective for any ministry setting. These qualities are particularly important in ministry with prisoners of war, with their families, and with families of those missing in action. Chaplain Hutcheson’s observations, made in the wake of having ministered to thousands of returning prisoners in 1953, typify also the sensitive approach of those Navy chaplains who, under the direction of Rear Admiral Ross H. Trower, CHC, USN (Ret.) in 1973, welcomed home the 591 prisoners of war returning from Vietnam.

MEETING THE PRISONERS

Certainly the repatriation of a few hundred prisoners was a far cry from processing thousands at one time. Additionally, the prisoners who returned home in 1973 did not arrive in one large group, but were released in waves, usually one to two weeks apart, over a period of two months (February and March). Given the concern at the time to provide these prisoners with a “hero’s welcome” so that the nation could express, in a positive way, their relief over the end of a painful, controversial war, Operation Homecoming was very carefully orchestrated to permit this expression, while at the same time protecting the needs of the prisoners.

Once they had departed North Vietnam, the returning prisoners were flown directly to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Here is where they received their initial medical screening, including a psychiatric evaluation, and the opportunity to talk with a chaplain. From Clark they went on to the major military medical facility closest to their home, where they were met by their families. Families were not allowed to meet the returning prisoners in the Philippines. The screening at Clark was intended to be a re-entry “cushion” so that any “sensitive information,” i.e., bad news, could be shared with the prisoners before their arrival home. The screening was also an opportunity for the services to assess the prisoners’ physical and mental condition, which, until they actually stepped off the plane, no one knew.

Each branch of the service had appointed its own team of chaplains to the Operation Homecoming effort. These teams worked cooperatively with one another, with those on the medical staff, and with the sponsors who had been assigned to assist each returning prisoner in a variety of administrative ways. The team of Navy chaplains reported their ministry experiences to Rear Admiral Francis L. Garrett, CHC, USN (Ret.), the Chief of Chaplains at the time. These four situation reports were taped, transcribed, and issued as oral history in 1982. They are fascinating and absorbing reading for many reasons: not only do they reveal the chaplains’ impressions of the returning prisoners, and the prisoners’ response to publicity and to religious ministry; they also model the ongoing evaluation of a methodology for ministry in a specific setting.

Following are the chaplains who served on the Navy team under Chaplain Trower’s direction:

- CDR Alexander Aronis, CHC, USN (Ret.)
- CAPT Samuel R. Hardman, CHC, USN (Ret.)
- LCDR John C. Keennon, CHC, USN (Ret.)
- CDR John G. Newton, CHC, USN (Ret.)
- LCDR Edward A. Roberts, CHC, USN (deceased)
The four briefings for the Chief of Chaplains were held between returning groups of prisoners (16 February, 7 March, 18 March, and 30 March 1973). As a result, the observations and stories of the chaplains carry an immediacy to the events of homecoming that would have been lost with the passage of time. Some of the more significant lessons and observations from that oral history are summarized and presented here.

The entire Operation Homecoming team was able to spend two weeks together before the return of the prisoners. For everyone concerned, but particularly for the chaplains, this was time well spent. Following the departure of the first group from Clark, the Navy team observed that learning each other’s styles of ministry before the actual homecoming had contributed immeasurably to a smooth and successful first phase.

Chaplains assigned to Operation Homecoming were assigned no other duties, so they could devote full attention to this unique and specialized ministry. The sensitivity to making this an exclusive assignment paid substantial dividends in the quality of ministry offered to the returning prisoners, and in the opportunity for critical reflection by the chaplains.

After much debate, it was decided that there would be no ecumenical worship service(s) held for the prisoners. Instead, the ministry team opted for faith-specific services, and, upon evaluation, considered this a wise move. “Distinct” worship services preserved privacy and individual inclinations for worship, without placing pressure on those who might not want to participate.

In addition to providing the opportunity for traditional religious expression, chaplains were also the bearers of bad news. The Navy team estimated, for example, that of the 43 Navy and 4 Marine Corps returnees who arrived with the first group, 25 to 30 percent of them were to receive some kind of sensitive, or “bad,” news. This was a difficult task for the chaplains, and not one with which any of them felt entirely comfortable; but on the other hand, as Chaplain Trower was to recall some years later, “neither did anyone else.” The news that a man’s mother or father had died while he was in captivity, or that his wife, whom he had idealized and dreamed about for 6 or 7 years, had divorced him while he was in prison, spread rapidly through each group of returning prisoners.

After a while, the chaplain found that he could not casually visit a returnee without first having to dispel the fear that something adverse had happened. Nevertheless, the Navy team felt that, having a clear understanding from the outset that the delivery of sensitive information was the chaplain’s domain, made it much easier on everyone else involved with the homecoming, in the long run. Additionally, there was probably no one better to deliver sensitive information than the chaplain, as these occasions introduced an immediate need for religious ministry.

The returning prisoners were, for the most part, surprisingly strong, both physically and emotionally; but they were most vulnerable to the crumbling of the family structure, especially a marriage.

A sizable majority of the prisoners described deeply felt religious experiences while they were imprisoned. What particularly impressed the chaplains was the depth of feeling associated with these experiences. One man, in response to the chaplain’s reflection, “God really helped you to get through this,” said, “No, Chaplain, that’s not it. I’m not saying that he merely helped me; I’m saying that without God I simply would not have been able to survive or make it.” These unequivocal statements of trust in God were always expressed with great emotional intensity — a clue not only to the pain of captivity, but also to the perception that, in the midst of life’s most painful and tragic circumstances, God is a powerful presence who can be counted upon. As a result of these experiences, bearing witness to the power of God became more than a desire on the part of some prisoners; it was something they felt that they needed to do.

The chaplains heard very little, if any, bitterness or hatred. As one chaplain commented, referring to the captivity experience as a whole, “We look upon it as an experience we feared and I presume that later on they would look upon it as something to be feared in the future if it would happen to them again, but they probably have a lot of comfort from their faith and they wouldn’t have to worry about becoming bitter.”
The returning prisoners, both individually and as a group, took the initiative in conducting worship, particularly services of thanksgiving. The chaplain team responded positively to their initiative, encouraging and honoring the religious leadership that this cohesive community of men sought to exercise.

In many cases, a person’s religious experience in prison, far from being limited to that setting, was the first step in a faith journey that culminated, eventually, in an orthodox religious commitment. Nearly every prisoner came away from captivity with a resolve to accomplish certain goals. Some of these goals were material or educational in nature; others were vows to make personal, spiritual changes in their lives. Captivity, as a whole, made these men more human. While some who had not been particularly religious before captivity recognized a need within themselves to formalize their relationship with God, even if this was at the most basic level of inquiry, others who had been somewhat rigid in their religious convictions became more flexible and forgiving.

All of the chaplains observed a striking quality of humility about the returnees, almost a childlikeness. With all of the ceremonies and dinners and official welcomes held in their honor, the events which touched them the most were those involving children. As a group, the men seemed filled with wonder, awe, and a purity of gratitude that caused them to be especially drawn to children, and in return, the children to be drawn to them.

The emotional “high” of homecoming was greatest for the first group who returned. The chaplain team noticed that the groups which followed, in late February and March, were certainly joyful, but were also a little more subdued. This they attributed to the fact that the later returnees had known for a longer period of time that they were coming home, and, as a result, they slept longer and better once they arrived at the hospital. The first two groups seemed to be in “a rush to run around the hospital and get things done.” As time went on, each group appeared more relaxed than the ones previous. The chaplains also noticed that they themselves were increasingly relaxed with each returning group: in addition to experiencing some of the same emotional letdown as the later returnees, they were also much more certain of what to expect. With fewer ambiguities, the practice of ministry could become routinized (in a good sense), so that critical reflection could take place on this unusual and important ministry opportunity.

Chaplain Trower summarized most fittingly the experience of captivity, as seen by an outsider, and its effect on people’s lives:

Again and again I have heard the men say that they wouldn’t want to go through this experience again. I think that one of the things that we have really been privileged to share in a very close and very personal way is the magnificence of their lives. The qualities of kindness and the mutual support that they gave to one another, the spirituality with which they face life — are magnificent qualities.

MINISTERING WITH THE FAMILIES

Before chaplains were ministering with returning prisoners through the emotional highs and lows of Operation Homecoming, they were attending to prisoners’ families during the long and uncertain years of captivity. Captain George T. Boyd, CHC, USN (Ret.) was one of many chaplains serving the families of men stationed aboard ship in Southeast Asia, many of whom were POW/MIA families.

At Naval Air Station Oceana, where he was serving at the time, he recalls that these were extremely difficult years for the families, not only because they did not know whether they would ever see their husbands and fathers again, but also because they were not always sure whether they could depend on other people’s promises of help. Chaplain Boyd remembers in particular the number of civic organizations in the area that would offer to do something for the children of POW families, and then would never follow through. When this happened repeatedly, families felt hurt, angry, and frustrated.

The challenge in terms of ministry was how to sustain and nurture a sense of hope in the families over time, given the lengthy period of captivity, and given the fact that many families felt the government was not doing nearly enough to bring the prisoners home. To build hope, the chaplains organized special ecumenical prayer and communion services, for which every detail and appointment was meticulously attended to, and in which as many families as possible were included. The
response to these services was very positive, because, as Jane Denton expressed it, “Everybody feels better because we feel that people care. People do care.”

Two former POWs interviewed for this study, Captain J. B. McKamey, USN (Ret.), and Captain Giles Norrington, USN (Ret.), attested strongly to the need to include families in command activities. Captain McKamey, an A-6 pilot at the time of his shoot down, stressed the importance of “the little things,” noting that every opportunity to make the wives and children feel that they had not been forgotten by the command or by the Navy, was worth taking. The difficulty, as many a chaplain realized, was, over “the long haul,” letting people drift away without taking the time to follow up with them. The effort by the command to bring families together had to be intentional, if it was to be done at all. Captain Norrington mentioned that the chaplains often filled the role of “inviter,” but noted that they should not always have been the ones to do the inviting. The command had an essential role to play in this area, but did not always fulfill it as consistently as they could have. In these instances, the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer needs to be reminded to bring the families into squadron, unit, or base-wide functions.

Rear Admiral Francis Garrett, CHC, USN (Ret.), the Chief of Chaplains during Operation Homecoming, and during much of the captivity, recently reflected on the events of the early 1970s. He recalled that during the captivity, time became an enemy. He was greatly concerned that families not “get lost in the shuffle,” but on the other hand, he noted that it was wise to know “when to drop it.” Knowing when to keep in touch, and when to leave someone alone for a while, required a special degree of sensitivity. How does one achieve the proper balance of remaining available and open, without becoming intrusive? That question was an important one for the chaplains working with returning prisoners in connection with Operation Homecoming; it was also an important question for those working with the families. The problem was that those touched by captivity were vulnerable, and were easily taken advantage of.

Chaplain Boyd’s description of local civic organizations making promises and then not delivering, is an example of this. (The families’ response in that instance was to meet as a group with civic leaders, and then “let them have it” about not doing what they had said they would). Families were also taken advantage of by the media. While some felt comfortable using the media to “get the word out” about the prisoners’ plight, others felt exploited by data-gatherers and curiosity seekers. Chaplain Garrett observed that chaplains are in an excellent position to be alert to exploitation, and can support families in deciding how to handle these situations.

One of the greatest assets chaplains have in their ministry with those affected by the ambiguous, often lengthy circumstance of captivity, is the nature of the pastoral relationship itself. As a result of reviewing the work which the Navy chaplain team did with Operation Homecoming, and which countless other chaplains at home did with the families, Chaplain Garrett concluded that people who have experienced the extremes of captivity assess very quickly whether contact is genuine, or whether it is artificial. Particularly damaging is the tendency to relate to people as a “panel,” rather than as individuals. Because much of the focus on captivity, and most recently, on hostage taking, is as an event, few may appreciate captivity as an ongoing circumstance, or as a condition of life that has long-term consequences. Constancy in follow-up and care allows people the opportunity to explore what they are experiencing in spiritual terms, thus freeing them to relate to the redemptive power of religion.

FOCUS ON SPIRITUAL EXPERIENCES AND RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION

“Operation Homecoming” demonstrates how Chaplains are in a critical position to offer hope to waiting families in a POW/MIA circumstance; to listen sensitively to those who have endured captivity; and to provide proactive support in advance to those at the command planning level, to service members, and to their families.

Obviously chaplains can help people put into words what they experience in the spiritual life, and how they express these spiritual experiences through religious belief and practice. Faith communities use worship as an opportunity to address and to teach such basic areas of expression as: prayer (what it is and what forms it can take), ritual (what spiritual disciplines are, and why faith groups have adopted ritualized practice over the centuries), and they can look for opportunities to address the valuable contribution that spiritual disciplines make to one’s understanding of and attitude toward adversity. Whether adversity takes the form of everyday disappointments, disillusionments, or broken dreams, the most basic awareness that, “God has not left me, and in fact still loves me,” is a powerful sustainer of
physical strength, emotional stability, and intellectual judgment. Chaplains can play an integral part with other caregivers to reconnect the service member and family with the reality of how they live their lives on a daily basis, outside the circumstances of separation and captivity.

**CONNECTING “REAL LIFE” SITUATIONS WITH CAPTIVITY**

LEARNING OBJECTIVE: Recall the role of chaplains for service members, POW families, and for chaplains themselves.

There are many ways to zero in on those individuals in a command who are insecure, who crave attention, and who desperately seek love. Caregivers can assist them by helping them identify their true needs, by encouraging them to avoid using others to prop themselves up, and by strengthening inner resources of which they may have been unaware of possessing.

One does well to by remembering to focus particular care on those who, as children, were victims of incest, physical abuse, or alcoholic parents. Leading them to a point of recognizing and admitting their childhood captivity circumstance, whatever this might have been, may mark the beginning of healing in their lives, and of equipping them with strength for the future.

When making specific mention of prisoners of war in ceremonies of remembrance, be sensitive to those in the command whose fathers may have been POWs, or whose turbulent childhood’s make the prospect of future captivity a terrifying ordeal. The realities of military service require an honest encounter with the truth of captivity; many individuals will need healing from past wounds if they are to be adequate for future challenges.

**Formulate Plans for Future Family Support** — by encouraging “pre-existing” relationships for those families who appear to be emotionally and socially isolated. Become aware early on of newcomers to the command, especially young couples, who are having difficulty forming friendships. Build into any emergency support program the understanding that families are not just objects of curiosity, but hurting individuals who are living with a frightening void in their life as a family, and as persons.

**Coordinate Efforts with Other Professionals** — early on, and become acquainted with other military and civilian professionals who provide support and counseling to families. Let them know what your interests and strengths are with families, and develop a way of working together as a team. In particular, any local disaster preparedness plan should include the POW/MIA or hostage-taking circumstance, with plans for follow-up support to families over the long haul should the need arise.

**What do you believe is the role of tradition in character formation and survivability?** Read “An Ethic Without Heroes” in Appendix I, “Further Reading.”

**Understanding the Chaplain as “Retained Personnel”** — starts by becoming conversant with DoD Directive 1300.7, portions of which are reproduced in this manual. The Code of Conduct applies to chaplains and medical personnel, although certain articles allow flexibility for discharging one’s professional duties. You should seek out spiritual direction that will help you polish your own tools of resistance. History has certainly revealed that enemy captors do not necessarily treat chaplains with greater mercy or leniency.

**CONCLUSION**

Designed to highlight the nature of personal and spiritual care in extreme circumstances, the chapters have outlined the history and policy pertaining to prisoners of war and recorded survival scenarios which have excellent potential in helping you to survive extreme circumstances. Discussion questions have directed your thinking inward to your own motivations, potential weakness and greater strengths. You were exposed to the philosophical burdens of forgiveness, personal ego needs and how these issues impact family life regarding anxiety and separation. And now, what might the future hold? What might we expect to face in the coming years of military life in our armed forces?

Neal A. Pollard, Co-Director, Terrorism Research Center, offers insight into an issue which will impact the taking of hostages or prisoners in future years. His essay entitled, “The Future of Terrorism” follows:

Possibly, we will see a relative decline, perhaps even extinction, of what we traditionally considered “ideological” terrorism: namely, the phenomenon that brought terrorism to the global stage via
hijackings and bombings beginning around 1968, perpetrated by such groups as Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, etc. The end of the Cold War has resulted in the drying of the well of support for anti-Democratic/anti-Capitalist, Marxist-based ideologically motivated political terrorists. Although there are a few of these ideologically motivated groups still active (particularly in Peru), the world will see these groups become extinct one by one, though possibly not without each one perpetrating one last paroxysm of violence before they disappear.

At the end of the Cold War, ideological terrorism lost its support and raison d’etre, however, the “depolarization” of the world has allowed several ethno-religious conflicts, some centuries old, to manifest themselves in terrorism, insurgency, regional instability, and civil war. Ethno-religious terrorism will not die away, and could respond to several future stimuli. Examples of these stimuli include: an increasing US presence in the Middle East and Pacific Rim, Western development of the Caspian oil reserves, and flourishing Western technological development (and attendant cultural exposure) in the Middle East and Pacific Rim. Former Soviet Republics (especially Transcaucasus) might grow less stable as outside influences increase (economic, political and technological/media), Russia’s ability to suppress insurgency lessens, economic conditions in those republics decline, and political power becomes a commodity for corruption and organized crime. As stability weakens in Central Asia, and Islamic fundamentalism gains political power the result of “protest votes” in governments from Turkey to Indonesia, but especially in Central Asia, relations among countries in the region could become more strained.

However, I believe relative to the above two other forms of terrorism (ethno-religious and ideological), single-issue terrorism will rise disproportionately, especially with US domestic terrorism, including groups oriented around or against technology (e.g.,

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**A POW/MIA VERSE FOR “ETERNAL FATHER”**

_O Blessed Father, high, yet near,_
_Lend us Thy love and will to hear,_
_Our call for mercy and concern_
_THAT missing ones may be return’d:_
_O listen as we call for Grace_
_To give our loved ones resting place._

By Jim Van Delinder
USN 1944-1948
neo-Luddites). In the post-print age, groups, even nationalities, will organize themselves without geographic constraints, bringing diaspora together and uniting issue-oriented groups and religions through the course of globalization, which will paint clearer pictures of who and what has the ability to affect and influence masses of people. This, coupled with the general evolution of state sovereignty (in which many super- and sub-state organizations, including corporations, could challenge the state-centered international system), will likely drive terrorism and guerrilla warfare into being more broadly rejectionist: attacking more than just the general legitimacy of states, but also Non-Governmental Organizations, Multi-National Corporations, etc. Furthermore, access to weapons and methods of increasing lethality, or methods targeting digital information systems that attract wildly disproportionate effects and publicity, will allow terrorists to be “non-affiliated” with larger, better financed subversive organizations or state sponsors. This could result in terrorist cells that are smaller, even familial, and thus harder to infiltrate, track, or counter. Terrorism will be increasingly networked, with smaller and more self-sufficient cells, and will globally integrate parallel to digital global integration, and will permeate geographic boundaries and state sovereignties just as easily.

Also, keyed in with the rise in single-issue terrorism will be the rise in “true” guerrilla movements within the US: that is, movements that seek the destruction of the US government, rather than movements that seek to influence government, a particular policy or population. This also includes movements that are geographically centered, rather than cellular and sparse, operating in rural areas rather than urban centers.

All of this information can be useful in ministry. Hopefully an awareness of what can happen will prepare us to live and model the spiritual values necessary to guide all of the members of our commands. All humankind has innate spiritual values, hopefully, each of us can in some way strengthen that reality for all to whom we minister.

Read Michael Walzer’s “Prisoners of War: Does the Fight Continue After the Battle?” It is an historical analysis of the rights and status of POWs. See Appendix I, “Further Reading.”

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. DOD instruction 1300.21 sets the standard for applying the Code of Conduct. Discuss how it applies to your unit mission.

2. In what ways does “Operation Homecoming” reflect an “institution oriented” role of ministry versus the traditional “chapel centered” role of ministry? Do you think personnel who deny any belief in an institutional church program can benefit from care provided by a military chaplain? How?

3. Recent hostage experiences and especially those of our Vietnam POWs, have given us access to important attitudes that impact how well we survive extreme circumstances. Discuss three attitudes you deem most important – for the service member; and for yourself.
APPENDIX I

Reprinted Articles


U. S. Army Chaplain Ministry to German War Criminals at Nuremberg, 1945 – 1946” THE Army Chaplaincy Journal. Photos were provided by COL Henry. H. Gerecke, USA, (Ret.).


“An Ethic Without Heros.” LT Lawrence Bauer, USN. PROCEEDINGS. Winner of the Vincent Astor Memorial Leadership Essay Contest (replete with qualities that can enable service members to survive extreme circumstances). This article makes the case that tradition is a formidable element in character development. (NRTC chapter 4).

For Further Reading


An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics. Donald W. Shriver, Jr., New York Oxford Univ Press. 1995. The author expands the concept of forgiveness from the realm of religion and personal ethics. He makes the case that forgiveness is at the heart of reflection about how groups of humans can move to repair the damages they have suffered from their past conflicts with each other. He employs forgiveness as a multidimensional process that is eminently political.


Bound to Forgive. Lawrence Jenco. Notre Dame, IN. Ave Maria Press, 1995. Father Martin Jenco suffered 19 months as a hostage in Beirut. He relives his kidnapping, his imprisonment, offers
portraits of the Shiite Muslims who held him captive and describes his pilgrimage to reconciliation.


“*Education and Leadership and Survival: The Role of the Pressure Cooker.*” Military Ethics. James B. Stockdale and Joseph Brennan. Washington, D.C. National Defense University Press, 1987. Drawn and developed from the literature of the Middle Ages, the concept of ‘hermetic transformation,’ the idea discussed in this article is that the soul would be ‘hermetically’ sealed, possibly changed, in certain environments – say, captivity.


*Martial Justice: The Last Mass Execution in the United States* (Bluejacket Books Series) Richard Whittingham. United States Naval Institute. Oct 1997. Most Americans don’t even know we had hundreds of camps all over the U.S. that housed German POWs. This is a frightening study of some decisions military bureaucracy has made regarding POWs.


*Preparing for Terrorism: An Emergency Services Guide.* George Buck. Delmar Publ. Oct 1997. This book is an excellent resource in gaining an understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and how best to respond. The book lays out a brief, but adequate, framework of terrorism, and then sketches out how to prepare and respond to a terrorist attack. The author includes valuable resources, such as the Federal Response and Planning Guidelines to Terrorism, information on chemical and biological agents, and several incident management tools.

“The Grievances of Bosnian Religious Groups.” Paul Mojzes. CHURCH AND SOCIETY. May-June, 1998. Vol 88. This article is a transcript of the author’s address to a colloquium presented by the Woodstock Theological Center of Georgetown University. The article is an analysis of the philosophical and historic conflicts among the three primary religious groups in a strife-ridden part of the world where military forces might, in the foreseeable future, be subject to prisoner of war or other captive scenarios. Knowledge of the areas’ religious sensitivities may prove most helpful.
The Gulf Between Us: Love and Terror in Desert Storm. Cynthia B. Acree. This uplifting true story of patriotism, courage and faith is told by a Marine aviator’s wife. She chronicles a POW’s struggle to stay alive while preserving his honor, and her own struggles on the home front awaiting his return. NRTC chapter 2.


We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese. Elizabeth M. Norman. Random House. May 1999. Ruth Marie Straub, an Army nurse, was lucky, but her colleagues were taken to Santo Tomas Internment Camp, where they were to spend almost three years in captivity. Amazingly all the Angels of Bataan, some 99 in number, survived their ordeal - and clearly helped other sufferers survive. NRTC chapter 4


“Don’t Worry, Be Still: The Virtue of Nonchalance”
by John Garvey

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An Orthodox bishop once told me that he receives people into the church only after they have been made part of an Orthodox family’s life for a year, allowed by the family to worship and share meals and time with them freely. This is so that the person interested in entering the church can observe Orthodoxy as it is lived on a daily basis. “But,” he said, “I always make sure that the family has been Orthodox for at least five years.”

I asked what the reason was for that limitation, and he answered, “So that they will have lost all their convert’s enthusiasm.”

A Trappist monastery I once visited has a program which allows some guests to participate in the lives of the monks to a greater than usual degree, sharing their work and common worship. Participants must stay for at least five days, however. The monk in charge told someone who asked why a guest couldn’t stay a shorter length of time and still participate, “They need to have enough time to begin to be bored. Without that, you won’t begin to understand monasticism.”

I’m not sure five days is enough time to get bored with monastic life, but the principle is a sound one. Both of these ideas — waiting for “convert enthusiasm” to die off, and seeing what’s there after boredom — may offer a way into understanding what the earliest monastic writers meant when they spoke of “the fires of apatheia.”

Our word “apathy” doesn’t begin to convey the right sense of the word. A literal translation — away, or apart, from feeling or emotion — sounds a bit chilly, and so does a possible substitute, “detachment.” Perhaps the difficulty with a simple definition lies in the fact that the experience is distant from ordinary consciousness, which many commentators (not all of them gnostics) have compared to drunkenness or dreaming. Any attempt to be still can show how the mind jumps from instant to instant, scattering in every direction but the moment you actually occupy. Memories of the past and worries or fantasies about the future pull the attention away from the present. Simply to be, in the presence of God and others, is not simple at all. Stillness is sometimes a gift, but it is also in part a learned thing.

Which brings us back to the examples at the start of this. What is wrong with a convert’s enthusiasm, or with finding the particulars of the monastic life intriguing? Nothing, of course; nor is there anything wrong with enjoying a piece of music you haven’t heard before. But even this good thing is, in some important circumstances, a distraction. The idea of apatheia calls on us to question the ordinary place of the emotions in our life.

Our culture teaches us to identify our emotional life with the deepest parts of the self. We are taught to rely on feeling and emotion as guides, and the jargon of pop psychology reflects this: one should “be in touch with” one’s feelings, and not repress them. This isn’t without its wisdom. To deny anger, for example — to refuse to acknowledge its presence in us, or the way in which it can determine our behavior — this can lead to the worst forms of self-righteousness and self-deception. And to see nothing good in our feelings, to regard them as essentially unimportant or indifferent, is not Christian. Insofar as they have to do with our humanity, they are good.

They are not, however, guides — not, anyway, as we usually experience them. They can be understood properly only with a certain struggle, an effort at attentiveness which does not come easily to us. I was about to write, “does not come naturally to us” — but one point here is that our true nature is obscured, and must be won. This may be one reading of Jesus’ words, “The kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and the violent bear it away.”

There are instructive parallels in other religious traditions, in (for example) the philosophy of the stoics and in Buddhism. Rather than define apatheia abstractly, it is probably a good idea to look at
specific situations, to see what can be negative and limiting out our ordinary approach to feeling, and what is positive about the movement toward apatheia.

If someone insults me at an obvious level (say, by calling me ugly or stupid) or at a less obvious level (by telling me that something I have written is shallow, or by laughing at one of my firmly held opinions), my first reaction is to take offense, to feel anger or at least irritation, and to respond in a way which is a direct and emotional reaction, however well-disguised it might be in many instances, to the feeling of having been insulted or humiliated. Perhaps one of the reasons apatheia began to impress me as an idea which is of genuine practical help was that a number of incidents in my life made it uncomfortably clear to me that my need to be right had little or nothing to do with any love for the truth. That need had to do, instead, with the shoring up of ego; it could pose easily as a concern for truth.

But if truth were really at stake, my response would never involve anger or irritation or triumph (a feeling which is, I am fairly sure, a variety of anger). For instance, if I am in fact ugly, that is the case. No reason to be upset about it. If I am not, the person who has claimed that I am has done so to wound me, in which case I should wonder first how I may have caused such offense as to provoke that response, or I should feel compassion for someone who has some other need to wound; in either case, anger isn’t the appropriate response.

Similarly, if something I have written is shallow or stupid, it is; if not, it isn’t — but why be angry when this is pointed out? What gets hurt and makes anger arise is the challenge to an image of myself, an image which is never ugly, shallow, or stupid. The need to hold on to that image is the most common form of idolatry, and many of our feelings are tied up in the effort. The image does not need to be obviously foolish; it can also be the image of the self as a humble, responsive and loving person, or a prayerful person, or even a person who is open to correction.

Some Orthodox writers speak of “guarding the heart.” This means attentiveness to what goes in and out of our hearts emotionally, and an alertness to the ways we are accustomed to respond. There are spiritual directors who ask those who come to them to confess everything about the way they live — not only those things which most obviously involve spirituality, but also matters of daily habit and routine, so that the ordinary movements of attentiveness or inattentiveness can be seen more clearly. This has something in common with the Buddhist practice of observing such common and non-moral reactions as revulsion and fear. A Buddhist manual for monks describes revulsion as a kind of anger directed inappropriately toward an object that cannot harm you (for example, a decaying corpse).

Where the idea has gone wrong is not in being applied too strictly, but rather too selectively. There is in some of the stoics and some Christian ascetics too exclusive and negative a concentration on sexual temptation or drunkenness or gluttony — obvious passions, all having to do with the body — and this apparent denial of the goodness of the body has led some people to a rejection of the whole ascetic ideal. That’s unfortunate, because finally it is an affirmative, rather than a negative, approach to life. The body and our feelings assume the places they are meant to have before we distort them.

There are a number of prayers in Orthodox prayer books which speak of our passions as deluding influences which make us unhappy. If we react to this language by assuming that the passions in question are the ones preachers have always taken aim at — lust is probably the first choice there — they can look merely quirky and old-fashioned. But the passions in question, when they are identified, are often such emotions as sadness, or our obsession with bitter memories. One prayer to Mary asks for the dispelling of “the dream of despondency,” and another asks for “deliverance from my many cruel memories and deeds.”

The goal of apatheia is stillness. Perhaps the best image of what it means is the one offered in the Gospel, the image of Jesus with his disciples in the storm-tossed boat. They panicked and were afraid — they were at the time very attached to their feelings, driven by them. They were affronted by the fact that he lay at rest, his head on a pillow. It may not be too much to suggest that apatheia is, finally, a kind of divine nonchalance.
“We had two of the finest chaplains a prison commandant could have been given,” wrote Colonel Burton C. Andrus, the tough Commandant of the Nuremberg Prison, which housed high-ranking German war criminals during their trial for war crimes after World War II. The two chaplains he praised so highly were Henry F. Gerecke and Sixtus R. O’Connor, both part of one of the most singular ministries ever undertaken by U.S. Army chaplains; a ministry to the surviving leadership of the Third Reich who were tried for war crimes at Nuremberg.

For these two chaplains it was a unique, ground-breaking experience.

While the historical record of the Chaplaincy shows that Army chaplains ministered to enemy prisoners of war (POWs) in the past, this was not done in an organized way and was generally carried out by individual chaplains on a temporary, non-official basis.

In the aftermath of World War I, for example, elements of the U.S. Army were engaged in protecting parts of the Trans-Siberian railroad system. The 27th Infantry Regiment found itself at one point guarding and protecting some 2,000 German and Austrian prisoners in the Lake Baikel region deep in central Siberia.

Chaplain Joseph S. Loughran, who was attached to the 27th, found himself not only conducting services for the prisoners, but also acting as the liaison officer between the captives and American military authorities.

All this changed in World War II when large numbers of Axis prisoners of war were sent to camps in North Africa, in liberated Europe, and in the United States. Fort Slocum, New York, for example, the home of the Chaplain School from 1951 to 1962, served as an Army-run installation for German and Italian POWs during the war.

After the war, Army Chaplain Norman Adams headed an organization based in Paris, France, which supplied religious coverage to approximately 130 German POW camps with responsibility for about half a million men. With the total defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan, the question of how to treat the leadership of these nations, which had plunged the world into this terrible conflict, also had to be addressed.

The issue of how to treat the high-ranking leadership of a defeated state was one that had arisen in the United States only once before, and that was in the wake of the Civil War. At that time, there had been
serious consideration given to bringing to trial certain individuals in the Confederate hierarchy. While Jefferson Davis, the Confederate president, was imprisoned for a time at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Alexander Stephens, the vice president, incarcerated at Fort Warren in Boston harbor, no Confederate leader was ever tried for treason or war crimes.

After World War I there was an effort to bring Kaiser Wilhelm II to an international court of justice, but he fled to the Netherlands (neutral during World War I) and was granted asylum.

In fact, there had been only one trial and execution in United States history prior to World War II for what conceivably might be defined as a war crime in today’s parlance; i.e., Confederate Army Captain Henry Wirz, the commandant of the Andersonville prison camp.5

The unimaginable horrors perpetrated during WW II by Germany and Japan however, made their political and military leadership particularly open to legal retribution. At the end on the Yalta Conference on 12 February 1945, the Allied leaders declared: “It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to … bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment.”6

After President Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945, the new president, Harry Truman:

accepted the wisdom of a trial, based on a model proposed by the War Department, and he convinced the British, the Russians, and the French, who were brought into the discussions. Following agreements in principle at the United Nations founding Conference in San Francisco, experts from the four occupying Powers met in London in June to work out the details. On 8 August 1945, the representatives reached agreement on a charter establishing an International Military Tribunal [IMT] ‘for the just and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals of the European Axis.’7

This tribunal was made up of one member and an alternate chosen by each of the four signatory powers. The first session took place in Berlin on 18 October 1945. Beginning on 20 November 1945, the tribunal sessions were held at the Palace of Justice in Nuremberg. This city was chosen as the venue because of its close association with the Nazi party. Originally there were 24 members of the Nazi leadership charged with the perpetration of war crimes. One defendant, Robert Ley, committed suicide on 23 October; a second defendant, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, was judged incapable of being tried because of his mental and physical condition. A third, Martin Bormann, would be tried and condemned to death in absentia.8

Security for the remaining 21 prisoners was provided by the Army’s 6850th Internal Security Detachment, under the direction of the commandant of Nuremberg Prison, Colonel Andrus. Initially Chaplain Carl R. Eggers, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, was assigned to work with the prisoners. Chaplain Eggers, who spoke fluent German and was a Lutheran (Missouri Synod), held this position briefly. On 12 November 1945, as the trial moved from Berlin to Nuremberg, he turned over his duties to Chaplain Henry F. Gerecke, another Lutheran (Missouri Synod). A second Army chaplain was chosen to be his Roman Catholic counterpart, Chaplain Sixtus R. O’Connor. These two chaplains, along with the prison Army psychologist, Dr. G.M. Gilbert, were the only American officers on the prison staff who could speak German.9
As a result of the Reformation and the ensuing religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, German society was sharply divided between Protestantism (mainly Lutheran), and Roman Catholicism. Nazi leadership mirrored this split. Adolf Hitler and Josef Goebbels, for example, were born, baptized and raised in the Roman Catholic faith.

Of the 21 on trial at Nuremberg, the 13 Protestants would be ministered to by Chaplain Gerecke. They were: Herman Goering (Reichmarschall and Luftwaffe-Chief); Joachim von Ribbentrop (Foreign Minister); Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht); Hans Frick (Governor-General of Poland); Walter Funk (Minister of Economics); Hjalmar Schacht (Reichbank President and former Minister of Economics); Admiral Karl Doenitz (Grand Admiral of the German Navy); Admiral Erich Raeder (Grand Admiral of the German Navy); Baldur von Schirach (Hitler Youth Leader and Gauleiter of Vienna); Fritz Sauckel (Chief of slave labor recruitment); Albert Speer (Reich minister of Armaments and Munitions); Baron Konstantin von Neurath (former Foreign Minister and later Protector of Bohemia and Moravia); and Hans Fritzsche (Radio Propaganda Chief).10

Chaplain O’Connor would serve the four professed Catholic prisoners: Ernst Kaltenbrunner (Chief of SS Security HQ); Franz von Papen (Ambassador to Austria and Turkey); Hans Frank (Governor General of Poland); and Artur Seyss-Inquart (Austrian Chancellor and later Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands).

Four of the prisoners refused to align themselves with either chaplain. They were: Rudolf Hess; Alfred Rosenberg (Chief Nazi philosopher and Reich minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories); Julius Streicher (Gauleiter of Franconia); and General Alfred Jodl (Chief of Operations for the High Command).11

The ministry of these two chaplains is mainly seen through the eyes of Chaplain Gerecke. While both he and Chaplain O’Connor worked closely together, only Gerecke has left us a detailed written record of the experience. This was not without controversy. Initially, Chaplain Gerecke’s request to publish an account of his ministry was denied by the Office of the Chief of Chaplains:

The objection was based on the ground that the manuscript revealed intimate confidences which were deserving of the secrecy of the confessional. The War Department discourages anything that would possibly suggest to men that chaplains did not zealously guard intimate knowledge and confidence.12

When Gerecke did publish his experiences he introduced his story by saying:

Remember, friends, this report is unofficial and has no connection with any report that may come from the War Department. These are my personal observations and feelings about the men on trial at Nuremberg.13

Maintaining his silence, Chaplain O’Connor wrote nothing for publication.

Chaplain O’Connor was a former parish priest from Loudonville, New York, who had entered the Army in 1943. Chaplain Gerecke was a 53-year-old pastor from Missouri, who had also entered the Army in 1943. A hospital chaplain, he was serving in Munich with the 98th General Hospital Unit, when he was ordered to report to the 6850th Internal Security Detachment at Nuremberg. He had not seen his wife in two-and-a-half years, and two of his sons had been severely wounded in the war, one during the Battle of the Bulge.

Prior to coming to Munich, he had spent “15 melancholy months in English hospitals, sitting at the bedsides of the wounded and dying.” Chaplain Gerecke had many doubts about this new assignment. The Office of the Chief of Chaplains told him that the decision to accept or reject it was up to him.14
Colonel Andrus wrote that Gerecke told him: “How can a humble preacher from a Missouri farm make any impression on the disciples of Adolph Hitler?” Despite his doubts, Gerecke accepted the assignment.

From November 1945 to October 1946, Chaplains Gerecke and O’Connor ministered to their charges on a daily basis. Gerecke’s first communicant was Fritz Saukel. He regularly prayed with the chaplain, often ending his prayers with: “God be merciful to me, a sinner.” Fritzche, von Schirach, and Speer, were regular takers of Communion. Field Marshal Keitel asked Gerecke, “to convey his thanks to the Christian people of America for sending a chaplain to them.” At one point Keitel told him: “You have helped me more than you know. May Christ, my Saviour, stand by me all the way. I shall need him so much.”

On the Catholic side, Hans Frank told Dr. Gilbert, the Army psychologist, in December 1945:

I am glad that you and Pater Sixtus, at least, still come to talk to me. You know, Pater Sixtus is such a wonderful man. If you could say ‘virgin’ about a man you would say it about him — so delicate, so sympathetic, so maidenly — you know what I mean. And religion is such a comfort — my only comfort now. I look forward to Christmas now like a little child.

The prisoners who refused to see either chaplain were adamant in their stance.

Hess, of course, was mentally disturbed, and probably, like Krupp, should not have been on trial. Streicher’s response to some religious leaflets left by the chaplain was that: “I don’t put any stock in that stuff... All that stuff about Christ — the Jew who was the Son of God — I don’t know. It sounds like propaganda.”

Rosenberg, the party theoretician, treated Gerecke with a cool disdain. He told him that he had no need of his services, but he thought it was nice that someone could be so simple as to actually accept the story of Christ as Gerecke had done.

Hermann Goering, the highest-ranking Nazi on trial, was for Gerecke the most interesting and the most troubling. When Gerecke held services in the little prison chapel, Goering was always the first to arrive, sat in the front, and sang the loudest. His rationale for this was somewhat disconcerting, since he told Gerecke that with his position as the highest-ranking member of the prisoners, it was his duty to set an example. “If I attend,” he maintained, “the others will follow suit.”

The depth of his faith was questionable. Once, ending a session with the prison psychologist, Dr. Gilbert, he said that he must get to chapel. When Gilbert said that prayer was beneficial, Goering replied: “Prayers, hell! It’s just a chance to get out of this damn cell for a half hour.” He told Chaplain Gerecke at one point that he was not an atheist, but rejected Lutheranism. He believed in a higher power, but not in Christianity.

By the spring of 1946, both chaplains had established strong bonds with the prisoners. When a rumor spread that Gerecke wanted to leave, all 21 defendants signed a letter to Mrs. Gerecke in St. Louis telling her how much they had benefited from his ministry and how much they needed him.

After 216 court sessions, on 1 October 1946, the verdict was handed down. Twelve of the defendants (including the absent Bormann) were sentenced to death by hanging. Seven were given prison sentences — Hess, Funk, and Raeder for life. Three — Schacht, von Papen, and Fritzche — were acquitted. The time for the executions was set for midnight, 15 October 1946.

As the final hour approached, Colonel Andrus reported that “Father O’Connor and Chaplain Gerecke were untiringly moving from condemned cell to condemned cell. Prayers were now taking on a new meaning, a new urgency.”
At 2030 hours Gerecke saw Goering. He requested communion but refused to make a confession of Christian faith. Chaplain Gerecke in turn refused to give Communion, basing his decision on denominational grounds. Two hours later Gerecke was hurriedly summoned and found that Goering had committed suicide and cheated the hangman by taking a cyanide capsule.26

The chaplain was later criticized for this refusal of the sacrament, and Gerecke himself had struggled with his decision. “If I blundered in my approach to reach this man’s heart and soul with the meaning of the Cross of Jesus,” he wrote later, “then I’m very sorry and I hope a Christian world will forgive me.”27

As the ten remaining condemned prisoners walked the “last mile” that night the chaplains went with them. “I put my trust in Christ,” von Ribbentrop confided to Gerecke.28 As the hood was pulled over his head he turned to him and said: “I’ll see you again.”29 Field Marshall Keitel said: “I thank you and those who sent you, with all my heart.”30

The place of execution was located in the gymnasium of the prison. Brightly lit, the room contained three wooden scaffolds painted black. Thirteen steps led up to the platforms on which the gallows were erected. The lower part of the gallows was draped with a curtain. Hands tied behind their backs, a black hood pulled over their heads, one by one each man went to his death. Master Sergeant John C. Woods of San Antonio, Texas, and his two assistants conducted the executions. By 2:45 a.m. it was over.31

Kingsbury Smith of the International News Service, who attended the executions as a representative of the American press, remembered that “most of them tried to show courage. None of them broke down.”32

At four o’clock in the morning two Army trucks arrived at the prison. Eleven coffins were loaded and the trucks, protected by vehicles equipped with machine guns, drove off in the direction of Furth, followed by a procession of newspapermen in automobiles. At Erlangen the press contingent was prevented from proceeding any further and the two trucks containing the bodies drove off into the early morning mist. Taken to Munich on a roundabout route, the remains were reduced to ashes in the crematorium of the East Cemetery. These ashes were then scattered in the river Isar.33

Chaplains Gerecke and O’Connor were soon reassigned, returning to their normal duties as U.S. Army chaplains. Yet, for a year they had played an intimate part in one of the most historically significant episodes of the 20th century special ministry.
Endnotes

10. Ibid. 7; Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, 4-7.
11. Ibid.; Ventzke, Confidence, 8.
17. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary, 81.
18. As quoted in, Ibid., 87.
20. Gerecke, “Assignment,” 137; Goering quote, Gilbert, Nuremberg, 60.
21. As quoted in, Ibid., 125.
22. Andrus, Nuremberg Jailer, 185-86.
23. Ibid., 188-89.
27. Ibid.
28. As quoted in, Andrus, Nuremberg Jailer, 194.
30. As quoted in, Andrus, Nuremberg Jailer, 195.
32. Ibid., 387.
33. Ibid., 387-88.
The POW: Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions
The Unique Skills of Seaman Doug Hegdahl, USN

The Code of Conduct was designed to govern the behavior of service personnel captured during war. The code arose out of the Korean War experience, where a breakdown of morale occurred, primarily among the enlisted POW community, and widespread collaboration followed. The 1955 code as promulgated by President Eisenhower called for POWs to make every effort to escape, accept no special favors from the enemy, and when questioned, give only one’s name, rank, serial number, and date of birth: “the big four and nothing more.

During the Vietnam War, this version of the code quickly became untenable. North Vietnamese camp authorities routinely ignored the Geneva Convention and subjected POWs to severe torture, extortion, and brutality. As a consequence, senior officers at the Hanoi Hilton developed a modified version of the code, known as Plum, which stands for little jewels of knowledge. Plums came out as policy statements, and were meant to augment, expand, or substitute for the Code of Conduct. “As POW’s were treated not as POW’s but as common criminals, we sailed uncharted waters,” explained James Stockdale, one of the leaders who helped develop the Plums. “The Code did not provide for our day to day existence; we wrote the laws we had to live by… We set a line of resistance we thought was within the capability of each POW to hold, and we ruled that no man would cross that line without significant torture. “Plums required a pilot to take physical abuse and torture before acceding to specific demands, but did not expect a man to die or seriously jeopardize his health and safety. They also called for “working with the camp authorities for the improved welfare of all and ignoring petty annoyances.”

However, there would be no appearances for propaganda, and any “flexibility or freelancing would be subordinated to the need for unity and discipline.” The ethical dilemmas confronted by even the lowest ranking POW in Hanoi are well illustrated by the example by the case of Doug Hegdahl.

Seaman Hegdahl, a modest 19-year old farm boy from South Dakota, had never been east of his uncle’s Dairy Queen stand in Glenwood, Minnesota, or west of his aunt’s house in Phoenix, Arizona, before enlisting in the Navy in October 1966. On the night before his capture, he was serving as an ammunition handler on the guided missile cruiser Canberra in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Excited by the prospect of seeing a night bombardment for the first time, he went up to the deck (in violation of orders) and was knocked overboard by the shock of one of the ship’s five-inch guns. A skilled swimmer, Hegdahl floated for several hours before being picked up by a North Vietnamese fishing boat, and later turned over to the Vietnamese militia. The fishermen treated Hegdahl well, but the militia nearly clubbed him senseless with their rifles before moving him to the Hanoi Hilton.

Once at the Hilton, Hegdahl understood implicitly that it was to his great advantage to convince the Vietnamese that “he lowly fool,” someone not worth worrying about. The Vietnamese interrogators thought he was an agent or a commando, so ridiculous was Hegdahl’s tale, but after being grilled and slapped around for several days, Hegdahl finally convinced his captors that he was nothing but an ignorant farm boy. Because of his youth, his “hillbilly” accent, and his bumpkin demeanor, the guards viewed Hegdahl as unthreatening and gave him an almost complete run of the Plantation, a satellite POW camp near the Hilton.
They also decided to “punish” the camp’s SRO, CMDR Richard Stratton, by making Hegdahl, a lowly seaman, his roommate — a serious mistake that both men soon capitalized on.

Rather than resent each other because of differences in rank, education, and social background, the two men bonded immediately: Hegdahl respected Stratton for his accomplishments as an aviator and his Georgetown and Stanford education; and Stratton, in turn, admired Hegdahl for convincing the Vietnamese that he was a simpleton and for his superb memory. The two men soon developed a surprisingly effective intelligence network, with Hegdahl as the courier and Stratton as the case officer. Hegdahl played the ignoramus role to the hilt, and soon became the main link for the POW communications network at the Plantation. Among Hegdahl’s “surprising skills, an uncanny memory enabled him to retain not only the names and shoot-down dates of captives, but also the names of their family members and hometowns and innumerable other bits of information.”

Beginning in August of 1967, conditions within the Plantation improved. Prisoners began receiving more and better food and were allowed to spend more time outdoors. Stratton and others assumed that the improved treatment meant that the Vietnamese were contemplating an early release for some of the POWs. Knowing that Hegdahl represented the perfect courier to deliver comprehensive intelligence about the POWs and their conditions to Washington. Stratton, who by this time was being held in a separate cell, ordered Hegdahl to accept early release if offered to him.

Initially, Hegdahl struggled over the order. Unsure if obeying it would mean breaking Article 3 of the Code of Conduct, he became a more “incorrigible” POW to delay his release. During the fall, he intentionally provoked the Vietnamese by refusing to write an amnesty request to Ho Chi Minh and giving Tom Hayden, a prominent peace activist who visited the Plantation during this period, the “finger.” Hayden retaliated by refusing to carry back a taped message to Doug’s parents, and the Vietnamese did likewise by throwing him into solitary. As he sat in solitary, Hegdahl regretted evading Stratton, a man he respected as much as his father, but on the other hand, viewed the order as a direct violation of the Code of Conduct, and a breach of faith with his fellow POWs.

Ultimately, a new order from LTCOL Hervey Stockman, USAF, temporarily solved his dilemma. A “strict constructionist,” Stockman flatly turned down Stratton’s request to send Hegdahl home. “Nobody goes home,” he tapped, “Not that kid — not anybody.” A persistent man, Stratton gradually convinced Stockman to change his stance, arguing that Hegdahl’s phenomenal memory was the best opportunity the POWs had for getting a complete list of captives to Washington. The news of the change came to Doug via Al Stafford, his cellmate at the time.

“Al, I can’t do that.”
“Why not?”
“I can’t bug out on the guys.”
“It’s the not the same with you Doug. You can understand that.”
“I can’t go home while the rest of you guys stay here. If one of us goes, we all go.”
“It’s an order, Doug.”
“I don’t care. I’m not going.”
“All right, Seaman Hegdahl. I am a lieutenant commander and your superior officer, and I order you to go.”
“Aye, aye, sir.”

Seaman Hegdahl did more for the POW cause than provide Washington with intelligence on the North Vietnamese camps; he also brought much needed news about loved ones to POW families and publicized the North’s brutal mistreatment of American captives.

After accepting a position at the Navy’s SERE school near San Diego as a civilian instructor, he met with Sybil Stockdale on numerous occasions to provide her with detailed briefings about her husband. As a civilian, he traveled around the country speaking out against Hanoi; at one point even journeying to Paris to petition the North Vietnamese for a visa to return to Hanoi as part of a Red Cross inspection team. Getting the news out about Hanoi became a crusade for Doug, and in the end, he emerged as the most powerful weapon in Nixon’s campaign to improve POW conditions through full disclosure of war crimes being committed by North Vietnam in Hanoi.
EXPERIENCES AS A POW IN VIETNAM

Rear Admiral James B. Stockdale, U.S. Navy

From Naval War College Review, January-February 1974 Issue...

LAST FEBRUARY, WHEN I FIRST TOUCHED foot on American soil, I was asked to make a few remarks on behalf of the ex-POWs who were embarked in the airplane with me. An ancient verse came to mind that best summarized my relief at dropping the mantle of leadership and responsibility I had held during seven and a half years of imprisonment, four of them in solitary. These lines are attributed to Sophocles; I remember them well because of their modern ring: “Nothing is so sweet as to return from sea and listen to the raindrops on the rooftops of home.”

Well, I was dreaming. I had forgotten that an old sea captain’s job does not end when he anchors in home port.

My wife Sybil and I have a private joke. Before I returned she was advised by a Navy psychiatrist, “The fellow will probably make a quick readjustment to modern society if you will remember one rule for the first few months: Don’t put him in decision-making situations.” Well, the reality of my post-confinement simply did not allow such an environment. In the past year I have probably made more important decisions than in any like period in my life.

Today I find myself truly back home. I am back with old friends, back in my native Middle West, and I have decided that this is my last public speech as an ex-POW. I have no ambition to become a professional ex-prisoner. As soon as I finish today, I am going down to my farm in Knox County [Illinois] for a couple of days, then to Colorado to spend the weekend with my second son, who is in college there, then back to San Diego. Next week I hope to check out of the hospital, and then, I hope, I will be ready for a good seagoing job.

Incidentally, before we were released by the North Vietnamese, I had occasion to be approached by other prisoners who were thinking about their careers. We were all more or less pessimistic about our future utility to our services. Not with any malice — it was just that we had been used to living that stoic life and faced up to the fact that there was a good chance that our service careers had been overcome by time. We came home to find that the service was devoted to giving us every chance to regain that time. I am informed, as our Navy ex-POWs’ duty assignments are made — and their orders are good — that each man has been given the personal attention his devotion to duty deserves.

As a theme for this audience, I will address the subject of how a group of middle Americans — average American guys who have chosen military life as a profession — survived in a POW situation and returned home with honor.

The conditions under which American POWs existed have changed radically since World War II. It is no longer a matter of simply being shot up, coming down in your parachute, going to a reasonably pleasant Hogan’s Heroes prison camp, and sweating out the end of the war. At least it was not that way in Vietnam. In Vietnam the American POW did not suddenly find himself on the war’s sidelines. Rather, he found himself on one of the major battlefronts — the propaganda battlefront. Our enemy in Vietnam hoped to win his war with propaganda. It was his main weapon. Our captors told us they never expected to defeat us on the battlefield, but did believe they could defeat us on the propaganda front.

Unlike the World War II POW, who was considered a liability, a drain on enemy resources and manpower, the American POW in Vietnam was considered a prime political asset. The enemy believed that sooner or later every one of us could be broken to his will and used as ammunition on the propaganda front. Some of us might take more breaking than others, but all of us could be broken. Thus, for Americans who became POWs in Vietnam, capture meant not that we had been neutralized, but that a different kind of war had begun — a war of extortion.
For the sane man there is always an element of fear involved when he is captured in war. In Vietnam the enemy capitalized on this fear to an extreme degree. We were told we must live by sets of rules and regulations no normal American could possibly live by. When we violated these rules and regulations, we gave our captors what they considered sufficient moral justification for punishing us — binding us in ropes, locking us in stocks for days and weeks on end, locking us in torture cuffs for weeks at a time, and beating us to bloody pulps. As we reached our various breaking points, we were “allowed” to apologize for our transgressions and to atone for them by “confessing our crimes” and condemning our government.

At this point you may be asking the question, Had the POWs received any training to prepare themselves for possible capture? The answer is yes, and it was based on two things that I have come to respect very, very much.

One was on the taking of physical abuse. I think if you were to prepare yourself to be a prisoner of war — and I cannot imagine anybody going about that methodically — one should include a course of familiarization with pain. For what it is worth, I learned the merits of men having taken the physical abuse of body contact in sports. It is a very important experience; you have to practice hurting. There is no question about it.

Second, survival school was based on taking mental harassment. I came out of prison being very happy about the merits of plebe year at the Naval Academy. I hope we do not ever dilute those things. You have to practice being hazed. You have to learn to take a bunch of junk and accept it with a sense of humor.

On the subject of education, beyond the scope of survival school, there is always the question, “Do we need to start giving a sort of counter-propaganda course? Should we go into the political indoctrination business?” I am not very enthusiastic about that. I think the best preparation for an American officer who may be subjected to political imprisonment is a broad, liberal education that gives the man at least enough historical perspective to realize that those who excelled in life before him were, in the last essence, committed to play a role. He learns that though it is interesting to speculate about the heavens and the earth and the areas under the earth and so forth, when it comes right down to it, men are more or less obliged to play certain roles, and they do not necessarily have to commit themselves on issues that do not affect that role.

Now, how does the average American — which is what the POW is — deal with his world? On a day-to-day basis, the POW must somehow communicate with his fellows. Together they must establish a viable set of rules and regulations to live by. We were military men. We knew we were in a combat situation and that the essential element of survival and success in a combat situation is military discipline. That meant, isolated though we were from each other, we could not afford to live in a democracy. We had no choice but to live in a strictly disciplined military organization — if you will, a military dictatorship.

Our captors knew this as well as we did. Several members of Hanoi’s Central Committee had spent long periods in confinement as political prisoners. They felt that we too were political prisoners. They held as their highest priority the prevention of a prisoner organization, because they knew an organized body of prisoners could beat their system. If they were to get what they wanted from us, they had to isolate every American who showed a spark of leadership. They did so. They plunged many of us into a dark, solitary confinement that lasted, in some cases, four full years.

“For what it is worth, I learned the merits of men having taken the physical abuse of body contact in sports. It is a very important experience; you have to practice hurting. There is no question about it.”

For us the Code of Conduct became the ground we walked on. I am not aware that any POW was able, in the face of severe punishment and torture, to adhere strictly to name, rank, and serial number, as the heroes always did in the old-fashioned war movies, but I saw a lot of Americans do better. I saw men scoff at the threats and return to torture 10 and 15 times. I saw men perform in ways no one
would have ever thought to put in a movie; and because they did perform that way, we were able to establish communication, organization, a chain of command, and an effective combat unit. We lost some battles, but I believe we won the war.

In fact, I am not so sure we lost many battles. Unless you have been there, it is difficult to imagine the grievous insult to the spirit that comes from breaking under torture and saying something the torturer wants you to say. For example, “My government is conducting a criminal war. I am a war criminal. I bomb churches, schools, and pagodas.” Does that sound silly to you? It does to me. But I and many others were tortured in ropes for that statement. The reason it was important to take torture for that statement was to establish the credibility of our defiance — for personal credibility — so that the enemy would know that they must pay a high price to get us into public if they ever could. Needless to say, in a POW situation, viable leadership is not possible without example. In a unit with good communication, almost everyone knows what everyone else is doing or not doing most of the time.

In short, what I am saying is that we communicated. Most of the time most of us knew what was happening to those Americans around us. POWs risked military interrogation, pain, and public humiliation to stay in touch with each other, to maintain group integrity, to retain combat effectiveness. We built a successful military organization and in doing so created a counterculture. It was a society of intense loyalty — loyalty of men one to another, of rigid military authoritarianism that would have warmed the cockles of the heart of Frederick the Great; of status — with such unlikely items as years in solitary, number of times tortured, and months in irons, as status symbols.

Most men need some kind of personal philosophy to endure what the Vietnam POWs endured. For many it is religion; for many it is a patriotic cause; for some it is simply a question of doing their jobs even though the result — confinement as a POW — may not seem necessarily fair. For myself it seemed that becoming a POW somewhere, someday, was a risk I accepted when I entered the Naval Academy. I think it is fair to say that most POWs — including, certainly, those who did not attend service academies — felt the same way. They accepted this as a risk they undertook when they took their oath as officers. To be sure, very few sat around bemoaning their fate, asking the heavens, “Why me?”

As POWs who were treated not as POWs but as common criminals, we sailed uncharted waters. The Code of Conduct was the star that guided us, although several of us are making recommendations for its modification, particularly in the area of a prisoner’s legal status. The Code did not provide for our day-to-day existence; we wrote the laws we had to live by. We established means for determining seniority. We wrote criteria and provided mechanisms for relieving men of command for good and sufficient cause — and we used those mechanisms. We set a line of resistance we thought was within the capability of each POW to hold, and we ruled that no man would cross that line without significant torture. Thus, in effect, we ordered men into torture.

From what I have said here today, I think you can realize that as we prison leaders developed this organization, this unity, this mutual trust and confidence, this loyalty that permitted us to ask a guy to give his all sometimes, we acquired a couple of things. We acquired a lot of close friends, but in addition we acquired a constituency.

Now life has to make sense to that constituency. And that constituency comes home and says to itself: You spoke with force of law, and at great personal pain and inconvenience I obeyed that law, and now I come home and no one seems interested in whether everybody obeyed it or not. What kind of a deal is that? We prison leaders have a lifetime obligation to back up our stalwarts.

A couple of final comments. Self-discipline was vital to self-respect, which in turn is vital to survival and meaningful participation in a POW organization. Self-indulgence is fatal. Daily ritual seems essential to mental and spiritual health. I would do 400 pushups a day, even when I had leg irons on, and would feel guilty when I failed to do them. This ritual paid valuable dividends in self-respect, and, incidentally, I learned yesterday at Mayo Clinic that it also paid physical dividends.
I thank God for the other Americans I was imprisoned with. The respect one develops for others in a POW situation is really indescribable. I think it might be best illustrated with a story of something that happened once when I was in solitary and under extremely close surveillance. I was in dire need of a morale boost when two other POWs, Dave Hatcher and Jerry Coffee, sent me a note at great risk to themselves. I opened it and found written the complete poem, “Invictus,” which begins,

Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul.

William Ernest Henley, 1849-1903

In our effort to survive and return with honor, we drew on the totality of our American heritage. We hope we added something to that heritage. God forbid that it should ever happen to other Americans — to your sons and grandsons, and mine — but if it does, we pray that our experience will be known to them and give them the heart and hope they will need.

1Vice Admiral Stockdale graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1946, serving first in destroyers and later as a naval aviator. In 1965, as Commander Air Wing 16 embarked in the carrier USS Oriskany (CVA-34), he was shot down over North Vietnam, becoming the senior U.S. naval prisoner of war until his release in 1973. After his return he became Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Wing Pacific in the grade of rear admiral, then President of the Naval War College in 1977 as a vice admiral.

Retiring from naval service in 1979, Admiral Stockdale became the president of The Citadel in Charleston, South Carolina; in 1981 he joined the Hoover Institution as a senior research fellow. He is a member of the advisory board of the Naval War College Review. His books include A Vietnam Experience (1985) and Thoughts of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot (1995); he and his wife Sybil wrote In Love and War (2nd ed. 1990). He holds a master’s degree from Stanford, honorary doctorates from Brown University and the University of Rhode Island, nine other honorary degrees, and the Congressional Medal of Honor.
Almost 70 years ago, Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves raised a toast to the Navy’s traditions. “Certainly, it is our duty to keep these traditions alive,” he said, “and to pass them on untarnished to those who come after us.” If Admiral Gleaves were alive today, it is likely he would be concerned with polishing some tarnished traditions. During the past two years, revelations of sexual harassment and other misconduct have brought discredit to the Navy and the reputation of its officers. As a result, professional ethics are — now more than ever — an important factor in the education of an officer. Long after Tailhook becomes a footnote in the history books, our response to it will have a profound effect on the practice of leadership.

For a naval officer, ethics is not academic; it is a discipline applied to every day decision making. It is a source of inspiration, encouraging us to remain faithful to it when the temptation to compromise is great. We rely on our leaders to make wise choices in difficult moments. For an officer, then, devotion to the professional ethic must be equal to his or her devotion to subordinates, because to fail one is to fail them both.

Like the professional ethic of many old institutions, ours has developed over the years and is rich in tradition. Last year (1992), however, the Navy adopted an official set of core values and introduced it into the fleet. For the first time in its history, the Navy codified the qualities it finds most desirable in its personnel and in its leaders: courage, honor, and commitment. Indeed, these are timeless virtues, but what is missing, and what this philosophy will need if it is to accomplish any lasting good, is tradition — heroes and a history of its own.

“Fortune,” said Winston Churchill, “is rightly malignant to those who break with the customs of the past.” What began in Las Vegas two years ago (at time of writing) has been called a watershed by military and civilian leaders. But watershed is a dangerous word. It places most of our history and tradition on the wrong side of the time line dominated by a single tragic event, and it reinforces the viewpoints of skeptics that ethics is a political expediency in the wake of a scandal. It deprives us of what the past has to offer.

For more than two centuries, officers have been expected to treat others with dignity and respect because they defend and represent a society based on an assumption of individual worth. The crises that plague the Navy are not the result of a flawed standard of conduct, but rather they are the work of a few officers who failed to keep faith with a 200-year old ethic — either by their own actions or by tacit approval of the actions of others. Only an ethic steeped in history provides the means to put these failures in perspective.

The characters and lives of our great leaders dwarf the indiscretions of lesser men. It was, for example, George Washington’s reputation for fairness that established him as the preeminent military officer in America even before the Revolution. Historians agree that he gained not merely the obedience, but the respect of the troops he led:

He had it because of his actions, not because he was an officer, nor even because his was a deferential society in which men looked up to their social and economic betters.... Today, officers are entitled to respect because they are officers. Even so, there are varying degrees of
regard, determined by the manner in which superior officers conduct themselves. In contrast, the view in Washington’s time was somewhat the reverse: the man by his character and performance gave dignity to the office; the office was less likely to give luster to the man.... Washington implicitly acknowledged the conditions for respect when he cautioned his juniors to “remember that it is the actions and not the commission that make the officer — and that there is more expected of him than the title.1

This still is true, but not simply because the Navy has adopted a set of abstract words to define an officer’s character. Rather, it is true because our history spotlights leaders — from George Washington and John Paul Jones to Vice Admiral James Stockdale — who have set the example and the standard for us, by their actions as well as their words. They provide us with a sense of history, which will help us “avoid the self-indulgent error of seeing [ourselves] in a predicament so unprecedented, so unique, as to justify… making an exception to law, custom, or morality in favor of [ourselves].”2

“To sustain a culture,” says Ernest Boyer, president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, “you need points of common memory, tradition, and experience. If we don’t have those, it’s impossible to intellectually and socially engage with one another.”3 The service is a culture unto itself — a reflection of the society from which it draws its people, but with its own unique ethic. To sustain that culture, we must draw on our unique memories, traditions, and experiences — our history.

It is paradoxical that our solution to what the core values instructor guide calls the fragmented experience of American youth4 is as devoid of heroes and spirit as that experience itself. Educators partly blame the lack of role models for declining student performance and a dearth of values — yet our adopted ethic makes no reference to men and women who have been such models.

Our earliest leaders — General Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison among them — believed the qualities most desirable in citizens of the republic would flourish only if there were examples to emulate. They purposely and methodically created such examples.5 In a nation without a long-established military or political aristocracy, example became the means by which new leaders were developed.

By weaving history into our ethic we put life into it. “Seldom do [soldiers] fight for causes or abstract values,” writes Colonel Anthony E. Hartle, “though they will fight for a strong leader whom they know well.”6 We must ensure that the values we fight for are not abstract.

Some might argue that history is not integral to maintaining an ethic; if it were, it should have prevented the indiscretions of the past two years. But any ethic becomes weakened if it is reduced to platitudes. At the Naval Academy, for example, John Paul Jones’ caution that an officer must be more than a “capable mariner” is still grist for memorization by midshipmen. But no parallels are drawn between his words and the development of an officer’s character. The words are history, and for many, history has grown irrelevant. While the qualities Jones found necessary in an officer — tact, patience, justice, firmness, and charity — are coincidentally the same qualities lacking among the offenders in all of our recent scandals, we seem to have focused little attention on them. Instead, we have rewritten them and, in the process, stripped away their eloquence and the historical significance of their author. The question we face is whether an institution that has made history by overcoming adversity will now overcome adversity by ignoring its history. And if so, at what price? Admittedly, a doctrinaire emphasis on ethics is better than no emphasis at all. At the very least, unacceptable behavior may be eliminated. But in a profession where leaders accept responsibility for the welfare of others, merely acceptable conduct is not enough. We might eliminate demeaning behavior toward women, for example, or educate officers about racism.

By omitting tradition from its official core values, the Navy has robbed its people of what the past has to offer. Naval history is full of leaders — from John Paul Jones, to Admiral Marc Mitscher, to Vice Admiral James Stockdale — who have set the example and the standard, by their actions as well as their words.
It would be far better, however, to produce leaders who are able to recognize injustice without having to be sensitized to each of its guises, who are able to respect the dignity of others without conscious effort.

To do this, we must first eliminate the notion of statutory ethics, translated into a policy of “get on board with our values or get out.” Laws may be a reflection of the values they uphold, but they are not a substitute for the values themselves. The Navy has a set of regulations in place, to enforce its standards. Those who cannot meet the standards are now, as they have always been, subject to punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Unfortunately, there is a punitive tone to the presentation of our new core values. By preaching a philosophy of life as if we were administering the law, we obscure the purpose and meaning of both. As Colonel Hartle points out:

Some might suggest that these rules are part of the professional military ethic [PME]. The UCMJ, however, applies to all members of the military, not just the most obviously professional component. It is more comparable to the laws of the state in relation to other professionals, which apply to professionals and laymen alike. Nonetheless, the UCMJ defines honorable conduct in a negative sense by establishing what members of the military will not do. The PME, on the other hand, emphasizes ideals and positive aspects of conduct. Without question, the morality that shapes the PME also underlies the UCMJ, but the two guides for conduct are quite different.

Once established as ideals, standards are free to become obligations, imposed not by external forces, but by personal pride. Without heroes, however, ideals are easily reduced to ideology. The second step toward reaffirming a truly effective ethic for ourselves is to ensure that it is seen as part of our history, not a deviation from it. By declaring unconscionable behavior no longer acceptable, we imply that at some time it was — and do a disservice to the countless officers before us who might otherwise serve as examples.

Character development must go hand in hand with an understanding of our history — not simply battles and dates but the trials and personal philosophies of past Navy leaders. Establishing that historical camaraderie increases the sense of obligation to the ethic, since compromise now means becoming a lesser member among greats. It provides examples, and as Admiral Stockdale wrote, the knowledge that there is no situation so unique as to warrant compromise.

Finally, a historical perspective provides a healthy dose of humility. It is humbling to remember many of those past members of the profession whose lives defined the word character. Certainly, humility is, to some small degree at least, a prerequisite for selflessness, and selflessness is at the heart of our profession.

The future of professional ethics in the Navy is not especially bleak, nor is it particularly bright. We have taken the first steps toward reaffirming integrity and respect for human dignity as essential qualities in our leaders. The danger is that now, satisfied with a clear policy, we will stop, and fail to put spirit into the words. Words without the power to inspire cannot provide effective guidance for an ethical way of life. Woodrow Wilson believed that no one can lead who does not act, whether it be consciously or unconsciously, under the impulse of a profound sympathy with those whom he leads — a sympathy which is insight — an insight which is of the heart rather than of the intellect.

Words and policies appeal to the intellect, but appealing to hearts — and developing them — requires developing a sense of pride and purpose that only other hearts can accomplish.

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Lieutenant Bauer, a graduate of Northwestern University, was assigned to the U.S. Naval Academy at the time of this writing. He served earlier as combat information center officer, first lieutenant, and navigator on board the USS Moinester (FFT-1097).
APPENDIX II

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ASSIGNMENT 1

Textbook Assignment: Chapter 1, “Historical Perspectives,” pages 1-1 through 1-11.

1-1. A prisoner’s ability to adhere to the Code of Conduct, their faith, and their value system depends upon which of the following?

1. Personal integrity
2. Strength of character
3. Belief in self and country
4. Each of the above

1-2. During the middle ages, what factors continued to typify wars?

1. Barbarism
2. Brutality
3. Mass killings
4. Each of the above

1-3. Francisco de Vitoria in 1550 considered it illegal to take what action more than was warranted by the objective?

1. Spend more income
2. Take more booty
3. Do more harm
4. Use more equipment

1-4. Which of the following writers produced documents that would later develop into an international code for treatment of Prisoners of War?

1. Belli Pacis
2. Montesquieu
3. Grotius
4. Both 2 and 3 above

1-5. In the Thirty-Year’s War, the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) specified that prisoners would be released under what conditions?

1. Immediately
2. Without ransom
3. In equal numbers
4. At given intervals

1-6. In the years before 1864, what total numbers of international agreements were written for the protection of human life during a state of war?

1. 62
2. 150
3. 291
4. 310

1-7. What individual suggested that prisoners should only be prevented from further active fighting?

1. Grotius
2. Montesquieu
3. Rousseau
4. de Vattel

1-8. During what century did humane treatment of prisoners of war become an established ideal?

1. 15th
2. 18th
3. 19th
4. 20th
1-9. Rousseau made the distinction between individuals as soldiers and what category of persons?

1. Civilians
2. Non-combatants
3. Support personnel
4. Prisoners

1-10. In de Vattel’s time, clergy and what other category of personnel were given special status provided they did not bear arms on the field of battle?

1. Medical personnel
2. Females
3. Men of letters
4. Civilians

1-11. In the American Revolution, prisoners from what country were treated fairly well?

1. Britain
2. Germany
3. America
4. Canada

1-12. During the American Revolution, at the hands of colonists, loyalists received what treatment as prisoners of war?

1. Flogging and solitary confinement
2. Torture and no medical treatment
3. Both 1 and 2, above
4. Conviction of treason and condemned to death

1-13. During the American Revolution, the colonists let what factor influence their treatment of a particular enemy group?

1. Enemy religious affiliation
2. Enemy nationality
3. Colonist’s attitude
4. Enemy ethnic background

1-14. Which of the following factors is cited as a deterrent to giving humane treatment to POW’s?

1. Location of the facility
2. National diet of the captors
3. Hatred of the enemy
4. Experience and age of the captors

1-15. de Vattel defined what category of persons as those who were able to fight for the aims of war?

1. Civilians
2. Prisoners
3. Belligerents
4. Non-Combatants

1-16. In the early 19th century, Daniel Webster stated that prisoners of war should not be treated as

1. criminals
2. booty
3. slaves
4. hostages

1-17. In April 1863, President Lincoln issued “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” prepared by which of the following individuals?

1. Hannibel Hamlin
2. Francis Lieber
3. Henri Dunant
4. Jean Gaspard Bluntschli

1-18. In Lincoln’s General Order 100, Article 53 states, “Chaplains, medical staff officers, hospital nurses, and what other category of persons are not prisoners of war”.

1. Servants
2. Crippled soldiers
3. Foreigners
4. Civilians
1-19. Article 74 of General Order 100 states that, “Prisoners of war are prisoners of what entity, not of the captor?”

1. The occupying power
2. The government
3. The guards

1-20. In the civil war, neither side, North or South, was equipped to maintain prisoners due to which of the following factors?

1. Inadequate supplies
2. Improperly trained guards
3. Unprepared for prisoners
4. Each of the above

1-21. In the same year as the publication of the Lieber code, efforts were initiated on an international scale for a uniform code of prisoner treatment. This effort culminated in the establishment of what organization?

1. The Geneva Convention
2. The International Red Cross
3. The Hague Conventions
4. The United Nations

1-22. The 1874 Project for an International Convention on the Laws and Customs of War was held in what city?

1. Geneva
2. Brussels
3. Paris
4. Hague

1-23. It was the Hague Conventions of 1864 and 1899, along with the Geneva Conventions of 1906 and 1929, that codified most of what still exists today as the definitive law of war. These actions came to fruition in what year?

1. 1935
2. 1940
3. 1949
4. 1952

1-24. In the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907, which of the following statements were stipulated for prisoners of war?

1. Required to give their name and rank
2. Liberty to exercise their religion
3. Could be used as laborers
4. Each of the above

1-25. The Hague conventions were not binding during WW I because of what factor?

1. Signing was not unanimous
2. The document was not translated properly
3. The document specifically omitted non-combatants
4. The document was not gender specific

1-26. Beginning with WWI, what country had an effective model of humane treatment of POW’s?

1. Germany
2. Great Britain
3. United States
4. Italy

1-27. During WW II, what two countries were non-signatories to the convention?

1. Germany & Italy
2. Israel & Switzerland
3. Russia & Japan
4. Sweden & Ireland
1-28. During WWI, the United States considered it appropriate to interrogate POW’s as long as what action was not used?

1. Torture
2. Denial of food
3. Force
4. Deception

1-29. American treatment of enemy prisoners followed specific treatment standards with regard to what factors?

1. Food
2. Clothing
3. Pay
4. Each of the above

1-30. The treatment of Americans imprisoned by the Japanese depended on the interests and personality of what individual(s)?

1. Camp commander
2. Emperor of Japan
3. Commanding General
4. Individual guards

1-31. During WWII, Americans held by the Germans were NOT denied what activity?

1. Anti-German political rhetoric
2. Religious expression
3. Family visits
4. Transfers

1-32. During the Korean War, which, if any, of the following countries were signatories of the Geneva Convention?

1. Republic of Korea
2. North Korea
3. Communist China
4. None of the above

1-33. Which of the following was a major problem the United States faced in its management of enemy prisoners during the Korean War?

1. Language barriers
2. Insufficient medical supplies
3. Diet of Western food
4. Transportation

1-34. During the Korean War, of the 173,219 Korean prisoners taken by the United States, what percentage died in captivity?

1. 2%
2. 12%
3. 20%
4. 35%

1-35. During the Korean War, of the 7,190 Americans taken prisoner by North Korea, what percentage died in captivity?

1. 5%
2. 10%
3. 20%
4. 38%

1-36. During what war did the United States first become acquainted with the power of indoctrination and propaganda?

1. WW I
2. WW II
3. Korean War
4. Vietnam War
1-37. During WW II, what country was more adept at getting information from POWs?

1. Japan
2. Germany
3. Italians
4. Russians

1-38. As a result of the Korean War, it became apparent that American prisoners of war needed extensive training in which of the following skills?

1. Escape
2. Evasion
3. Resistance
4. Each of the above

1-39. During the Vietnamese war, which of the following recommendations of the Defense Advisory Committee of 1955 proved most effective for prisoners of war?

1. Code of Conduct
2. Training program
3. Security regulations
4. Escape and evasion strategy

1-40. During the Vietnam War, Vietcong prisoners were under the direct management of what country or organization?

1. United States
2. Great Britain
3. South Vietnam
4. International Red Cross

1-41. In 1973, approximately what total number of American prisoners of war returned from Vietnam?

1. 400
2. 500
3. 600
4. 700

1-42. What was reported as the most valuable quality exhibited by released American POWs?

1. Sense of honor
2. Heightened awareness of the meaning of life
3. Adjustment to cultural changes in America
4. Religious convictions

1-43. What advantage(s) did American prisoners of war imprisoned in Vietnam have over those held in Korea?

1. Higher overall education
2. Better advance training
3. Code of conduct
4. Each of the above

1-44. What branch of service developed the SERE school?

1. Navy & Marine Corps
2. Army
3. Air Force
4. Coast Guard

1-45. A sobering consequence of the Vietnam War is the number of military members still unaccounted for in what countries?

1. Vietnam
2. Cambodia
3. Laos
4. Each of the above

1-46. As of 28 June 2000, what total number of Americans is still missing and unaccounted for from the Vietnam War?

1. 989
2. 1,502
3. 2,014
4. 2,583
1-47. What factor is seen today as causing the “New Captivity”?

1. Nationalist wars in Africa
2. Arab/Christian conflicts
3. International Terrorism

1-48. Prior to what year were 80 percent of terrorist attacks against property, and 20 percent against people?

1. 1782
2. 1882
3. 1982
4. 1995

1-49. What leverage is lost in a terrorist hostage situation?

1. Communication capabilities
2. Red Cross access
3. Geneva Convention protections
4. Diplomatic intervention

1-50. Hostage taking, whether for a short or long duration, can cause what problems for the victims?

1. Inhumane treatment
2. Traumatic after effects
3. Medical complications

1-51. During the 1980’s, despite a slight decline in the total number or worldwide terrorist incidents, the percentage of attacks against people followed which trend?

1. Decreased to 50 percent; the rate of death decreased 13 percent
2. Increased to 50 percent; the rate of death increased 13 percent
3. Remained the same

1-52. Since 1982, approximately how many foreign nationals have been taken hostage by a variety of ideologically and politically committed terrorist groups?

1. 25
2. 50
3. 100
4. 200

1-53. During the 1980’s, the percentage of terrorists attacks against people increased by what percentage?

1. 30%
2. 40%
3. 50%
4. 60%

1-54. Regarding today’s terrorist activity, which of the following best describes the situation?

1. Hostages will be released unharmed
2. Hostage takers will admit defeat
3. Intimidated governments will acquiesce
4. Hostage taking of prisoners/hostages will remain a fact of international political life

1-55. Deaths of hostages, and death threats against them have typically taken place in response to which of the following?

1. To the economy
2. To the political climate
3. To the perceived need of the captor
4. To world events

1-56. Training to survive captivity has been developed out of what factors or actions?

1. Hard lessons of past scenarios
2. War gaming
3. Police actions
4. Political action groups
ASSIGNMENT 2


2-1. What emotions did CDR Sullivan feel for his captors initially?
   1. Disgust
   2. Hate
   3. Both 1 and 2, above
   4. Sympathy

2-2. What factor(s) gave hope to CDR Sullivan while in the POW camp?
   1. Religion
   2. Patriotism
   3. Family background
   4. Each of the above

2-3. What insight did CDR Sullivan eventually use in his role as director of the Navy’s SERE training program?
   1. SERE training is not a game
   2. Maturity is an important factor in survival
   3. Values needed to survive were acquired long before Navy enlistment
   4. Religious training is essential

2-4. How many years active duty did CAPT Mulligan have when he was shot down over North Vietnam?
   1. 18
   2. 21
   3. 24
   4. 25

2-5. What was the real name of the “Hanoi Hilton”?
   1. Bilibid
   2. Cabanatuan
   3. Davao
   4. Hoa Lo

2-6. What does CAPT Milligan consider his most valuable tool for survival?
   1. Family values
   2. The Code of Conduct
   3. Religious training
   4. A liberal education

2-7. For CAPT Milligan, what form of forgiveness became essential for his survival?
   1. Divine
   2. Human
   3. Global
   4. Personal

2-8. In 1971, for Vietnam War POWs, it seemed the politically smart course of action to not make an issue of the captor’s rules regarding which of the following topics?
   1. Working hours
   2. Ration allotment
   3. Worship services
   4. Shower times

2-9. Those who were imprisoned early in the Vietnam War noticed what difference in the later POWs captured?
   1. The younger ages
   2. Shift in cultural values
   3. Ethnic variance
   4. Shift in service branch
2-10. After release, how did CAPT Norrington characterize his debrief?

1. As a negative experience
2. It made him angry
3. It was helpful and purging
4. It was boring

2-11. What personal quality did CAPT Norrington feel most males do not acquire and yet is essential for emotional survival in captivity?

1. Teamwork
2. Accepting failure
3. Dependence
4. Patience

2-12. What life role, if any, helped each of the POW’s immensely in this stage of their careers?

1. As a father
2. As a mother
3. As a brother
4. None

2-13. What experience during COL Marvel’s initial confinement turned around his thinking?

1. A letter from his spouse
2. Helping a fellow pilot
3. Hearing the sound of an A-6 being shot down
4. Being released from solitary confinement

2-14. What information was referred to as the “Big Four” of the Code of Conduct?

1. Name, Rank, Service Number, Date of Birth
2. Name, Rank, Branch of Service, Date of Birth
3. Name, Religion, Service Number, Date of Birth
4. Name, Rank, Service Number, Marital Status

2-15. What, according to COL Marvel, was the most emotionally vulnerable area for each of the POWs?

1. Communication
2. Isolation
3. Family
4. Religion

2-16. What factor helped CAPT Coskey in finally accepting his state as a POW?

1. Communication with other prisoners
2. Recuperation from physical pain
3. Feeling release was relatively close
4. Passage of time

2-17. Which of the following “personal codes” helped VADM Martin to survive?

1. Absolute trust and faith in God
2. Absolute trust and faith in the family at home
3. Absolute trust and faith in his fellow prisoners
4. Each of the above

2-18. What scenario did most of the POW’s realize existed?

1. Win-win
2. No win
3. Win-lose
4. Lose-lose

2-19. As CAPT Coffee was floating in the ocean after his shoot down, who was his fantasy with?

1. Navy Seals
2. His wife
3. Fellow pilots
4. A War College professor
2-20. In what way was CDR Alvarez unique as a Vietnam POW?

1. Only Hispanic
2. Second longest period of captivity
3. Youngest pilot shot down
4. Not married

2-21. Who or what were the only companions CDR Alvarez had at the beginning of his confinement?

1. RVN military members
2. Rats
3. An Air Force major
4. His RIO

2-22. What traumatic experience did CDR Alvarez experience while in confinement?

1. Death of his mother
2. Loss of a limb by surgery
3. Divorced by his wife
4. Death of a fellow POW

2-23. CDR Halyburton, as an LTJG, had flown how many combat missions before his shoot down?

1. 15
2. 25
3. 50
4. 75

2-24. What stage of reflection finally helped CDR Halyburton to survive?

1. Retrospection
2. Future dreaming
3. Escape planning
4. Living in the present

2-25. COL Cherry had what distinction as a POW?

1. 1st USAF officer captured
2. 1st black to be captured
3. Evaded capture for the longest period of time
4. 1st POW to undergo a medical operation

2-26. VADM Stockdale had what distinction as a POW?

1. Most senior Naval officer
2. Shortest time in confinement
3. Longest time in solitary
4. Spoke Vietnamese

2-27. What was VADM Stockdale’s “secret weapon” for security?

1. The Bible
2. The Code of Conduct
3. Epictetus’ *Enchiridion*
4. Geneva Conventions

2-28. In the Japanese campaign account against the Philippines, how many chaplains were taken prisoner?

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4

2-29. Two Chaplains were interned at what college in Manila?

1. Santa Sophia
2. Santa Scholastica
3. Manila State
4. National War College
2-30. Chaplain Brewster relates that prisoners were transported to Cabanatuan in what type of vehicles?

1. Trucks
2. Half-sized boxcars
3. Helicopters
4. Boats

2-31. Which of the following was a common disease for POWs held in the Philippines during WW II?

1. Leprosy
2. Beri-beri
3. Cancer
4. Hepatitis

2-32. What POW kept a diary of this period in the Philippines?

1. Petty Officer Kentner
2. Major Hawkins
3. Gy Sgt Brown
4. LTJG O’Brien

2-33. Despite their lack of materials, what did the chaplains do that aided their fellow prisoners?

1. Petitioned Red Cross aid
2. Conducted services
3. Communicated with prison camp authorities
4. Applied medical procedures

2-34. Which US Naval ship was able to function for a while since the Japanese thought it was a derelict?

1. USS Holland
2. USS Canopus
3. USS Lexington
4. USS Coral Sea

2-35. For what reason did chaplains conduct religious worship services other than for strictly spiritual needs?

1. Denominational requirements
2. To maintain morale
3. Japanese requested it

2-36. Of the 1,639 prisoners transferred by boat from Formosa to Japan in January 1945, less than what number survived?

1. 100
2. 400
3. 600
4. 800

2-37. Of the four chaplains taken prisoner in the Philippines, which one survived?

1. Chaplain Brewster
2. Chaplain McManus
3. Chaplain Quinn
4. Chaplain Trump

2-38. At the POW hospital at Cabanatuan, POW’s died after being there what average number of days?

1. 5
2. 12
3. 19
4. 25

2-39. After repatriation, Chaplain Taylor ended his role as a chaplain in what manner?

1. As a pastor in Texas
2. As Air Force Chief of Chaplains
3. Was medically discharged
4. Left the ministry

2-40. What lesson(s) did Chaplain Minjares learn in his Escape and Evasion exercise?

1. Stay calm and be patient
2. Fatigue and hunger make everything difficult
3. Have confidence in your abilities
4. Each of the above
2-41. Which qualities strengthened each POW in their survival?

1. Family background
2. Religious training
3. Military bonding
4. Each of the above

2-42. For the families of the POWs, in addition to faithfulness and honor, what other value was necessary?

1. Consistency
2. Permanency
3. Constancy in adversity
4. Loyalty

2-43. Research into the effects of captivity was undertaken intentionally during which war?

1. WW II
2. Korean War
3. Vietnamese War
4. Desert Storm

2-44. The Family Studies Branch for Prisoner of War Studies was established in what year?

1. 1945
2. 1954
3. 1971
4. 1973

2-45. What is the title of the book co-authored by Jim and Sybil Stockdale?

1. *The Vietnam War*
2. *Family Survival Techniques*
3. *In Love And War*
4. *Our Story*

2-46. What behavior, as evolved by the POW’s, is needed by the family members of POWs?

1. Friends/family support
2. Communication
3. To initiate nurturing contacts
4. Each of the above

2-47. Following the shock of notification, how long did the spouses of Vietnam’s POWs remain in a “limbo” state?

1. One to two years
2. Three to four years
3. Five years
4. Six years

2-48. What percentage of the reunited POW families were divorced after one year?

1. 10%
2. 20%
3. 30%
4. 40%

2-49. What procedure can chaplains initiate to help support families in a POW situation?

1. Try to contact the victim through channels
2. Use the “system” for information
3. Give immediate and responsive assistance to the family
4. Contact support groups with the family information

2-50. What action did the National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Southeast Asia initiate?

1. Organized social activities for the families
2. Made contact with the media
3. Caused DoD and DoS officials to began to listen
4. Contacted the Geneva Convention
2-51. During this process, what great lesson was learned regarding family care?

1. Food, and clothing are a primary concern
2. Church/chapel support is essential
3. Programs need to be well planned, responsive, and quickly implemented
4. Financial aid is a big concern

2-52. What term describes the situations of POWs in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam?

1. Similar
2. Few similarities
3. Totally different
4. Each unique

2-53. What feelings are common to all POWs?

1. Loneliness
2. Sense of loss and abandonment
3. Despair
4. Each of the above

2-54. Based on studies, what factors need to be emphasized in training service members for survival?

1. Develop their will to resist
2. Encourage a sense of humor
3. Teach them stealth tactics
4. Teach them to understanding the psychological techniques of brainwashing
ASSIGNMENT 3


3-1. SERE stands for Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and what other term?
   1. Example
   2. Energy
   3. Escape
   4. None of the above

3-2. The SERE school discussed in this chapter was held in what state?
   1. North Carolina
   2. Maine
   3. Virginia
   4. California

3-3. An underlying assumption of the capture scenario is that once shot down the aircrew would have the opportunity to perform what action?
   1. Evasion
   2. Escape
   3. Retaliation
   4. Spying

3-4. Before they begin SERE training, students are told they will experience which of the following sensations?
   1. Capture shock
   2. Time disorientation
   3. Constant anxiety
   4. Each of the above

3-5. Students were informed that they would experience uncomfortable circumstances and sensations during the SERE training. When asked if this training experience prepared them for captivity, the majority of the former POWs gave what response?
   1. Absolute No
   2. Qualified No
   3. Absolute Yes
   4. Qualified Yes

3-6. Former POWs reported what part of SERE training benefited them most?
   1. Two-way communication
   2. Chain-of-command
   3. Concern for shipmates
   4. Discipline

3-7. For the families, which of the following was a lesson learned from the POW experience?
   1. Make sure that bills are paid
   2. Expect divorce papers while imprisoned
   3. The Red Cross will intervene in family affairs
   4. Prepare the family

3-8. During confinement, what was the greatest single shock to the POWs?
   1. Total isolation
   2. The transition
   3. Breaking under torture
   4. Guilt and depression
3-9. How was the Code of Conduct meant to be applied?

1. Rigidly  
2. Flexibly  
3. Moderately  

3-10. In resisting torture, the POWs decided to react in what manner?

1. To resist to the point of confusion  
2. To resist to the point of insensibility  
3. To offer misleading or useless information  
4. To allow going unconscious  

3-11. For the captor in the oriental environment of Vietnam, which of the following interrogation concepts was most important?

1. Being the most cruel  
2. Being the kindest  
3. Saving face with superiors  
4. Indoctrinating the captives  

3-12. Which of the following lessons did the POWs learn about enduring torture in captivity?

1. No consistent lesson was learned  
2. How much they could endure before breaking  
3. That they could recuperate  
4. Both 2 and 3 above  

3-13. The POWs learned the value of which of the following survival factors?

1. Consuming whatever nourishment was available  
2. Keeping physically fit  
3. Both 1 and 2 above  
4. Meditation  

3-14. To avoid boredom, POWs “kept busy” by performing what actions?

1. Going over their past lives  
2. Volunteering to work on the compound  
3. Writing letters  
4. Being friendly with their captors  

3-15. What thoughts or subjects did the POWs try to avoid thinking about?

1. Depressing thoughts  
2. Their captors’ habits  
3. Keeping track of time  
4. Their families  

3-16. POWs thought about which of the following subject or actions to usefully occupy their time?

1. War games  
2. Inventing products  
3. Insects  
4. Anticipating release  

3-17. The tap code devised by the POWs consisted of what other communication methods in addition to tapping?

1. Sweeping  
2. Spitting  
3. Coughing  
4. Each of the above  

3-18. The war did not cease with their capture, but what did change?

1. The Chain-of-Command  
2. The mode and front  
3. The goal  
4. The Code of Conduct  

3-19. Most authorities reject the term “brain-washing” in favor of what phrase?

1. Indoctrination  
2. Conversion  
3. Thought reform  
4. Re-orientation
3-20. A few POWs accepted the communist propaganda. What personal qualities allowed this acceptance?

1. Not being a Christian
2. Being a minority
3. Being from a Southern state
4. Having no firm convictions

3-21. What amount of time was required to adapt to the shock of capture?

1. Two weeks to two months
2. Four weeks to four months
3. Five weeks to five months
4. Six weeks to six months

3-22. What action or activity did the POWs find facilitated recovery from their initial shock?

1. Being released from isolation
2. Receiving good medical treatment
3. Sharing their experiences with a fellow POW
4. Starting a healthy exercise program

3-23. Which of the following was the most common POW reaction to the culture shock of repatriation?

1. Insomnia
2. Depression
3. Excessive drinking
4. Marital discord

3-24. Admiral Stockdale’s squadron was flying from what aircraft carrier?

1. Oriskany
2. America
3. Coral Sea
4. Abraham Lincoln

3-25. Admiral Stockdale’s shoot down occurred during what type of mission?

1. Aborted planned mission
2. Routine milk run
3. Surprise attack
4. Night mission

3-26. As he was descending in his parachute, Admiral Stockdale thought the Vietnam War would last what total number of years?

1. Five
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four

3-27. Admiral Stockdale felt that which of the following personality traits was the most important for students?

1. Honesty
2. Sincerity
3. Integrity
4. Piety

3-28. From his career on selection boards, Admiral Stockdale enumerates three criteria for promotion – two are formal and objective; what is the third?

1. Timely
2. Conscientious
3. Fair
4. Inclusive

3-29. Admiral Stockdale cites what factor as the death knell for a possible selectee?

1. Youth
2. Limited experience
3. Lack of integrity
4. Lack of aggressiveness
3-30. In relating the history of one of the POWs who collaborated with the enemy, what personality flaw did the Admiral identify in that POW?

1. Insincerity
2. Expediency
3. Immaturity
4. Obsession

3-31. In reflecting on their captivity, Admiral Stockdale and the other POWs cited what life long habit as being of great benefit to them?

1. Reflecting on personal matters
2. Establishing a ritual
3. Continuing physical exercise
4. Observing the chain of command

3-32. What great historical leader did Admiral Stockdale, while a POW, decide at one point he would emulate?

1. Gandhi
2. Socrates
3. Mohammed
4. Jesus

3-33. Admiral Stockdale gained a valuable contemplative survival tool during captivity by working to remember the details of what aspect(s) of his life?

1. Significant events and participants in his life
2. Events from cocktail parties
3. Insincere social contacts
4. Old school room activities

3-34. What emotion did Admiral Stockdale realize was very inefficient to harbor during confinement?

1. Jealousy
2. Envy
3. Hatred
4. Retaliation

3-35. From what source did Admiral Stockdale learn the value of POWs being united in prison to beat the enemy?

1. SERE training
2. Naval Academy classes
3. His own philosophical reflections
4. Former prisoners in Hoa Lo prison

3-36. Admiral Stockdale sees rules to live by arising from what individual sources or attitudes?

1. A healthy home experience and church participation
2. Honest commitments and a positive job ethic
3. Moral rectitude and sincerity
4. A classical education and an understanding of history

3-37. Which Old Testament book gave Admiral Stockdale comfort in prison?

1. Psalms
2. Genesis
3. Job
4. Isaiah

3-38. What professor gave Admiral Stockdale a copy of the *Enchiridion*?

1. Rhinelander
2. Goethe
3. von Braun
4. Churchill

3-39. Epictetus is in what school of philosophy?

1. Stoic
2. Realist
3. Surrealist
4. Christian
3-40. What classic statement did Admiral Stockdale identify as dangerous for POWs?

1. Better safe than sorry
2. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing
3. Might makes right
4. One day at a time

3-41. What experience from his youth was beneficial to Admiral Stockdale?

1. Menial labor
2. Theatrics
3. Debating society
4. Writing classes

3-42. What is Admiral Stockdale’s opinion about leadership?

1. It can be taught
2. It is innate
3. A combination of 1 and 2 above
4. It is dependent on the situation

3-43. The Enchiridion is which of the following?

1. Epictetus’ writings
2. Flavius Arrian’s summary of Epictetus’ philosophy
3. Excerpts from a larger work

3-44. Which of the following was NOT a goal of the Vietnamese captors?

1. Reprisal
2. Propaganda
3. Ransom
4. Ideological conversion

3-46. Which of the following is a common reason for terrorist activity?

1. A revolutionary effort to gain political control
2. An overt or covert political struggle with a system
3. A gesture used in isolation from any political effort
4. Each of the above

3-47. The Army definition of terrorism includes which of the following statements as a purpose for terrorist acts?

1. To influence an audience beyond the immediate victims
2. To gain access to political institutions
3. To prove the powerlessness of the military structure
4. To gain a financial goal

3-48. The term terrorism was officially identified/used in what century?

1. 17th Century
2. 18th Century
3. 19th Century
4. 20th Century

3-49. Which of the following is/are an element(s) of the repatriation process?

1. Physical examination
2. Debriefings
3. Media interest
4. Each of the above

3-50. What is the positive expectation of Combat Stress Control?

1. Full recovery
2. Anticipated future psychopathology
3. No marital stress
4. Financial security
3-51. Which of the following is NOT an element in the Army PIES formula?

1. Proximity
2. Intervention
3. Expectancy
4. Simplicity

3-52. The elements of the Air Force and Navy program for combat stress control are identified in which of the following mnemonic?

1. BICEPS
2. DICEPS
3. NICEPS
4. TICEPS

3-53. The intervention for treating Battle Fatigue is summarized in which of the following four letters?

1. Four Bs
2. Four Ds
3. Four Fs
4. Four Rs

3-54. What POW mental process has been shown to be a likely guarantee of survivability during captivity?

1. Exercising patience
2. Understanding the captor’s attitudes
3. Recovery of self-esteem
4. Practicing a religion
ASSIGNMENT 4

Textbook Assignment: Chapter 4, "Moral and Ethical Implications of Surviving Captivity," pages 4-1 through 4-24.

4-1. The 28 March 1988 amendment to the Code of Conduct included which, if any, of the following changes?

1. Made the Code applicable to hostage situations
2. Eliminated gender specific terminology
3. Included tenets of the Geneva Convention
4. None of the above

4-2. The Code of Conduct contains what total number of articles?

1. 5
2. 6
3. 3
4. 4

4-3. For Americans to survive long periods of captivity they must have which of the following beliefs and trusts?

1. Belief in American democratic institutions and concepts
2. Love of and faith in the United States and a conviction that the U.S. cause is just
3. Faith in and loyalty to fellow POWs
4. Each of the above

4-4. What action or belief does Article II of the Code require of the service member?

1. Never surrender voluntarily
2. Dedication to the principles of democracy
3. Determining methods of evasion
4. Loyalty to the Constitution

4-5. What action(s) does Article III of the Code require of the service member?

1. Continue to resist
2. Make every effort to escape
3. Not to accept parole or special favors
4. Each of the above

4-6. The Code makes special allowances for which of the following personnel?

1. Medical Personnel
2. Chaplains
3. I & 2 above
4. Public Affairs Officers

4-7. According to the Geneva Conventions, medical personnel and chaplains are considered what category of personnel, rather than POWs?

1. Non-combatants
2. Retained personnel
3. Non-military
4. Civilians

4-8. During peacetime, personnel detained by a hostile government should immediately request what action or information?

1. To be freed
2. Contact with U.S. or friendly embassy personnel
3. Contact with the Red Cross
4. Probable total time of retention
4-9. When lost or isolated in a hostile foreign country, if no state of armed conflict exists, U.S. military personnel should keep which of the following facts in mind?

1. The Geneva Convention offers them no protections
2. The civil laws of that country do not apply to them
3. They must act as combatants at all times
4. Each of the above

4-10. In a hostile foreign country in peacetime, which of the following actions could jeopardize a detainee’s status?

1. Refusing to answer captor’s questions
2. Breaking out of jail
3. Being aggressive to the captors
4. Refusing to eat

4-11. For captives, what factor is enhanced if held by terrorists vice held as a POW?

1. Probable release time shortened
2. Communication with media more available
3. Greater role in determining their own fate.
4. Less chance of torture

4-12. In a hostage situation, captives should avoid which of the following actions with their captors?

1. Praising them
2. Participating with them
3. Debating with them
4. Each of the above

4-13. Which of the following factors is impressed on the mind of personnel as soon as they enter military service?

1. Wait for promotions
2. Do the minimum to succeed
3. Don’t investigate another rating/MOS
4. Be in control

4-14. Which of the following lessons did Vietnam POWs pass on to the current military system?

1. The importance of rank in captivity
2. The importance of knowing your field of expertise
3. The value of a classical education
4. Obey the captors

4-15. What field of study forms the basis for the concept of Hermetic Transformation?

1. Anthropology
2. Biology
3. Alchemy
4. Zoology

4-16. Which of the following is a central idea of the concept of Hermetic Transformation?

1. Prisoners will change and break eventually
2. Hostages can endure any suffering
3. Better transmuted substances will result
4. Events will speed results

4-17. What other things or experiences can cause a Hermetic Transformation?

1. A football field
2. A deployed ship
3. A family at home
4. Each of the above

4-18. Which of the following POW experiences, if any, proved true in captivity?

1. Physical survival was a prerequisite for spiritual survival
2. Spiritual survival was a prerequisite for physical survival
3. Both 1 and 2, above
4. None
4-19. Which Biblical character gives us a model of experiencing the evils of suffering?

1. Isaiah
2. Job
3. Ezekiel
4. Baruch

4-20. The ethic of the Judeo/Christian culture enforces what attitude toward evil?

1. Man can overcome evil on his own
2. Evil is necessary
3. Evil only happens to bad people
4. Only God offers true freedom from evil

4-21. The words of what hymn helped LCDR Gaither during his captivity?

1. Rock of Ages
2. Gladly, the Cross I Bear
3. Amazing Grace
4. Holy God We Praise thy Name

4-22. Some POWs used which of the following activities to keep their minds busy?

1. Remembering birth dates of family members
2. Recalling vocabulary words from another language
3. Recalling speeches they had heard
4. Each of the above

4-23. What other avenues may a chaplain use to teach survivability?

1. Train a basketball team
2. Encourage long hikes
3. Promote reading programs
4. Stress chapel attendance

4-24. What message is worth repeating daily to emphasize the value of the chain of command?

1. Keep a neat and clean uniform
2. Participate in extra training
3. Practice mutual accountability with honor
4. Perform daily exercise

4-25. According to POWs, the tools for maintaining resistance to captivity and captors manipulation are available from what source?

1. Training programs
2. The Navy system
3. Within each person
4. The service academies

4-26. What classical studies will anchor a person’s understanding of the world?

1. Geography
2. Anthropology
3. Religion
4. Philosophy

4-27. Which of the following documents or agreements is NOT needed for legal and financial preparedness?

1. A will
2. Allotments
3. Pre-burial arrangements
4. Mutual agreement between spouses

4-28. What impression did Chaplain Hutcheson have of the welcome home program for Korean War prisoners?

1. Organized well
2. Very effective
3. Assembly line process
4. Too many centers
4-29. Who was Chief of Chaplain in 1973 when the Vietnam POW release took place?

1. John O’Connor
2. Ross Trower
3. Frank Garrett
4. John McNamara

4-30. What was the major difference between the Korean and Vietnam repatriation process?

1. Thousands versus a few hundred
2. All at once vice in waves
3. Vietnam process carefully orchestrated
4. Each of the above

4-31. Upon release, Vietnam POWs were flown to which of the following Air Force Bases?

1. Kadena AFB
2. Clark AFB
3. Hickham AFB
4. Osan AFB

4-32. POW families were not allowed to meet returning prisoners at the Air Force Base for what reason?

1. DOD financial restraints
2. AF security would be jeopardized
3. So “sensitive” information could be protected
4. Not all families could be contacted

4-33. According to the team of chaplains, what factor contributed immeasurably to a smooth and successful first phase of Operation Homecoming?

1. Meeting all the service chaplains two weeks before
2. A good mixture of denominational representation
3. Learning each other’s styles of ministry
4. A healthy rank structure

4-34. What other factor paid substantial dividends to Operation Homecoming for the chaplains involved?

1. Making homecoming duties their only duties
2. Setting up a chain of command for each service’s chaplains
3. Having a duty chaplain after scheduled conference times
4. Offering worship services each day

4-35. The chaplains offered the POWs what type of worship services?

1. Ecumenical
2. Faith-specific
3. Individual based
4. Counseling centered

4-36. What common chaplains role was also assigned to the chaplains in Operation Homecoming?

1. Coordinating the Welcome Home program
2. Being the bearer of bad news
3. Counseling those with substance abuse problems
4. Organizing Red Cross needs

4-37. Which of the following was a positive characteristic of returning POWs?

1. Their sense of humor
2. Their desire for worship services
3. Their physical and emotional strength
4. Their desire for camaraderie

4-38. During Operation Homecoming, POWs were most vulnerable to which of the following problems?

1. Medical
2. Legal
3. Family structure
4. Diet
4-39. A majority of POWs cited which of the following occurrences as happening to them while imprisoned?

1. Diminished ability to undergo torture
2. Deeply felt religious experiences
3. Enhanced hope for recovery
4. Inability to adjust to the food

4-40. While at the initial reception station, returning POWs often took which of the following initiatives?

1. Sought medical attention
2. Contacted their families
3. Conducted thanksgiving worship
4. Formed counseling teams

4-41. Upon their release, most POWs were determined to accomplish what type of goal(s)?

1. Material
2. Educational
3. Spiritual
4. Each of the above

4-42. For POWs with rigid religious convictions prior to imprisonment, what changes occurred?

1. They lost their faith altogether
2. They changed their faith denomination
3. They became more flexible and forgiving
4. They became more rigid

4-43. What was the most striking personal quality the chaplains noticed about the returning POWs?

1. Patriotism
2. Humility
3. Gratitude
4. Faith

4-44. After the initial group, the chaplains noticed what characteristic about the returning POW groups in Operation Homecoming?

1. More anxiety filled
2. More joyful
3. More relaxed and subdued
4. More medical problems

4-45. What were the “magnificent” qualities Chaplain Trower summarized about the returning POWs?

1. Kindness
2. Mutual support
3. Spirituality
4. Each of the above

4-46. What practical lessons for ministry can be applied as a result of the chaplains experiences with POW families?

1. Encourage chapel attendance
2. Make promises
3. Strengthen inner resources
4. Wait for people to come to you

4-47. Experiences in life can parallel captivity.

1. True
2. False

4-48. Participation in POW/MIA ceremonies requires sensitivity to what factors about those attending?

1. Former POWs possibly there
2. Children of current/former POWs/MIAs possibly there
3. Surviving spouses possibly there
4. Each of the above
4-49. According to Pollard, which form of terrorism, if any, seems to be rising disproportionately today?

1. Ethno-religious
2. Ideological
3. Single-issue
4. None of the above

4-50. What is the goal of single-issue guerilla movements in the US?

1. Destruction of the US government
2. Influence government
3. Establish a particular policy
4. Help a particular section of the population